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TO BE ALMOST LIKE WHITE: THE CASE OF SOON JA DU
Augustina Jhi-ho Chae, MA
University of Nebraska, 2002
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This is a case study of Korean Americans’ prejudiced attitudes toward African
Americans. To discuss this attitudes, I chose to examine the case of People o f the State
o f California v. Soon Ja Du. On the morning of March 16, 1991, Latasha Harlins, a
fifteen-year-old African American high school girl was shot in the back of the head by
Soon Ja Du, a fifty-one-year-old Korean liquor and grocery store owner after a fight.
This fight started by Soon Ja falsely accusing Latasha of shoplifting. In many ways,
Soon Ja Du’s negative attitudes represent a typical Korean American’s prejudice.
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PREFACE

For my thesis I selected the topic of Korean Americans’ prejudice toward African
Americans in historical perspective. Although several people had attempted persuasively
to discourage me from studying this topic, I decided to devote my time to understanding
the origins of the Korean Americans’ prejudice. In my more than half-a-century life
span, I have never met any Korean American who sees the African Americans’ skin tone
as beauty, strength, or a desirable image.

This has been a simple puzzlement to me. As

a first-generation Korean-American immigrant, who has spent more than half of my life
in the United States and who also has a beautiful, strong, and compassionate AfroKorean-American daughter, I have been much interested in understanding this puzzle. I
was and am quite sure that this study would help me grow intellectually as well as
spiritually.
I have encountered many difficult, unpleasant, annoying, and saddening incidents with
many Korean Americans—some are relatives or friends—who unconsciously displayed
their prejudice in unthinking words and/or behaviors. I have also seen similar displays in
many European Americans’ words and/or behaviors. In supermarkets, meeting places,
classrooms, and dinner tables, this type of words and behaviors have too frequently
caught my eyes and ears. I can only imagine what African Americans in this country go
through every time they encounter people who have prejudiced feelings against them.
One day, for example, a Korean friend called to compliment me on my daughter’s
beauty. She had seen my daughter in a shopping mall, and she was amazed how pretty
my daughter looked. Then she said that her skin color had become much lighter, as if her

light skin tone made my friend think my daughter became very pretty. She, undoubtedly
unconscious of what she was saying, sounded as if there is something wrong or
undesirable with my daughter’s dark skin.
It is these kinds of unconscious and unreflected suggestions, words, and actions of
Koreans’ negative attitudes toward African Americans that initially drew me to
investigate the sources. Many Koreans with whom I grew up and with whom I have been
acquainted in Korea and in the United States openly express their dislike and contempt
toward African Americans. It is a rare case to meet a Korean American who is not
racially prejudiced toward blacks.
I, however, would like to emphasize one important aspect of my study. My study is a
very small piece in Korean-American culture. Hence, my study on Koreans’ negative
attitudes toward African Americans does not represent a complete evaluation of Korean
culture.
I would like to thank Dr. Sharon E. Wood, the chairwoman of my thesis committee, for
encouraging me to study this topic. She was the first professor who gave me hope for
the possibility of my study. When I was not sure where I should be searching to
substantiate my thesis, Dr. Wood guided me to pursue this research on Korean
American’s prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans through ethnic and other
newspapers. She is one of those teachers who is not afraid of encouraging her students
to learn more, guides them without putting them down, and constantly looks for a way to
lead them to learn. I feel I am fortunate to have her guidance in doing my graduate
research.

I would also like to express my thanks to Dr. Lorraine M. Gesick for her time and
efforts in helping with this thesis. She has spent many hours in working with my paper
and critically reviewing it in terms of historical frame of reference. I felt her sincere
desire to help me—a non-native English speaker—write this paper less awkwardly.
Also, I would like to thank Dr. Frank Bramlett for bravely accepting to be on my
thesis committee when I asked him to be at the last minute. I really appreciate his help
with my research and his time in critically reading this thesis.
I would also like to thank University of Nebraska at Omaha Campus library staff,
particularly the Interlibrary Loan staff, for always kindly helping me find the various
resources I need for my research. They searched and found many books that would have
been ordinarily unavailable for me.
Several people also read this paper and offered me very constructive criticisms along
with many corrections on my clumsy English writing. I would really like to thank Lori
Brdicko, Susan Janzen, and Jeanne Henry for their many hours of reading and correcting
this paper.
Lastly, I would like to thank two Sogang University friends of mine for their
friendship: Agatha Chey (Sun Ja Park) and Jhin Ja Chung.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This is a thesis about the treatment of African Americans by many first-generation
Korean-American immigrants, particularly by Korean small shop owners in
predominantly African-American and Latino neighborhoods. Korean Americans’
prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans are neither infrequent nor simple. They
are multifaceted. Nor do all Korean Americans show the same degree of intensity and
depth in their aversion and contempt toward African Americans.

Some scholars have

attempted to explain the root causes of their prejudice, exploring Koreans’ monocultural
ethnic make-up, status obsession, class distinction, cultural difference, language problem,
ignorance, overwork, fear, aggressive materialism, historic dislike of blackness, media
racism, and U.S. military racism and U.S. economic and social structure. Depending
upon their emphasis of one or several factors that contribute to the attitudes, they see,
nonetheless, that the cause is complex.
In this paper, I argue that first-generation Korean-American immigrants have a
propensity to be prejudiced toward African Americans because of Koreans’ monocultural
ethnic pride, status obsession, and ignorance toward other cultures. These characteristics
manifest themselves in unsophisticated manners, unthinking behaviors, and unnecessary
clashes in race relations of many Korean Americans. Although many factors contribute
to Black-Korean conflict, much more important, however, is the decisive role that the
prejudice of individuals contributes to the clash.
To discuss this point, I chose to examine the case of People o f the State o f California
v. Soon Ja Du. On the morning of March 16, 1991, Latasha Harlins, a fifteen-year-old
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African American high school girl, went into Empire Liquor Market in South Central Los
Angeles to get some orange juice. A Korean liquor and grocery store owner, Soon Ja
Du, accused Latasha of shoplifting when Latasha stuck the $1.79 bottle of orange juice
in her backpack pocket. The fight between Latasha and Soon Ja followed. Soon Ja
grabbed Latasha and pulled her bag, and Latasha punched her face at least three times.
Soon Ja was knocked down on the floor and threw the chair to Latasha. Eventually, the
fight ended when Soon Ja killed Latasha by shooting her in the back of the head with a
.38 caliber revolver. One of the three Empire Liquor Market surveillance cameras
videotaped the entire incident from the time Latasha walked into the store until the police
entered the store. Soon Ja was arrested for the murder and tried in Superior Court of Los
Angeles County from September 30, 1991 through October 2 , 1991. On sentencing day,
November 15, 1991, the presiding Judge Joyce Ann Karlin suspended a ten-year prison
sentence of the jury’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter and placed Soon Ja on five
years probation.
In many ways, Mrs. Du’s negative attitudes represent a typical Korean-American
immigrant’s prejudice. Although the prejudice stands out more frequently in clashes
between Korean-American merchants and African-American customers, many non
merchant Korean Americans privately or publicly reveal their deep-seated contempt, fear, or
suspicions regardless of their education, occupation, and wealth. Maintaining limited
contacts, spreading, perpetuating, and rationalizing their stereotypical racial beliefs and
discriminatory practices, many Korean Americans share Mrs. Du’s attitudes toward African
Americans, refusing to recognize African Americans’ diversity. African Americans are not
all alike, just as Korean Americans are not. Mrs. Du’s presumption that all African
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Americans are lazy and uneducated thieves and immoral drug-addicts and alcoholics is
commonly talked about and believed among many Korean Americans. Some Korean
Americans even sound like racists of the nineteenth-century U.S. South.
This thesis has seven chapters. Chapter one introduces my methods the primary and
secondary sources I used for this study. Chapter two examines some scholars’ work on
the existence of Korean-American prejudice toward African Americans and attempts to
trace the early Korean-Americans’ attitudes toward African Americans in the written
records. Chapter three looks at the background of Korean Americans’ immigration
history, and Confucian values that influenced Korean-Americans’ prejudice.

Chapter

four explores Korean-American merchants’ choice of business locations and the history
of African Americans in South Central Los Angeles in relation to the Black-Korean
conflict. Chapter five examines and evaluates Soon Ja Du’s testimony and her prejudice.
Chapter six focuses on the Korea Times articles on the Du murder incident and the
Korean-American community’s stance on the incident. Chapter seven presents some
scholars’ interpretations of the Black-Korean conflict and my conclusion.
To understand the details and meaning of the Du murder case and Korean Americans’
prejudice, as primary sources, I examined the two transcripts of the Grand Jury
proceedings and the Criminal Court Trial proceedings of People o f the State o f
California v. Soon Ja Du and read most articles about the Du murder incident in the
Korea Times (Korean-language daily), Korea Times (English-language weekly), the Los
Angeles Sentinel, and the Los Angeles Times from March 1991 through March 1992.
Korea Times publishes two papers—one is daily in Korean and the other is weekly in
English. Although there were two other Korean ethnic newspapers in Los Angeles, the
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Oriental Daily (Dong a Ilbo) and the Central Daily (Joong-ang Ilbo), I was only able to
read the Korea Times, because the other two did not make their old newspapers available
to the public. I spent one month in the Korea Times office reading old worn out
microfilm dating from January 1991 to April 1992—just before the Los Angeles riots.
Also, I would like to make it clear that all quotes from the Korea Times (Koreanlanguage daily) in this thesis were translated into English by me.
When I called the Los Angeles Discovery Unit on October 14, 1998, an officer in the
unit informed me that the Empire Liquor Market surveillance camera videotape was
destroyed five months after the trial in accordance with police procedure. I then tried to
obtain it through ABC and other sources, but I could not get the tape until recently. Just
by luck, although it was not the entire tape, I was able to see most of it in Twilight Los
Angeles shown on PBS on April 22, 2001, in Omaha, Nebraska.1 This tape resolved
some questions I had on the incidents regarding Soon Ja Du’s shooting capability,
Latasha’s backpack, Latasha’s handing the orange juice bottle to Soon Ja Du, and
Latasha’s step toward the door.
Also, I found out that without Soon Ja Du’s written permission, the court would not
allow the public to see the probation officer’s report, the photos, and diagrams of the
crime scene. So I had to rely on the articles in the newspapers, supplemented with
secondary sources, and conversations with the newspaper reporters who were assigned to
the case, Deputy District Attorney Roxane Carvajal, and South Bureau homicideinvestigating officer assigned to the case, Jerry C. Johnson. Except for Tae-gi Moon, the
primary Korea Times (Korean-language daily) reporter for the case, whom I met in the
Korea Times conference room, I talked with the other reporters such as the Los Angeles
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Times reporters on the case, Jesse Katz and John Lee, on the phone. They were very
helpful. On the phone I also talked with Lou Cannon, the author of Official Negligence:
How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD, and he too was
very helpful.
On October 30, 1998,1 took a No. 81 bus to Ninety-second and Figueroa St. and
walked to the comer of Ninety-first Street where Empire Liquor Store used to be at the
comer. There was a new Mexican-American grocery store, Numero Uno, with a “Grand
Opening” sign. Its size, cleanliness, and well-stocked and moderately priced store
inventories resembled a Baker’s grocery store in Omaha. According to the store
manager, a very friendly but business-like Mexican man, after the murder the store had
been vacant until its new owner recently remodeled and opened a new business three
months previously.
Contrary to the pre-conceptions that my Korean friends had about the area, the area
was clean and did not appear to be dangerous. It was actually much cleaner than Korea
Town was. People I talked with around the area were friendly and asked me whether I
wanted to buy a business there since I appeared to be a Korean.
While I stayed in Los Angles from October 1 through November 1, 1998,1 also saw a
stage performance, “The Tragedy of the Bucket in a Closed Room.” The story is about a
love relationship and human spirit between Koreans and African Americans during the
1992 Los Angeles riots. It was performed at the Korean Community Cultural Center in
Korea Town. The actors and actresses consisted of African Americans and Korean
Americans, but the audience was predominantly Korean Americans.
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In studying the early Korean Americans’ feeling toward African Americans in
America, I reviewed diaries, autobiographical novels, and autobiographies written in
English. Also, I reviewed books, journals, and newspaper articles to find out when
Koreans’ initial contact with people of African descent in Korea occurred and how they
felt about them. I also wrote letters and received two letters from the U.S. military,
which showed the possible time frame of African Americans’ presence in Korea through
the military. However, because I was not very successful in locating any other written
resource that explored Koreans’ attitudes toward African Americans in a historical
perspective, I reflected my own lived experiences in examining and evaluating the
secondary sources I reviewed.
My secondary sources include books, dissertations, master’s theses, newspaper
articles, and journals that related Korean American’s attitude toward African Americans.
In discussing Koreans’ predisposed characteristics that influence them to be anti-black,
this paper focuses on several arguments presented by some scholars. In addition, I
reviewed Korean history, Korean Americans’ immigration history, and African-American
history to understand further the current clash between Korean Americans and African
Americans.
In this thesis, however, I attempted to explore neither the legal aspects of the Du
murder incident nor the political aspects of the case. Nor did I include the prejudice of
Judge Joyce Karlin and white racism. Nor did I include the African-American prejudice
toward Korean Americans. As a result, this paper in regard to the case only deals with
the Korean-American prejudice toward African Americans and the time frame of the
incident from the day the incident first appeared in the Los Angeles Times, March 17,
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1991, through November 15, 1991, the day Judge Joyce Karlin handed down the sentence
on Soon Ja Du.
In this thesis, I am not saying that Koreans are the only ones with racial problems or
that Koreans have more prejudices than other ethnic groups. Many ethnic groups have
shown their racial prejudices toward people of African descent. Some people acquired
the American racial prejudice after they immigrated to the United States, others came
with the prejudice, and the others probably fell between the two groups. Although some
immigrants had not originally had prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans, they
developed such attitudes as they became acculturated to American racial prejudice.
Others did not need American acculturation to strengthen their prejudiced attitudes that
they brought from their homeland. The others who fell between the two had their
prejudiced attitudes further reinforced by American acculturation when they moved to the
United States.
For instance, James W. Loewen in The Mississippi Chinese. Between Black and White
describes how some 1,200 Chinese in Mississippi made the transition from relatively
unprejudiced racial attitudes to anti-African-American prejudice. According to Loewen,
the 1,200 Chinese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries lived in an AfricanAmerican neighborhood, and some twenty to twenty-five percent of them had either
African-American wives or mistresses because they needed African Americans’ aid in
running their grocery stores in the community. But change from the relatively prejudicefree attitudes into American race prejudices took place when the Chinese could not get
the privileges associated with white skin unless they ended their ties with African
Americans. To send their children to white schools, to move into white areas, and to
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move up to higher social status, the Chinese in Mississippi moved away from the
African-American community, disassociated from them, and shunned those Chinese who
were married to African Americans.2
Also, Noel Ignatiev in How The Irish Became White explains how the American value
system of white skin made the Irish immigrants who, in their homeland, had objected to
racial oppression become oppressors of African Americans in the United States.
Ignatiev credits this transformation to the American acculturation—the overriding value
of white skin. To obtain the white privileges, the Irish chose to discard their previous
value and practiced the new value—the American racial order.3
As many other races have rationalized and legitimized their prejudices against African
Americans based on this phenomenon, so have many Korean Americans defended their
anti-African-American feelings and actions. They argue that there is nothing wrong with
their prejudiced attitude because every other ethnic group took advantage of African
Americans by using them as a stepping stone and treating them as inferior. But Koreans’
persistently narrow worldview, compounded by their ignorance of other cultures and their
cocky racial superiority, can make Koreans’ prejudices against African Americans rise to
a dangerous racial crisis.
Additionally, the Korean Americans that I am talking about are the first and older
generation of Korean immigrants. The second and younger generation Korean
Americans may have a different attitude toward African Americans that they meet in
schools and in their professional fields, even though their parents, in forming their
negative racial attitudes, may have influenced them. My study does not include them.
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Many Korean Americans will undoubtedly disagree with many of my observations
and interpretations. Although I did not intend to embarrass or hurt any Korean
Americans, some may feel hurt or offended. Or perhaps some will agree with me and
feel less defensive about what this thesis presents. Moreover, my analysis and findings
are not final. As more research becomes available, I hope, someone can revise my thesis.
Most scholars and journalists agree that the Du murder incident played an important
role in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, adding fuel to the destruction of many KoreanAmerican owned stores. Many compare the Du incident with the Rodney King incident
and see the Du incident as a prelude to the riots. About thirteen days prior to the Du
murder incident, March 3, 1991, an unarmed African-American motorist, Rodney King,
was brutally beaten 56 times by four white Los Angeles police officers. An amateur
cameraman, George William Holliday, videotaped the King beating incident. Both
incidents were videotaped, and both victims were unarmed. What is more significant is
that the defendants in both incidents got off easy in the court system.4 Most African
Americans perceived the “no-prison” sentence in the Du case and the “not guilty” verdict
in the King case as a clear-cut example of an unjustifiable dual justice system and a
manifestation of racism practiced against them. These two decisions frustrated, angered,
and outraged them. This widespread distrust and resentment over the American justice
system came to a crisis point on April 29, 1992, when the Simi Valley jurors acquitted
the four white police officers who beat King on March 3, 1991. During the riots, ABC
had replayed the Du store’s surveillance videotape along with the riot scenes. Some
scholars argued that ABC-TV’s repeated showing of the videotapes of Du’s shooting
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Latasha and the officers’ beating King effectively stimulated rioters’ looting and
destroying of Korean-American stores.
The Du murder incident also marked a beginning of new awareness in race relations.
It forced Korean-American merchants to be more aware of the need to have better
relations with African Americans for their economic survival. Their fear of African
Americans’ boycotts, physical violence, demonstrations, and verbal attacks all required
them to become more self-conscious about explicitly expressing anti-black prejudice.
Although Korean American’s awareness of their racial problem did not start with the Du
murder incident, their much increased efforts to improve on the race relations with
African Americans after the incident are clearly and publicly evidenced in newspaper
articles, church programs, joint-agency meetings, scholarship fund drives, political
campaign-fund donations, cultural exchange programs, athletic activities, and joint-town
meetings.
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Notes
1 Anne Deavere Smith and Marc Levin, Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992 (New York: Thirteen/WNET,
Educational Broadcasting Corporation, 1999).
2 James W. Loewen, The Mississippi Chinese: Between Black and White (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1971).
3 Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995).
4 See Lou Cannon, Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the
LAPD (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 20-50.
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CHAPTER TWO
FUZZY FIRST IMPRESSIONS
Many Koreans show a great deal of pride in their monocultural ethnic make-up.
Such a pride in their belief that they are an ethnically pure and homogeneous people
quickens their expression of emotional protest when it is challenged.

Faithfully

tracing a common ancestral bloodline far into ancient times, the myth of Tan’gun,
“ancestor of Koreans,” they appear to be instinctively ready to defend their belief even
before anyone actually challenges it. According to legend, Tan’gun was a son bom of
a union between a man who descended from heaven and a female bear who became a
woman after eating twenty cloves of garlic and some sacred plants while avoiding the
sunlight for one hundred days. This legend put the beginning of Korea, Old Choson—
Choson means “morning calm”—that Tan’gun founded, in the third millennium B.C.,
some five thousand years ago .1
As for understanding and dealing with other peoples, this pride of having one
culture, one language, and one ethnicity limits Koreans from broadening their views
about other peoples. Unfortunately, it also strengthens their prejudiced views,
insensitivity, and defensiveness toward other peoples. Most detrimentally, this pride
breeds conflicts with other peoples.
Some historians and others have observed this chin-up pride in the Korean nation’s
“pure and homogeneous” ethnic bloodline. For instance, Bruce Cumings in Korea’s
Place in the Sun, likened Koreans’ ethnocentric attitudes to Europeans’ ethnocentric
superior attitudes discussed by J. M. Blaut in The Colonizer’s Model o f the World:
Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History2 In contrast to the common belief
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that Korea is one of the most homogeneous nations in the world with a single culture,
ethnicity, and language, Cumings contends that Koreans’ homogeneity is not absolute
and their bloodlines are not pure .3 This relative homogeneity means neither absolute
purity of bloodlines nor superiority over people with mixed cultures, ethnicities, and
multi-languages. Yet many Koreans not only erroneously believe in the myth of
Tan’gun, but also ignorantly think that this relative homogeneity gives them some sort
of advantage over less homogeneous peoples. Against this belief, Cumings argues that
modern Koreans are mixtures of Japanese, Chinese, Manchu, Mongolians, Russians,
Europeans, and many other East and Central Asian ethnicities.4
At the heart of the race conflict lies Koreans’ belief that a homogeneous lineage
gives them an advantage over multiethnic peoples. Jan Sunoo, a Korean-American
mediator with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the Los Angeles City
Human Relations Commission, observes how “this relative homogeneity” incites the
conflict.

In his attempt to illuminate the causes of the current conflict between African

Americans and Korean Americans, Sunoo explains that Koreans’ national history limits
them in understanding race relations in a multiethnic society. The belief in a
homogeneous lineage from Tan’gun held by many Koreans sometimes arouses an air of
superiority toward “less powerful peoples.” In Sunoo’s observation, this belief,
combined with their inexperience of multi-ethnic peoples, compounds problems of race
relations for Koreans in a multiethnic society. Depicting Koreans as “babes in the
woods” of a multi-cultural society, Sunoo sees Koreans’ lack of exposure to different
cultures, particularly to African-American culture, as imprisoning them in their own
prejudices.

This prejudiced attitude in many ways provokes the conflicts.5
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This prejudiced attitude among Koreans has recently attracted some scholarly
discussion. Although some scholars observed Koreans’ prejudiced tendency before the
1992 Los Angeles riot, many have ignored, hidden, or denied the existence of this
inclination. Some have even tried to present it as unimportant. But the riot changed
the trend among Korean scholars. For the first time, in many ways, it forced Korean
Americans not only to acknowledge the existence of the prejudiced attitude but also to
view it in the context of race relations in America.
Supporting evidence of Koreans’ prejudiced attitude toward African Americans
comes from some scholars like Nancy Abelmann and John Lie, Pyong Gap Min, Ella
Stewart, and Edward Tea Chang.

In Blue Dreams. Korean Americans and the Los

Angeles Riots, Abelmann and Lie have pointed out Korean Americans’ general
tendency to see African Americans in “unflattering stereotypes.”6 Quoting the
founding statement of the Korean-American Research Center (KARC),7 Abelmann and
Lie give evidence of Koreans’ recognition of their own prejudiced attitude toward
African Americans. Although the founding statement of the KARC blamed the
American ruling class’s racism for Koreans’ attitudes, nonetheless, it acknowledged that
Koreans already had a tradition of racism and recognized the problems arising from the
conflicts between African Americans and Korean Americans that were caused at least
partially by this prejudiced tendency. The statement, moreover, defines what
constitutes Koreans’ problem of prejudice and pinpoints the origin of the problem.
While the KARC defined the Korean Americans’ prejudice as their cocky superiority to
African Americans and Latinos despite a willing acceptance of inferiority to whites, it
viewed Korean Americans’ rejection of minority consciousness coming from their

15

feeling of racial or cultural superiority originating from their homogeneous ethnic
pride.8
The Korean-American Sociologist, Pyong Gap Min, goes further in proving the
existence of Korean’s prejudice against African Americans. In examining the extent of
Koreans’ prejudice in Caught in the Middle: Korean Merchants in America’s
Multiethnic Cities, Min stated that the results of his 1992 New York City survey did not
surprise him. The survey revealed that over sixty percent of Korean merchants in the
survey not only viewed African Americans as less intelligent, generally lazier, less
honest, and more criminally oriented than they did whites, but also admitted that they
had been rude to African-American customers. From his survey data, Min suggested
that the overwhelming majority of Korean merchants in African-American
neighborhoods showed more prejudice against African Americans than whites did.
Additionally, he stated that most Korean merchants viewed African Americans’ poverty
mainly caused by their own “cultural deficiencies.”9
Similarly, Ella Stewart in her master’s thesis, “Ethnic Cultural Diversity: An
Interpretive Study of Cultural Differences and Communication Styles Between Korean
Merchants/Employees and Black Patrons in South Los Angeles,” confirms the negative
attitudes of Korean-American merchants toward their African-American customers. In
explaining their communication problems with their customers, eighty-five percent of
Korean-American merchants put the blame on African-American customers’ lack of
sufficient education and “low intelligence level.” Some Korean-American merchants
even stated that “Lincoln should have never freed the slaves” or ccthey have small brains
like alligators.” 10 Utilizing direct observations, survey questionnaires, and face-to-face
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interviews, Stewart observed that most Korean-American merchants acknowledged
Mexican Americans sooner after entrance into their stores and watched them less than
they did African-American customers.11 Furthermore, her observations revealed that
most merchants followed their African-American customers around the store with their
eyes or even physically, did not welcome them with smiles or greetings, and put the
change on the counter rather than in the customer’s hands.
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Another Korean-American Sociologist, Edward Tea Chang, recognized Koreans’
tendency to look down on African Americans.

In his doctoral dissertation, ccNew

Urban Crisis: Korean Black Conflicts in Los Angeles,” Chang argues that Korean
Americans’ “negative images” of African Americans was a learned perception
reinforced by the Korean-American media and the Korean Americans’ ignorance of
African-American history. These images portrayed all African Americans as criminals,
welfare recipients, drug addicts, lazy, and jobless individuals. According to Chang,
prior to leaving Korea, Koreans got the images from American movies, television
shows, and American Forces Korea Network in Korea.

Then, in the United States,

Korean Americans with these images became more afraid of African Americans. Their
negative images were intensified, magnified, and reinforced by the Korean-American
media, which frequently reported some African-American criminals’ violent acts
against Korean immigrants in a sensational manner.

Since most first-generation

Korean Americans get their information from Korean language newspapers, television
programs, and radio broadcasts because of their language barriers, these media exert an
overwhelming influence on the shaping of these images. Linking Koreans’ reported
fear of African-Americans’ criminal violence to their physically stronger and more
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powerful appearance, Chang points out the media’s contribution to the deepening of
Koreans’ negative attitude toward African Americans.13
From an African-American point of view, Jonathan Rieder, a journalist with The
New Republic, suggests that Koreans’ racist attitudes, which are deeply embedded in
Korean ethnocentrism, contribute to African Americans’ frustration and anger. In his
July 2, 1990, article, “Trouble In Store,” Rieder illustrates how Koreans’ ethnocentrism
and racist attitudes contributed to the conflict between African Americans and Koreans.
In this article, he interviewed a Korean man who was afraid to step outside the house
because he feared African Americans. During the interview, the man described his first
day in America as one that was filled with fear and contempt of African Americans.
The man stated that he got an idea that all African Americans were dangerous and dirty
from watching American films and from his experience with black soldiers in South
Korea before he left the country.14

This interview further explains how much news

media and films globally propagate negative prejudice against African Americans.
Rieder gives examples of Koreans’ “brusque,” rude, and disrespectful behaviors—
reluctant smiles, dropping change on the counter to avoid any physical contact, avoiding
direct eye-contact, avoiding answering any questions, yelling, and presumptuous
treatment of all blacks as shoplifters, lazy welfare recipients, alcoholics, and drugaddicts.15
Too many African Americans, especially ones in the poor inner city, have witnessed
Korean Americans’ disrespectful, rude, and arrogant gestures, looks, and voices that
belittle their humanity. And they resented these behaviors of Korean Americans.
Most of all, Korean Americans’ intense suspicion and scrutiny aroused African
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American customers’ anger.

Korean Americans’ quick and erroneous presumption

that all African Americans shoplift not only unmistakably displays an insult to African
Americans’ humanity but also raises a business question.
Why would Korean-Americans open stores where all customers are black if they
believe that all African-American customers shoplift? Profit would be impossible, and
their stores would not last more than few days. Yet many Korean-American merchants
opened stores in South Central Los Angeles beginning in the 1970s. As a result,
prejudices clashed more frequently, and often incited and magnified conflicts between
Korean-American merchants and African-American customers.
Prejudice means different things to different people. In this thesis, however, it means
exactly the same as the word “ethnocentrism” defined by Robert A LeVine and Donald T.
Campbell in Ethnocentrism: Theories o f Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior.
These two sociologists define ethnocentrism: “in the most naive form a person
unreflectively takes his own culture’s values as objective reality and automatically uses
them as the context within which he judges less familiar objects and events.” 16 So, too,
are Koreans’ prejudices against people of African descent viewed in this context. Have
Koreans always had racial prejudice against those of African descent or those with black
skin? Not all Koreans have shown prejudice against blacks, and it is arguable that the
prejudiced tendency appears to be the product of recent times.
It is not an easy task, however, to trace Koreans’ historical encounters with Africans.
From ancient times until the late nineteenth century, written source materials are extremely
hard to find, if they exist at all. Yet, during this period, some indirect evidence hints that a
very few Koreans had probably met Africans or people with dark skin. These indirect
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indications come from some Chinese written descriptions of meeting Africans as well as
from stories in Korean legends and histories of Korean Buddhism and Korean trading
activities in the South China Sea.
For many centuries, Korean people have been dominated and shaped by Chinese
culture, which continued from ancient times until the early twentieth century. In
particular, Koreans emulated the Chinese attitude of seeing all foreign people as
“barbarians.”

In this respect, although no written records were found to substantiate

Koreans’ impressions of people of African descent in the pre-modem period, Chinese first
impressions perhaps suggest some indication of what Koreans’ first impressions might
have been.
Although Chinese thought all outsiders “barbarians,” some Chinese written records
reveal that they treated Africans according to social status. As in many pre-modern
societies, social status rather than skin color determined a person’s importance and
worth, as it did in Chinese society during this period. Examining the meaning of the
“Kunlun” slave in the Chinese literature, Philip Snow in The Star Raft. China’s
Encounter with Africa, argues that Chinese did not link skin color to the Kunlun slaves’
status. By the fourth century, according to Snow, the meaning of “kunlun” changed
from first a primeval chaos, then to a frontier tribe, then to a magical western mountain
to then the dusky seafaring peoples of Southeast Asia.

By the T’ang (A.D. 618-907)

and Song (A.D. 960-1279) dynasties, however, the meaning changed again to refer to
the African slaves brought to China by the Arab traders. These changes suggest that
“Kunlun” slave’s social status rather than skin color placed them to be inferior or
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contemptible. According to Snow, most Chinese neither viewed all Africans as slaves
nor connected skin color to a symbolic inferiority.

1 *7

Snow approximates China’s first contact with Africans in the middle of the sixth
century, although some Chinese scholars place a possible encounter much earlier in time,
going all the way back to the Han dynasty (202 B.C. to A.D. 220).18 While an encounter
between these two peoples in the Han dynasty was quite conceivable in view of the early
trading relations through Arab traders who established a trading port in Canton as early as
300 A.D .,19 Snow marks the point of their contact in the middle of the sixth century based
on Kosma’s Universal Christian Topography (A.D. 545), in which Kosma talked about
Ethiopian and Chinese traders in Ceylon, Buddhist Fa Xian’s two years memoirs of Ceylon
(A.D. 414), and Du Huan’s Record o f My Travels, which he wrote after he returned to
China (A.D. 762).20 Du’s travel record, according to Snow, is the first written record of a
Chinese and African encounter.21
By the ninth century, according to Snow, the educated Chinese knew much about the
African continent—its wildlife, its products, its society, and its people. As Arab traders
increased their energetic trading activities in the South China Sea, many Chinese writers
became more interested in writing about Africa. They talked about many African trade
products such as ivory, ambergris, rhinoceros horns, fragrant timber, and spices that were
exchanged for Chinese silk and porcelain.22

Supporting this trading relationship between

Africa and China with recent archaeological findings, Snow asserts that Chinese writers
during the T’ang and Song dynasties drew African maps, described its landscapes and wild
animals, and wrote about African society and people.23 Chinese geographers and
chroniclers between the tenth and fourteenth centuries had fairly good knowledge not only
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of the “the northern regions of the Horn of Africa, but also the region south of Cape
Quardafiii and Ras Hafim.”24 An African continent map drawn by the Chinese appeared
in Korea in 1402.25
Moreover, Snow traces Arab traders’ introduction of African slaves to the Song court in
977, based on the Chinese court records which described the African slaves with
“deep-socketed eyes and black bodies” and called them “Kunlun” slaves.26 From these
records, he places the approximate time of African slaves’ presence between the eighth and
tenth centuries.

on

Initially, the Chinese viewed African slaves with curiosity as people different from
themselves and treated them as a novelty. In the short stories of the T ang period, these
African slaves appeared as “physically strong, unfailingly heroic, resourceful, magical, and
mysterious.”28 Despite this initial favorable description, by the early twelfth century the
Chinese had changed their perception from “fictional glorification to realistic competitiondriven name-callings,” although they were still “accomplished divers” who could “caulk
ships under water” and work as “doorkeepers.” By the twelfth century, because many rich
Arab and Chinese residents in Canton owned Kunlun slaves, they were seen daily in
Canton and were no longer a novelty there.

Seeing them daily and competing with them

for the same jobs, many Chinese called them “savages” and “devil servants.”29
Fortunately, the twelfth century-Cantonese negative perception of the African slaves
neither spread to other parts of China nor encompassed all Africans in general. The
African slave trade did not thrive in China. Most Chinese probably could not afford any
African slaves nor could they make profits in the slave trading business venture, for China
had plenty of its own inexpensive and efficient slaves.30
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Nor were all Africans in China in the twelfth century and after ill-treated. As was
attested in the case of the emissaries of Zengdan, the status-oriented Confiician Chinese
treated Africans according to their social status. For instance, the Song emperor treated the
emissaries of Zengdan, a land of the blacks who had visited China in 1071 and 1081-83,
with honor. “Their leader, Zengjiani, was accorded a Chinese title, Lord Guardian of
Prosperity.” During his second visit, the emperor arranged boats to facilitate his trip to the
capital, and “lavished on him, in recognition of his long journey, gifts that included 2,000
ounces of white gold.”31
Unlike the Chinese literature and court records of T’ang and Song dynasties, Korean
records do not seem to reveal much of their encounters with African people. Despite
their silence, however, it appears reasonable to think that the encounters did occur, or if
not, some Koreans most certainly saw the Chinese-African encounters or just saw
Africans from a distance before the pre-modem period. From legends, historical
records of Buddhism, trading activities, emigration, and travel to China, a clue of
Koreans’ first impression of people of African descent can be drawn. Even the
pervasive silence perhaps reveals Korean attitudes toward people with dark
complexions.
Like the Chinese, Koreans in ancient and medieval times did not appear to think that
a person’s skin color determined that person’s importance and value. Koreans’
attitudes toward people with dark complexions were clearly delineated in some legends
involving Indians. Though their histories are different, because Africans and Indians
share dark skin, Koreans’ impressions toward dark-complexioned Indians represent
their attitudes toward people with dark complexion in general. In Samguk Yusa
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(Legends and history of the Three Kingdoms of Ancient Korea), Ilyon, a Buddhist
monk in thirteenth century Korea,32 wrote about a legend of a Korean king’s wedding to
an Indian princess in the first century A.D. Connected to this legend, even today, the
Indian princess’ tomb and the stone pagoda that she supposedly brought to Korea
survive in Kimhae in Korea.33
In the pre-modem period, Koreans met people with much darker complexion than
their own through Buddhism.
372, they met Indian monks.

Since Buddhism was first introduced into Korea in A.D.
Ki-baik Lee in A New History o f Korea notes

Buddhism’s vital role in Korean history. In his explanation, he mentions that many
eminent Korean monks made the journey to India to study Buddhism. From Record o f
a Journey to the Five Indian Kingdoms, Lee cites Hyech’o’s trip to India.34 Also, N.
M. Pankaj in “Indo-Korean Cultural Relations: A Survey” points out that several
Korean monks visited India and stayed there for a lengthy time to study Buddhist texts
and to take pilgrimage to sacred Buddhist places, while some Indian monks came to
Korea to teach Koreans Buddhism. Koreans’ attitudes toward these “dark foreigners”
appeared to be respectful.

'X

^

Their skin color apparently did not create a negative

impression.
In addition to Buddhism’s role in Korean history in the pre-modem period, several
historians remark upon Korea’s trading activities in the South China Sea.

Korea’s trading

relationship with Arab merchants goes back to the Three Kingdom period (37 B.C.-A.D.
669).36 By the tenth century, Korea sent its trading ships to the South China Sea and
exchanged Koryo dynasty (918-1392)'s leathers and furs with Arab spices and medicines.37
In discussing increased Japanese piracy on the South China Sea as one of the possible
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contributing causes of the Ming dynasty’s declining interest in keeping up with the Song
dynasty’s naval power, C. R. Boxer, in The Christian Century in Japan. 1549 -1650,
mentions Korean sailors’ activities in the South China Sea at the turn of the fifteenth
century. During this time, the Portuguese had engaged in very active trade with China in
the South China Sea. They were also known to have had black slaves working on their
ships.38 This indicates that Korean sailors must have seen or heard about the Portuguese
black slaves. In addition, Hiroshi Wagatsuma in his article, “The Social Perception of
Skin Color in Japan,” mentioned in a note that there is a document from the 1670s that
made a reference to a black person of seven feet who was captured during the Korean war
[Hideyoshi’s invasion of 1590s] and brought over to Japan.39
From 1650 until the end of the isolation policy in 1880, although Korea forbade
foreigners to enter the country, Korean elites probably knew about the existence of the
African continent. Through exchanging envoys, studying abroad, trading activities, and
through emigration activities with China, some Koreans probably conversed with
foreigners and obtained information on Africans and knowledge of maps of the continent.
The first written record of a Korean encounter with African Americans seemed to be
found in Yun Chi-ho ’s Diary40 written in the late nineteenth century. From 1888 to 1893,
Yun Chi-ho studied at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, and at Emory
College in Oxford, Georgia. While he was studying in these Southern colleges, he visited
several African-American churches (both Baptist and Methodist),41attended lectures given
by African-American preachers and intellectuals, met some working African Americans
such as a cobbler and waiter personally, and frequently visited what he called a pauper
asylum. Yun Chi-ho’s diary reveals that his attitude toward African Americans was
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neither contempt nor fear.

He was in fact sympathetic toward them and their sufferings.

He not only hated to see the after-effects of slavery but also criticized the incongruency of
American Christians’ racial prejudice with the spirit of Christ and the inconsistency of
American doctrine of the “inalienable right of man” applied to non-white persons.42
Yun Chi-ho arrived in Nashville, Tennessee, on November 4, 1888. On his way to
Nashville, he had experienced racism himself. In Kansas City he was refused a room in a
hotel because he was an Asian (“a China man”); he slept at the railroad station.43 At
Vanderbilt University, he observed the white students’ debate about colonization of all
African Americans. It was not easy for him to understand how a large number of people
in such a strong and powerful position felt threatened by such a small number of weak and
powerless people.

His first-hand observations of American racism soon after the end of

Reconstruction in the South were broad as well as keen. He not only watched how some
white Americans treated African Americans who worked around the campus, but also
listened to their derogatory comments toward African Americans while he was traveling
through many small towns in the South.
Yun’s observation of African Americans seems to come from his personal involvement
with them. His own feelings of powerlessness, isolation, and exclusion from American
society perhaps made him feel at ease with and close to African Americans.

In his diary,

he complimented them for not using profanity44 and for being warm. He even shook
hands with the waiter’s wife when he was invited in to George’s house (waiter).

He

wrote that this was the first time he had shaken hands with a black lady, and commented
that she had rather handsome features.45 He and his friends also frequently visited the
Newton County Poor Farm, a pauper asylum. During his visits, he noted that the asylum
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was occupied predominantly by African-American inmates and their condition was
miserable. Yun and his friends sang, talked, and prayed with the inmates 46
Some autobiographies, autobiographical novels, novels, and oral history essays written
by Koreans in the English language evidence similar sympathetic, friendly, and neighborly
relationships between African Americans and Koreans in the early immigration period.
These written records show that early Korean-American immigrants got along well with
African Americans as neighbors and friends. According to these records, African
Americans not only accepted Koreans into their neighborhoods, but also helped them to
adjust to American life while most whites barred Koreans from living in their
neighborhoods.
Younghill Kang, in his autobiographical novel East Goes West, depicts his experience
of white rejection and African-American acceptance of Koreans in Harlem during the early
twentieth century.47 In her autobiography, Quiet Odyssey, Mary Paik Lee recalled
growing up with and working with African-American friends in early twentieth-century
California.

She ended her story by saying that “I attend a church regularly where most of

the members are black, because it is there I feel most comfortable/

A novel, Clay

Walls, also portrays a similarly friendly and neighborly relationship between African
Americans and Korean Americans in the early immigration period.

Describing many

early Korean Americans’ experiences of the frustration and indignation caused by
American racism against Asians (“Orientals”) in housing, schools, military, and jobs, the
author, Ronyoung Kim delineates how the children of the principal character, Haesu,
played with African-American children on the streets of their shared neighborhood. Her
sons, Harold and John, “talked jive” and her daughter, Faye, became a good friend with an
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African-American girl. Their relationship to one another was built neither on racial
differences nor on color distinctions.49
After World War II ended, the United States military occupied South Korea from
1945 to 1948. Several scholars thought that Koreans would not have seen African
American servicemen before 1948 because there would have been no African-American
servicemen stationed during this period. But the Directory and Station List of the
Adjutant General’s Office shows U.S. Army African-American units stationed in Korea
beginning in 1945.50 Although the exact number of African-American men stationed in
Korea is not known, the Directory and Station List included in the letter dated
September 21, 1999, from Joe Webb, Team Leader, Historical Support Branch of
Department of the Army, do provide evidence for more than a small number of African
Americans’ presence in Korea. These records show that some Koreans possibly saw
not only the African-American military units but also American segregation at work in
Korea during this period since President Truman did not desegregate the military until
1948.
The Korean War (1950-1953), however, brought some changes not only in the silence
of the written record but also in the Koreans’ perception of African Americans. At the
beginning of the war, the Koreans’ perception of African Americans appeared to be
friendly and appreciative. Lyle Rishell in his Korean War diary, With a Black Platoon in
Combat, a Year in Korea, shows quite compassionate meetings with a boy, a woman, and
Korean soldiers during the war. Rishell was an African-American soldier in Able
Company, 24th Infantry Regiment. His diary did not indicate any trace of Koreans’
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prejudice toward him because he was a black soldier fighting in Korea for Korean
people.51
In spite of their friendly and compassionate encounters in the beginning of the war,
however, Koreans’ impression of African-American soldiers changed shortly after. The
United States sent approximately three to four hundred thousand soldiers to Korea.52 Each
year following the cease-fire in 1953, some 40,000 to 50,000 U.S. soldiers were stationed
in South Korea. Some scholars estimate more than a million U.S. soldiers have been
stationed in South Korea over the years since the Korean War began. This means that
there have been over 150,000 African-American soldiers rotated in and out of South Korea
from 1950 to the present.53 As a result, quite a few African Americans married Korean
women and produced many Afro-Korean children. Some estimate that African-American
soldiers fathered over twenty percent of the several thousand biracial children bom during
this time.54
Although the United States implemented a desegregation policy for its military for the
first time in the Korean War, the actual practice was far from integration. Its racist view
against African Americans, indeed, came with the troops. Koreans quickly learned the
value of the dollar and status of white skin over yellow and, particularly over black skin.
Quickly adapting to this racist view, in the U.S. military base area, Korea had segregated
“all-black” and “all-white” bars in separate sections of towns and enforced a sort of
segregated American Southern etiquette regarding women. If a prostitute dated or served
an African-American soldier, she could not later serve white soldiers. Yet a prostitute who
served white soldiers could later serve African-American soldiers.

Following this racial
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attitude, Korean residents and the prostitutes in the U.S. military base area developed their
own status hierarchy in which “white” prostitutes looked down on “black” prostitutes.55
The value of the dollar and status of white skin were essentially tied to the extreme
poverty prevalent during the Korean War. During and after the war, most Koreans faced
devastating poverty. Stealing, looting, shoplifting, pick pocketing, begging, and deceiving
were not uncommon during this period. For many Koreans, these were a way of life and
necessary for survival. Many foreigners who lived or visited Korea during this period
thought that all Koreans were thieves.56 Mark Gayn in Japan Diary talks about an
incident in which his wife’s roommate in the hotel warned his wife that all Korean servants
were stealing everything in sight to “support their relatives who had fled from the Red
Terror in the Soviet zone.”57
Nor were these desperate behaviors unique only to Koreans during the War. Nor were
they reserved only to African-Americans in extreme poverty. Actually, stealing and
looting behaviors for which many Korean-American merchants presumptuously
condemned all African Americans have been commonly seen among all social and
economic classes and ethnic groups.

Paul Bullock in Watts: The Aftermath: An Inside

View o f the Ghetto by the People o f Watts argues that the looting and stealing behaviors in
the riots were not that much different from the behaviors of his middle-class white army
buddies who looted, stole, and sometimes raped in Germany during World War II.

The

rules of morality become meaningless when people are desperate to survive or when
people do not see “law and order” in the accepted sense applicable to them.58
In Korea, both Korean spouses of African Americans and Afro-Korean children
struggled to endure Koreans’ display of contempt. Many observed that Koreans treated
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them as having the “lowest marginal social status” and “heaviest burden of multiple
stigmas” in Korean society.59 In fact, Harry Holt, Pearl S. Buck, and others acutely
witnessed this fact. In The Seed From the East, in a letter dated June 24, 1955, Harry Holt
recorded his observation that “the Koreans will never let the black children grow to the
ages where they can reproduce.”60 Edwin McDowell, The Arizona Republic's staff writer,
described them as “double outcast.”61 Pearl S. Buck, the famous novelist and the founder
of the Pearl S. Buck Foundation in South Korea,62 in Children fo r Adoption confirms this
problem. Their economic, academic, and social opportunities were restricted, and they
were treated as the lowest social outcasts. The racist slur of calling an African American
as “kkamdungi” (darky) has been widely accepted in Korean society. In children’s books,
in schools, on television, or in cartoons, an African American’s skin color is used to
symbolize “dirtiness” or “uncleanness.” It is often emphasized that not taking a bath or
not washing means to be like an African American.
The 1992 Los Angeles riots eventually forced many first-generation Korean Americans
to become more aware of their racial prejudices. Up until the riots, they commonly
showed unthinking and unself-conscious stereotypical attitudes toward African Americans.
Historically, Koreans before the Korean War did not appear to be color conscious. Like
the Chinese, they treated people with dark complexions according to their social status.
The early Korean Americans liked African Americans because whites rejected them while
African Americans helped them. Although many scholars tie Koreans’ prejudice to their
belief in the myth of “pure and homogeneous” ethnicity, some think that Koreans’
ignorance and inexperience of living in a multi-ethnic society contribute more to their
narrow thinking and preconception against African Americans. On the other hand, the
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American media and American soldiers helped Koreans’ perception of African Americans
grow and spread. American television programs, films, fashions, and advertisements all
have transmitted American racist views to Korea and fostered anti-African-American
views, tying them to the power of money. American soldiers stationed in Korea since the
Korean War modeled racism for Koreans.
Unfortunately, before the riot Korean Americans’ encounters with African Americans
in America worsened. Since the 1970s, as more Korean immigrants became selfemployed by setting up stores in predominantly poor African-American and Latino
neighborhoods, they experienced more negative encounters with African-American
customers in the store and overgeneralized their perceptions to all African Americans.
Sadly, many Korean Americans have not realized that middle class African Americans
hold work ethics and family values similar to their own. Undoubtedly, they spread their
false impressions to their relatives, fellow church members, and friends in the KoreanAmerican community. Fueled with this false information, Korean Americans’ initial
perceptions of African Americans took firm hold in their highly segregated and isolated
social interactions.
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CHAPTER THREE
A BIGGER APPLE
Since the early 1970s, most encounters between Korean Americans and African
Americans have taken place in metropolitan areas. Many African and Korean Americans
meet each other for the first time in Korean-owned stores located in predominantly
African-American and Latino neighborhoods. Their meeting places quite frequently are
in “the most desolated, deserted, and dangerous inner cities.”1 This sets up the initial
contact as a disaster for both of them. They face each other unprepared.
Overwhelmingly influenced by misconceived stereotypes and puzzled by the different
physical features, lifestyles, and languages of the other, they show fear and animosity
toward each other. They do not understand what each side expects from the other.
Consequently, their incompatible expectations create an encounter frill of conflict and
hostility—a conflict that sometimes turns deadly. Their expectations set the stage for
Black-Korean conflicts.
Recently, conflicts between African Americans and Korean Americans have attracted
extensive scholarly and media attention. Major U.S. newspapers, magazines, and
television networks, including the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, CBS, and ABC,
have often covered the conflicts.2 In addition, stories of strikes, boycotts, and
complaints by the African-American community against Korean-owned stores have
abounded in Korean-language newspapers.3 Although the conflicts between African
Americans and Korean Americans rose to the highest point during the Los Angeles riots,
they have not been limited to Los Angeles. Other cities like New York, Baltimore,
Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Washington 4 have experienced African-American protests and
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boycotts against Korean-American merchants. Nor have they been limited to only these
two ethnic groups. A similar conflict broke out in Detroit between African-American
customers and Arab-American merchants,5 in Miami with Cuban merchants and in
Mississippi with Chinese merchants.

Nor are they limited to African-American

customers. Korean-American merchants have also encountered conflicts with European
Americans as well as Latino Americans 6 Nevertheless, the degree of conflict between
Korean-American merchants and African-American customers is far above the norm for
conflicts between other ethnic groups.7 Why is this so?

Perhaps, the influx of Korean-

American immigrants into major metropolitan areas after 1970, Korean Americans’
prolific entrepreneurship in small businesses and their choice of business locations, and
Korean Americans’ negative prejudice toward African Americans partly contribute to the
degree of animosity between them and African-American community in which they
operate.
Three coincidentally interacting forces stimulated the inrush of Korean immigrants to
this country after 1965. The globalization of the economy, the 1965 Immigration and
Nationality Act, and Korea’s economic, social, and political conditions all propelled
Koreans’ mass migration to the United States. While Korea’s internal conditions made
the exodus ripe and the 1965 Act made it possible, the globalization of capitalism acted
as the driving force behind the two preceding causes.
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act functioned as a catalyst for the sudden and
dramatic influx of Korean immigrants to the United States. Following the adoption of
the Act, the Korean-American population rose rapidly from about 45,000 in 1965 to
798,849 in 1990.8 This is an almost seventeenfold increase. The annual number of
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Korean immigrants was 30,000 in 1976 and reached its peak at 35,397 in 1987 before it
gradually declined to 18,000 in 1993.9 The annual number of 30,000 to 35,000 Koreans
entering the United States between 1976 and 1990 resulted in Koreans being ranked as
the seventh largest immigrant group behind Mexicans, Salvadorans, Filipinos,
Vietnamese, Dominicans, and Guatemalans in 1990.10 The 1990 Korean immigration
represented two percent (32,301) of the total U.S. immigrants (1,536,483), making it
almost equal to the total number of immigrants from the entire continent of Africa.
Furthermore, although this 798,849 represented only a 3.21 percent of the total 1990
United States population (248,709,873), by 1990, Korean Americans rapidly closed the
gap with the Chinese (1,645,472) and Japanese (847,562) populations in the United
States.11 In addition, they settled in major metropolitan areas: Los Angeles City and
County (218,401), New York (61,491), New Jersey (25,695), Chicago (17,517),
Washington D.C. (17,147), Atlanta and Houston (25,085), Baltimore (15,231),
Philadelphia (14,285) and others.12 Despite this relatively small number in the total
U.S. population, the rapidity of their immigration in the last two decades and their
concentration in a few larger urban areas have made them stand out in the communities in
which they have settled.
Korean-American immigration originated as a part of a global migration forced by
European expansionism. By the nineteenth century, as European colonists encroached
into China, Japan, and Korea in search of cheap Asian laborers, natural resources,13 and
open markets, Koreans began their emigration to the United States, following in the
footsteps of their Chinese and Japanese predecessors. Facilitated by American
missionaries and entrepreneurs, Koreans’ journeys to the United States and Hawaii
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commenced in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Just like many
peoples who came to the United States from all over the world, Koreans wanted to escape
from poverty, instability, and oppression in their homeland.14 Consequently, after the
signing of the Korean-American Treaty on May 22, 1882, Koreans came to the United
States as students, diplomats, merchants, laborers, picture-brides, political refugees, warorphans, war brides, professionals, and relatives of earlier immigrants.
Nevertheless, Korean-American immigration proceeded slowly and sparsely. When
the Koreans’ Hawaiian emigration began in December 1902, fewer than 50 Koreans lived
in the United States, while the Chinese population numbered 118,746 and Japanese,
85,716 by 1900.15 During this period, the Hawaiian sugar plantation owners were faced
with an acute labor shortage. With an increased demand for sugar production in Hawaii
and aggressive mainland recruitment of Japanese laborers from Hawaii, sugar growers
faced Japanese laborers’ strikes for higher wages and better working conditions. Since
Chinese were excluded from new immigration (the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act), and
Japanese were seen by employers as too demanding, Koreans became the natural
alternative to their labor problems. In other words, because Koreans were not subject to
the Chinese Exclusion Act, Hawaiian planters turned to Koreans to keep Japanese wages
low and to break their monopoly in Hawaii’s sugar plantation labor market.16 Between
1902 and 1905, about seven thousand Korean laborers took the opportunity opened to
them. They left for Hawaii beginning on Dec. 22, 1902, with prepaid passage to
Honolulu, “fifty-dollar” show money in their pockets, and three-year “work agreements”
on the plantations.17
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In 1905, Korea became a Japanese protectorate; Japan controlled all Korea’s foreign
affairs. Not so surprisingly, Korean emigration to Hawaii was stopped by the Japanese
government in 1905.

According to Wayne Patterson in The Korean Frontier in

America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910, the Japanese government eliminated
Korean emigration to Hawaii to avoid Japanese exclusion in the United States.18
By 1905, about a thousand Japanese, mostly from Hawaii, arrived in California each
month. The Japanese government was worried about a possible outcome of this influx: a
Japanese exclusion act. It feared that Californians might deal with this influx similarly
to the way they dealt with the Chinese influx by passing the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.
The Japanese government considered any Japanese exclusion act to be defamatory to its
international reputation.19
To discourage the Japanese influx to California from Hawaii, the Japanese
government had to make the wages and working conditions in Hawaii more competitive
with those in California. This meant removing Koreans’ presence in Hawaii. As
strikebreakers, Korean workers in Hawaii had prevented the Japanese workers from
gaining their demands for higher wages and better working conditions.

So, when the

Japanese government was quite sure that it would win the Russo-Japanese War by
February 1905, it forced the Korean government to ban all emigration to Hawaii.20
Until 1965, Korean-American immigration continued in small numbers. While the
primary restriction on Korean immigration to the United States came from U.S.
immigration laws, Japan’s tight controls over Korea during the Japanese colonial period
(1910-1945) further limited migration. Anti-Asian immigration laws and policies like
the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement negotiated with Japan, the 1917 Immigration Act that
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created the Asia-Pacific Triangle, and the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act all restricted the
annual numbers of Koreans allowed to immigrate.21
Despite all these restrictions, between 1907 and 1945, about 950 picture brides,22
300 students with Japanese-issued passports, 541 political refugees, and 200 students
sponsored by American missionaries in Korea entered the United States.23 While by
1940 Chinese immigrants numbered over 106,334 and Japanese over 285,115, Korean
immigrants totaled only 8,568, and of this small number, the majority lived in Hawaii.24
Even after 1945, the number of immigrants to America remained small. In spite of the
United States’ military occupation of Korea from 1945 to 1948 and the repeal of the
Chinese Exclusion laws in 1943, only 128 Koreans came to the United States between
1948 to 1951.

The 1924 Act continuously governed Korean-American immigration

until 1952.25 Koreans did not receive any minimum immigration quotas nor could they
be naturalized until 1952.26
Between 1950 and 1964, the overwhelming presence of U.S. soldiers in Korea and
their increased contacts with Koreans, together with the socio-economic and political
turmoil and instability of wartime, the threat of renewed war, and the close economic ties
with the United States all brought about 15,000 Korean immigrants to the United States.27
The majority of this 15,000 consisted of 6,423 Korean wives of U.S. servicemen and
5,348 adopted Korean orphans.28 In addition, the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration
and Nationality Act allowed a steady annual flow of 100 Koreans to enter the United
States after 1952.29 According to the 1965 U.S. Census Report, war brides, adopted
orphan children, and the second generation of Korean immigrants altogether increased
the total Korean-American population to about 45,000.30
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The history of immigration and naturalization laws in the United States explains how
the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act caused the influx of Koreans to the United
States. On March 26, 1790, the U.S. Congress passed the first U.S. naturalization law.
The 1790 naturalization law allowed citizenship only to free white immigrants who had
resided within the United States for two years.31 Although immigration and
naturalization laws are not the same things, they are, for the most part, interrelated. On
the one hand, immigration law predetermines the naturalization laws by restricting the
size and race of the citizenship applicants who can be admitted to the United States. On
the other hand, naturalization law gives direction to whom should be admitted to this
country. In this context, since 1790, the United States continued to enact immigration
laws and policies that reflected its desire to maintain the intention of the 1790
naturalization law: allowing only whites,32 while it compromised its desire with the
demand of America’s labor needs. Balancing its desire for European white purity
against the demand for labor, amid nativists’ threats and panics, U.S. immigration laws
gradually changed the 1790 racial restriction to encompass non-white persons.
Eventually, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act “eliminated national origin,
race, or ancestry as basis for immigration to the United States.”33 By striking out the
national origins quota that set the limit in the total number of immigrants allowed from
any particular nation at two percent of their nationality in 1890,34 the 1965 immigration
law dramatically increased immigration from Asia. Additionally, the law preferred
professionals and skilled workers in short supply, relatives of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents,35 and investors in the U.S economy.36 The preference for relatives
meant 87.9 percent of all Korean immigrants who entered the United States between
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1966 and 1981 came as relatives.

Consequently, by 1974 the Asian immigration rate

grew from seven percent in 1965 to thirty-three percent of all new immigrants to the
United States38
Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, in Immigrant Entrepreneurs. Koreans in Los Angeles,
1965-1982, explain why the immigration law completely abolished its racial preference
in 1965. They cite at least three components that contributed to the change: the
emergence o f the United States as the world’s leader, the domestic civil rights movement,
and the expansion of the global economic market. After World War n, the United States
emerged as the world’s leading power and the champion of democracy against
communism in the Cold War rivalry. As the world’s leading power, as well as the
champion of democracy, domestic racism and the racist principles embedded in
immigration laws and policies not only occasioned embarrassing worldwide criticism, but
also tarnished the American image. During the Vietnam War, for example, the
incongruity between America’s democratic principles and racist practices became the
object of Hanoi’s propaganda attacks, adding fuel to the fire of change.39
The civil rights movement in the early 1960s also pushed the change. On the one
hand, the movement domestically heightened European Americans’ awareness of their
racial prejudices and persuaded them to eliminate racially determined quotas in
immigration laws and policies.40 It also took the issue of American racism to the world.
By making world headlines, the movement intensified the need to change immigration
laws to counteract the ill reputation of United States abroad.41
The expansion of the global economic market also favored change. The 1960s and
1970s saw the world economy becoming increasingly integrated,

AD

both by importing
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cheap overseas products and by setting up plants overseas, as well as by moving cheap
labor to the United States through immigration. Traditionally, manufacturing had been
carried out in the developed Western countries like England, Germany, or the United
States with raw materials supplied by less-developed countries in Africa, South America,
and East Asia. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, manufacturing moved to the lessdeveloped countries as companies sought cheap labor. A typical example is the case of
South Korea. Low wages in South Korea attracted U.S. investment; consequently, some
U.S. companies moved to South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s.43
Another aspect of Korean labor attracted the international capitalists’ attention.

It

was not only cheap but also highly-educated skilled labor. Between 1953 and 1963,
South Korea’s literacy rate grew from thirty percent to over eighty percent of the
population. By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, it reached about ninety percent of the
population.44 Compared to many other Third World countries’ mostly cheap unskilled
labor, South Korea’s highly educated cheap labor drew U.S. capitalists’ investments into
Korea as a site for manufacturing goods. South Korea emerged as a major exporter of
manufactured goods to developed countries.45
In the 1960s and 1970s, although U.S. companies were creating more jobs in Korea,
low wages in Korea persuaded many Koreans to immigrate to the United States. While
low wages attracted U.S. companies in the international labor market, it, in turn,
dissuaded individual Korean workers from staying in Korea. Korean wages during this
period were equivalent to about one-tenth of U.S. wages. Koreans believed that they
could make more money in the United States. As the early Korean immigration before
1965 mirrored the nineteenth-century European colonists’ expansionism, the post-1965
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Koreans’ mass exit to the United States reflected the twentieth-century international
capitalists’ globalization of world economy.46
In addition to this shift in manufacturing trends, the number of European immigrants
to the United States dwindled. The United States faced shortages of skilled labor in
technical fields. The competition-driven global economy demanded cheap skilled labor.
This demand for cheap skilled labor also encouraged the change in the 1965 Immigration
Act by giving preference to professionals and highly skilled workers.47
The third force that propelled Koreans’ mass migration to the United States after 1965
came from Korea’s economic, social, and political conditions. Unemployment and
congestion following urban population growth, depressed wages, decreasing
opportunities in higher education and in the professional fields pushed Koreans who
could afford to leave to cross the Pacific ocean seeking a higher standard of living and a
better opportunity for their children.48

Although the prospect of earning more money

was their driving force, undoubtedly American culture and the close military, political,
and economic connections with the United States influenced many Koreans’ choice of
where to immigrate.49 Since the cease-fire of the Korean War (1950-1953), an estimated
one million U.S. service men and women have spent time in South Korea.50 This
overwhelming U.S. presence not only generated interracial marriages and a lasting
longing for things American, but also brought many Koreans to the United States. The
U.S presence produced about 28,000 South Korean women’s marriages to Americans by
1972 and 50,000 by 1980. From 1965 to 1981, half of the Koreans naturalized were
spouses of U.S. citizens.51
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Korea in the 1960s was not a stable and secure country.

Under the constant threat of

renewed war, it was a poverty-stricken, politically and socially unstable country. Its
unemployment rate was high, and its standard of living was low. Between 1949 and
1975, Korea’s population grew by seventy-two percent, making it, by 1975, one of the
most densely populated countries of the world. Overcrowding and high unemployment
became the most urgent and crucial urban problems. To alleviate the unemployment
problem caused by the overpopulation, the South Korean government encouraged
emigration.52
In the 1970s and 1980s, Korea’s education growth rate exceeded its economic growth
rate. The number of educated Koreans exceeded the number of jobs available for the
persons graduating from the colleges, resulting in widespread unemployment and
underemployment among college graduates.

The annual 12.1 percent increase in

enrollment in colleges and universities53 perhaps reflects the lack of employment
opportunities for high school graduates and lack of professional employment for college
graduates. During this period, one-fifth of college graduates could not find a job
commensurate with their college education. This difficulty also contributed to their mass
migration to the United States.54
Memories of the Korean War still linger in the minds of many Koreans. The threat of
renewed warfare in Korea constantly disquiets many Koreans, particularly North Korean
refugees who fled to the South during the war and who now make up about fourteen
percent of the South Korean population.55 A persistent fear brought by memories of the
Korean War and disruption of middle-class security heavily influenced many people’s
decisions to leave the country.56
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The growth of the South Korean middle class during the Park (1961-1979) and Chun
(1980-1987) dictatorships also provided another reason for the mass exodus. The newly
emerged South Korean middle class not only dissented from Park’s and Chun’s
authoritarian military control, but also wanted both personal and political freedoms.
Under Park’s and Chun’s political leaderships, professionals, students, Christian church
leaders, other middle-class independent businessmen and women suffered greatly.
Curfews, constant police and military surveillance, imprisonments and suppression, and
censorship all limited freedom.57 Some scholars argue that the coincidence of the peak
period (1985-1987) of Korean immigration with the end of the military dictatorship
reflected the attitude of the Korean middle class toward Park’s and Chun’s
dictatorships.58
South Korea’s “entrance examination hell”59 for high schools and colleges also
prompted many Koreans to leave their homeland for better opportunities for their
children. In 1969, the South Korean government abolished the middle school entrance
examination.60 Since then, most students are still required to take entrance examinations
for education beyond middle school. But the rapid population growth has made
competition to pass the high school and college entrance examinations increasingly brutal
and fiercely competitive. The shortage of good jobs in South Korea’s job market for
high school graduates vigorously pushes many high school graduates into college, since
higher education is perceived as the only possible way to get a decent job and thereby to
advance into a higher social status. So, to prepare for the nightmarish examinations,
many parents hire special tutors and send their children to entrance-exam preparation
schools before and after school hours. Furthermore, increasingly high tuition and other
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school-related expenses compound the parents’ financial problems. Consequently, the
fierce competition to get into these schools often produces economic strain, social
embarrassments, and psychological breakdowns for the parents as well as in their
children.

So, many South Korean parents avoid the cruel entrance examinations either

by emigrating or by sending their children to the United States for high school and
college educations.61
Another push for immigration came from South Korean Vietnam War veterans.
From October 1965 to March 1973, South Korea sent troops to Vietnam. A significant
number of Vietnam veterans immigrated to the United States, either directly from
Vietnam or later from South Korea.62
Christianity also encouraged Koreans’ immigration to the United States. Historically,
most Korean immigrants to the United States came from an urban Christian background.
Prior to 1965, they were mostly poor laborers in the urban areas, and over forty percent of
them were Christians when they left Korea. Thirty to forty percent of non-Christian
Korean immigrants eventually became Christians in the United States.63

Korean

immigrants’ urban Christian characteristics continued after 1965. Although only fewer
than one-fourth of the Korean population was considered Christian, about forty to fiftyfour percent of Korean immigrants belonged to a Christian church.

Since the Korean

War, most Christians in South Korea came from the urban middle-class, especially from
Seoul.64 In 1976, although only twenty-two percent of South Koreans were Christian,
about fifty to eighty percent of Korean Americans were Christian.65 This high
percentage of Christian immigrants reflects American missionaries’ involvement in
Korea’s immigration history since its beginning.
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Additionally, like other Asian immigrants after 1965, the majority arrived not only
with high educational backgrounds and professional work experience, but also with some
money—usually between $60,000 and $250,000 66 Although only five percent of the
Korean general population had college educations,67 according to the 1990 Census
Report, thirty-four percent of all Korean immigrants over the age of twenty-five had a
/T O

college degree.

This is higher than the U.S. general population—about twenty-five

percent of the U.S. general population had a college degree in 1990.

Moreover, sixty-

two percent of Korean men in Los Angeles were graduates of four-year colleges whereas
only fifteen percent of American-bom men of European ancestry in Los Angeles had
completed that much education.69 Again, compared with only eight percent of the
Korean general population in white-collar occupations, thirty-three percent of all KoreanAmerican immigrants had white-collar occupational work experience back home, and
eighty percent of them came from middle or lower-middle class backgrounds.

7ft

From the beginning of their immigration, Los Angeles attracted Korean immigrants at
a higher rate than any other U.S. city.

Although the census underreported Koreans

during these years, it showed that Los Angeles had 14 Koreans in 1910, 84 in 1920, 345
in 1930, 482 in 1940,71 and 800 in 1945.72 Light and Bonacich explain the Koreans’
historical preference for the city in terms of chain migration effect and a prosperous
Korean-American economy. According to them, in addition to mild weather and a good
school system, Los Angeles’s “thriving Korean economy” brought an additional onethird to the total chain migration of Koreans to Los Angeles.

Since Los Angeles had the

largest Korean-speaking economy in the United States, it became the most economically
attractive place for a new Korean immigrant to settle. Its Korean-speaking economy
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could offer a new immigrant a job either in a store owned by a relative or employment in
a Korean store where he or she did not have to speak English 73 Consequently, in the
1970s and 1980s, the Korean population in Los Angeles County grew rapidly from 8,881
in 1970 74 to 60,618 in 1980 75 and 145,431 in 1990.76 Los Angeles became the largest
Korean-American community in the United States with a Koreatown located three miles
west of downtown. 77
Many Korean-American immigrants saw Koreatown in Los Angeles as an extension
of Seoul, Korea. Numerous Korean ethnic restaurants, grocery stores, beauty salons,
bookstores, and social agencies in Koreatown have not only signs written in the Korean
alphabet, but also storekeepers who speak Korean. Hence, Koreatown makes Korean
immigrants who cannot speak English feel at home. Koreatown on one hand supplies
the feeling of being safe and at home for new immigrants who feel helpless and inferior
because of cultural and language barriers. On the other hand, it also fosters their
isolation from American society.78 This isolation deepens further when the KoreanAmerican entrepreneurs isolate themselves in small shops.

Spending long working

hours in the store, family members usually do not have much contact with others except
for their customers. This separates them further from the mainstream of American
society and encourages them to maintain the attitudes and values they brought from
Korea.79
Moreover, many first-generation Korean-American immigrants continue to keep very
close personal, political, cultural, and economic ties with South Korea.

520

Over eighty

percent of Korean Americans in Southern California read at least one Korean-language
newspaper.81 Because of the English language barrier, unfamiliarity with American
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culture, and their “fierce and settled sense of national identity,”82 Korean immigrants tend
to show more interest and participate in more South Korean affairs than in American
mainstream concerns. Many do not give up their Korean citizenship and consider
themselves Koreans rather than Korean Americans. Even if they identify themselves as
Korean Americans, they do not think it makes that much difference in the way they live
their lives.
Along with this sense of intense Korean ethnic identification, they bring Confucian
values of filial piety and status.

To the present day, Confucian values, deeply embedded

in Korean culture, have had a profound and lasting influence on Koreans’ interpersonal
relationships and have affected Korean Americans’ adaptation to life in the United States.
These values have been used to set the standard of all proper human behaviors. The
virtue of filial piety, the very core of Confucian values, is woven through three bonds and
the five moral rules. The three bonds are between ruler and subject, father and son, and
husband and wife. The five rules are faithful submission to ruler by subject; respectful
obedience to father by son; absolute surrender to husband by wife; proper regard to elder
brother by younger brothers; and trustfulness between friends.

O '*

Some scholars have remarked about the continuation of Confucian values as well as
their depth of penetration in the daily lives of Korean people.

Making some keen

observations of Korean culture, the 1940s anthropologist Cornelius Osgood, in The
Koreans and Their Culture, noted that even uneducated farmers in the village recited and
followed these rules quite well.84 Martina Deuchler also points out their continuing
practice to the present time. In The Confucian Transformation o f Korea. A Study o f
Society and Ideology, she argues that these five rules of proper ritual behavior in the
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hierarchy of three bonds thoroughly and forcibly indoctrinated all Koreans from very
early childhood through the socialization process. According to her, while the three
bonds legitimized the hierarchy of human relationships, the five moral rules stressed
importance of proper ritual behaviors in terms of duties and obligations.85 Jong Sam
Park in his dissertation, “A Three Generational Study: Traditional Korean Value Systems
and Psychosocial Adjustment of Korean Immigrants in Los Angeles,” found that KoreanAmerican families still hand down traditional cultural values and behavioral norms from
the past through the primary socialization of the family.
What is more, filial piety, anchored by the three bonds and the five moral rules,
strengthened Koreans’ “idiosyncratic” obsession with status. Deuchler argues how
Confucian teachings and pre-Confucian traditions of Korean culture have created and
strengthened Koreans’ status consciousness which has lasted until recent times.

87

Historically, Korean culture has been profoundly grounded on strictly enforced hereditary
status and class. During the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), visual distinctions set apart
different classes. Different styles of dress, speech patterns, household possessions, roof
materials, housing locations, and way of life all separated the yangban class—probably
only ten percent of the total population—from commoners, and commoners from a lower
class of “base people.”

oo

Observing a Korean farming village on the island of Kanghwa

in 1947, Osgood remarked upon the yangbans’ behaviors of ordering the commoners
around at whim by using low forms of speech and demanding respect in return in high
forms of speech and manners. Commoners needed permission from the yangbans to sit
or smoke a pipe.89
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Although the symbols that marked status and class changed from seventeenth centuryKorea to twentieth-century Korea, many Koreans attempted to possess the status symbols
blindly. Many have striven to obtain a high status by possessing material goods, often
using extreme measures to gain wealth. While getting a government office position
through civil service examinations symbolized status and prestige among Confucianeducated yangbans (scholar-official class) in “traditional Korean society,”90 many
contemporary Koreans think that possessing material goods like a Mercedes, a Stanford
MBA, an MD, a law school degree, or a mansion on a hill will give them high class and
status. Some recent Korean immigrants drive around in a Mercedes in predominantly
African- and Latino-American neighborhoods, and some flaunt their wealth in
unflattering ways, revealing an overambitious desire to make their children succeed.
Many Korean American parents overbearingly brag about their children’s going to Ivy
League schools as if nothing else matters in their children’s lives.91 This extreme status
consciousness makes them look down on people who do not have what they have.
These status-oriented behaviors are not peculiar to Koreans. Confucianism has
pervasively ruled many East Asian countries for many centuries, particularly in China.
Yet, in Korea, Confucianism bolstered Koreans’ historically rigid class system, making
Koreans’ obsession with status and class appear more frequently and intensely than the
norm. Although Koreans share similar Confucian cultures with Chinese, some scholars
observed Koreans’ more concentrated use of Confucianism to strengthen their preConfiician traditions of hereditary status and class-consciousness than the Chinese effort
of using it to support the Chinese status and class. For instance, comparing with Chinese
experience of Confucianism, in Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys. The
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Opening o f Korea, 1875-1885, Deuchler points out that the Koreans’ status obsession and
class consciousness were more hierarchical and rigid than the Chinese experience of
status and class. She argues that the ruling class in traditional Korean society
successfully enforced a fundamentally inflexible Confucian creed to prevent the
commoners from sharing the power. By narrowly interpreting and thoroughly applying
more rigid Confucianism through a highly centralized government structure, the ruling
class controlled the status and power. Unlike China, Korea was a small country. The
smallness of the country, she asserts, made highly centralized and strictly enforced
Confucianism possible and, in turn, allowed more inflexible Confucianism to be
practiced in Korea than in China. 92
These lingering Confucian attitudes perhaps bring about certain detrimental
repercussions. In his study, Osgood makes some keen observations on the repressions
that these moral behavior rules possibly cause to the subordinated persons, such as
subject, wife, son, and younger brother in the relationship. He argues that these strictly
enforced rules create long lasting frustration, anger, and rebellion.

By watching many

Koreans “at times break into uncontrolled fury” when they lost control of themselves,
Osgood was convinced that these behavior rules promote cruelty because these
repressions often times induced “sadistic furies” and “inconsolable turmoil of
unconscious guilt.”93 He also correctly observed another lingering Confucian behavioral
norm that relates to eye contact.

In the rules, a subordinate person could not look at a

superior. The rule requires looking down or avoiding eye contact to show respect for the
hierarchical order of rank and age.

Osgood writes that Koreans look into each other’s

eyes only when they are angry at each other.94
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Quite often, this unthinking mode of proper ritual behavior puts Korean Americans in
a precarious position, and unless they become aware of the socialization process, they
may respond by reflex to an apparent violation of the rules. In many Koreans’
interpersonal relationships, the rules frame Koreans’ expectations of what others’ proper
behavior should be. Although they might fail to apply these rules to themselves, they
demand from others a proper behavior based on these rules.
Thus, it can be expected that Koreans’ preconditioned expectations of proper behavior
from their inner-city customers could trigger tense and stressful contact between Korean
business owners and African-American customers. These tensions would certainly
heighten interracial conflicts and racial prejudice against each other, leading to bumps
and collisions, further exacerbating the problems already created by Korean Americans’
language barriers, rude manners, and negative attitudes toward African Americans.
While African Americans’ persistent joblessness and poverty in the inner cities further
reinforces Korean Americans’ prejudice and suspicion against them, Korean Americans’
ignorance of African Americans’ historical experience in the United States and their
preconditioned expectation of proper behaviors rooted in the three bonds and the five
moral rules put the finishing touch on their problems with African Americans.
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNTHINKING CHOICES
Tragically, what benefited Korean Americans in Los Angeles actually hurt African
Americans in South Central Los Angeles. While the 1965 Immigration and Nationality
Act and global economic mobilization stimulated Korean-American immigration and the
Korean economy, these two historical developments pushed South Central residents
further into deep poverty, crime, and hopelessness. More importantly, South Central’s
crime-ridden and economically depressed condition supplied a fitting place for Korean
Americans to open their small businesses by making the area cheap enough for their
limited capital resources. In other words, South Central’s blighted condition gave many
Korean Americans a chance to work for their American dreams.
South Central’s blighted condition was not an accident. Its condition actually stems
from the snowballed outcome of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the Civil
Rights movement, global economy, and a long history o f racial and economic oppression.
The 1965 Act put further pressure on South Central’s already depressed social and
economic condition. Since the 1970s, South Central’s African-American residents saw a
huge influx of immigrants from Mexico, Asia, and Caribbean Sea who were looking for a
relatively cheap place to live. The influx produced a tense competition with AfricanAmerican residents for jobs, housing, and public resources. Pushed to share the limited
space and scarce resources, overcrowded by immigrants, overcharged by the small
business entrepreneurs, neglected by the government, and abandoned by the middle class,
some African-American residents were easily drawn into crime and gang activities. As a
result, South Central became a crime-ridden and poverty-stricken place.
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Following the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, Los Angeles experienced
unprecedented demographic changes. During the 1970s and the 1980s, because of the
influx of Mexican, Asian, and Caribbean immigrants to the city, the white population
declined from fifty-nine percent to thirty-seven percent, and the African-American
population decreased from eighteen percent to fourteen percent in the city. During the
same period, the Latino population increased from eighteen percent to forty percent, and
the Asian-American population grew from less than five percent to ten percent. By
1990, Latinos had become the largest ethnic group in the city and the Asian population
doubled to be almost as many as the African-American population.1
In fact, the influx affected South Central African Americans much more than it did
other ethnic populations. Since the 1970s, an influx of Latinos, particularly from Central
America, had changed the ethnic complexion of South Central Los Angeles. The area
A

had been eighty-three percent African American in 1963, but by 1990, the AfricanAmerican population had dropped to fifty-three percent.3 Although some African
Americans left South Central to move into suburban communities,4 many more AfricanAmerican residents remained in South Central.

Forced to share their limited space and

scanty resources with Latinos who moved into the area seeking cheap housing, South
Central’s African Americans found themselves mired in frustration, anger, and
hopelessness.
What is more, the influx of immigrants brought Korean-American merchants into
South Central.

Many African-American residents in South Central perceived Korean

merchants as alien invaders and capitalist exploiters. The Korean merchants were seen
as outsiders who invaded their community and extracted money from them.
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Many residents claimed that the merchants overcharged them for poor quality items.
They resented Korean-American grocers for not hiring any African Americans and not
giving back money to the African-American community, further diminishing withering
resources.5
The fierce competition for South Central Los Angeles’ shrinking job and housing
markets eventually led to hostile ethnic conflicts among African Americans, Latinos, and
Korean Americans. Compounding the problem of South Central, the 1970s also saw
skyrocketing housing prices in the suburbs, further limiting the opportunities for AfricanAmerican residents to leave South Central Los Angeles.6
In contrast to the current socially demoted and economically depressed condition of
the South Central African Americans’ lives, before 1920, African Americans in Los
Angeles benefited from a better economy and less racism. Although the modem AfricanAmerican community traces its roots to the land boom of the late 1800s,7 African
descendants’ involvement in Los Angeles goes back to the late eighteenth century when
Mexican settlers founded the city in 1781.

Their early participation in the history of Los

Angeles was evidenced by at least two Los Angeles census reports during the Spanish
and Mexican periods. According to John M. Weatherwax, originally, the Spanish
attempted to recruit twenty-four families and fifty-nine men to establish a strong Spanish
garrison along the California coast when Gasper de Portola, under the order of King
Carlos III of Spain, completed his expedition in 1769. But, subsequently, the Spanish
attracted only twelve families with forty-six people who moved to Los Angeles.

The

twelve families became the founders of the city and appeared on First Census of Los
Angeles as the record of its original settlers of the city in 1781. This census includes
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names, ages, and ethnicities. According to this record, the founders of Los Angeles
consisted of twenty-six individuals with African ancestry, sixteen Native Americans, two
Spanish, and two “Chinos.”8 This indicated that people with African ancestry were the
majority among the newcomers. But their majority position quickly disappeared. The
1790 census counted twenty-two persons with African ancestry out of a total population
of 141. Moreover, the 1850 census counted only twelve persons with African ancestry.9
By 1900, Los Angeles possessed the largest African-American community in
California with 2,131 persons. Both the land boom and its 1887-1888 collapse attracted
African Americans from other regions of California, including unemployed AfricanAmerican farmers, who moved from rural California to the city to find jobs.
Nevertheless, the African-American population in the city remained very small, and its
growth tended to be slow up until 1900. This trend changed after the Southern Pacific
Railroad recruited about 2,000 African-American workers to break a strike by Mexican
construction workers in 1903. Following the railroad’s recruitment, many poor and non
skilled African Americans migrated from southern states, expecting better jobs and a
better racial climate. By 1920, the Los Angeles African-American population increased
to 15,579.10
Unlike early Chinese and Japanese immigrants, early African Americans in California
did not encounter much hostility from whites. Two factors probably contributed to their
seemingly unconcerned attitudes toward African Americans. One was the small and
“relatively inconspicuous” African-American population up to 1920. The other relates
to whites’ obsession with anti-Chinese and Japanese sentiment in California.11
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Whites in Los Angeles did not pay much attention to African Americans until around
1915, although, in 1910, the African-American population (7,599) in Los Angeles
exceeded both Chinese (1,954) and Japanese (4,238) populations in the city.12 They
were too preoccupied with the perceived threat of the Chinese and Japanese populations.
So, compared with the Chinese and Japanese, African Americans in Los Angeles lived in
an environment relatively free from restrictions against buying property and sending their
children to school.13 In 1900, thirty-four percent of Los Angeles’ African Americans
owned homes, exceeding the homeowning rates for Mexicans or Japanese Americans.
Furthermore, the early African Americans in Los Angeles had some political
opportunities, too. In the late 1890s, Los Angeles became one of the few cities in the
United States to have an African-American police officer and fireman.14
Despite their early laxity toward African Americans, Los Angeles whites quickly
changed their mood. This sudden mood swing in 1920 grew out of two developmental
changes in the city. The African-American population growth unfortunately coincided
with a large number of Southern whites flowing into the city. When the AfricanAmerican population in the city doubled from 7,599 in 1910 to 15,579 in 1920,15 a large
number of Southerners with their southern racial etiquette migrated into the city. Los
Angeles’ whites became fearful, even though the African-American population amounted
to only 2.7 percent of its total population. So, for this fear, Southerners attempted to
transplant their racial ideas into the city. Starting a “whites-only jitney bus system,” they
avoided riding public transportation with African Americans. This shift in racial
attitudes changed Los Angeles from a frontier city open to diversity into a narrowly
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defined city closed to non-whites and brought increasingly hostile attitudes toward
African Americans into the city.16
Furthermore, this hostility delivered the first African-American ghetto in Los Angeles.
To keep African Americans in an inferior position, Los Angeles whites instituted very
rigid and efficient residential segregation. To this end, they established race restrictive
covenants and block agreements. Because racially restrictive covenants prohibited white
property owners from selling or renting their property to non-white persons, these devices
forced African Americans to stay in the Central Avenue area and hurried the whites to
exit from Central Avenue to the suburbs. Both devices—race-restrictive covenants on
property deeds and mapping out block agreements—promoted not only whites’ mass
exodus from the area but also African Americans’ concentration in that area by
preventing African Americans and other non-whites from buying homes in other areas.
In essence, the devices made it possible for Los Angeles whites successfully to keep
African Americans’ population growth, economic gain, and educational and social
mobility to a minimum. While the restrictive covenants restrained white owners from
selling their property to non-whites, the block agreements reinforced and legitimized the
covenants by making the whole area unavailable to any non-whites. A distinctly visible
•
•
•
African-American
community—the ghetto—appeared in
Los Angeles by 1908. IV

By 1920, the overcrowded and deteriorated condition became much worse. The lack
of new home construction and inadequate maintenance pushed the area to further
deterioration.

Nearly all houses along Central Avenue that had been built before World

War I showed structural damages caused by inadequate repairs and maintenance. Signs
of a slum, such as “few sanitary conveniences, leaky pipes and roofs, patched windows,

69

and doors,” prevailed in the area. In addition, in 1922, the northern section of Central
Avenue was rezoned as a manufacturing area. Over a hundred industries moved into the
area by 1939.18 Although these companies might have provided more jobs, they certainly
made living there very crowded and unpleasant.
By 1920, the covenants and court decisions ended African Americans’ efforts to move
into neighborhoods adjacent to central Los Angeles. They prevented African-American
communities from expanding into outlying areas by surrounding them with all-white
areas closed to any African Americans.19 Moreover, court decisions and whites’
intimidation made the devices function successfully. In implementing race-restrictive
covenants and block agreements, court decisions bolstered them, and white intimidation
carried them out, creating a very rigid and efficient residential segregation.20 The
covenants were further enhanced in 1928 when the California Supreme Court made race
restrictive covenants retroactively applicable. This ruling forced African-American
families already living in the restricted areas to leave their homes because the previous
sale of the property by white owners to any African American buyer was illegal.
According to this ruling, all African Americans living in outlying areas of the Central
Avenue were breaking the law on the grounds that a restrictive covenant retroactively
made the sale illegal.21 By 1930, seventy percent of the city’s African-American
population resided in “one physical ghetto stretching approximately thirty blocks down
central Avenue [from 62nd Street] and several blocks east to the railroad tracks, or in a
few detached islands, especially on West Jefferson, Temple Street, and just south of the
city in Watts.”22
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Nonetheless, the growing Los Angeles African-American middle class fought against
housing segregation. When African Americans moved into the northern end of Central
Avenue seeking comparatively inexpensive rents, European-American property owners
panicked and abandoned the area. Breaking their restrictive covenants and block
agreements, they sold their property to African Americans at inflated prices. This act of
selling made the African-American middle class move initially to the northern end of
Central Avenue. But the majority of the African-American middle class remained in a
segregated area until 1948 when the U.S. Supreme Court finally declared the covenants
and the block agreements unconstitutional, making the move to the west side much easier
for middle-class African Americans.23
The Los Angeles African-American community eventually saw a different
environment in the 1940s. They had made some small progress in spite of European
Americans’ persistent attempts to exclude them by deterring their progress. World War
II brought significant economic gains and lifted them up to be one of the major groups in
the city. The war economy attracted a huge influx of African Americans into the city.24
During World War II, Los Angeles became a major military industrial site, and the
city faced a tremendous labor shortage. Although Los Angeles African Americans had
generally been shut out from obtaining skilled industrial jobs, massive military contracts
for air craft and shipbuilding demanded a large number of skilled laborers, creating a
market for African-American labor. Consequently, the African-American population
grew from 38,894 (3.1 percent of the population) in 1930 to 63,774 (4.2 percent) in 1940
and to 171,209 (8.7 percent) in 1950.25
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Several factors contributed to the war industry’s desperate need for African-American
labor. The military conscription of as many as 150,000 men from the area, the
internment of Japanese Americans in 1942, and deportation of Mexicans just before the
war all caused a serious labor shortage in Los Angeles. More importantly, President
Roosevelt’s executive order made the substitution of African-American labor possible.
In 1942, under enormous pressure from African-American labor leader A. Philip
Randolph, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that prohibited any racial
discrimination in the city’s military defense contracts. This order broke

iron grip of

racial discrimination” that had been practiced in the defense industry. Soon after that
order, the Southern Pacific Railroad transported southern African Americans “at a rate of
three hundred to four hundred a day.”26
Despite the acute labor shortage and the executive order forbidding racial
discrimination, African Americans in Los Angeles did not automatically get jobs in the
military defense industries. It took local African Americans’ well-organized and strong
political effort. Between 1942 and 1945, the Negro Victory Committee under Reverend
Clayton Russell and the NAACP organized many mass rallies and marches to win jobs.27
Success in getting jobs in the defense industries caused a housing crisis. The
thousands of African Americans who came to the city to work in the aircraft and
shipbuilding industries did not have a place to live, although some poor African
Americans moved into the abandoned Little Tokyo area. The city’s race-restrictive
covenants and block agreements compelled most of these newcomers to live in the
Central Avenue ghetto area.

The area was already run down and overcrowded with an

occupancy rate over ninety-eight percent. With no other place to go, moderately well-
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paid defense workers were pushed together with much poorer African Americans in the
central city. Persistent housing discrimination impeded African Americans from
enjoying their wealth and from further social and economic progress even though they
made significant occupational gains between 1940 and 1950. The housing crisis
remained unsolved until the end of the w ar28
Postwar Los Angeles disappointed and frustrated the heightened expectations of
African Americans. Between 1950 and 1960, they lost some of their war-time
occupational and political gains. The city was once again returning to minority
competition for unskilled jobs, while European Americans had taken the skilled jobs. It
became harder for African Americans to obtain skilled jobs because the old
discriminatory rules were reinstated and the lack of public transportation kept African
Americans from access to suburban jobs. It was the end of the labor shortage. Japanese
Americans were released from internment; soldiers returned; Mexican workers were
imported to Los Angeles again and by 1950 they outnumbered African Americans.
Politically, the African-American community lost not only its strong wartime bargaining
position but also its strong community-based leadership. The Negro Victory Committee
collapsed soon after the war.29
In addition to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, beginning in the 1960s, the
globalization of the U.S. economy, the civil rights movements, and the Watts rebellion
deepened the problems of South Central Los Angeles. The globalization process affected
South Central with further loss of jobs and curtailed economic activities when many
companies closed their plants in the United States and relocated overseas or cut jobs
through downsizing. These plant closings affected South Central residents particularly

73

because the majority of the plants closed were located in the African-American and
Latino communities. Between 1982 and 1989, the closing of 131 plants in Los Angeles
resulted in 124,000 workers losing their jobs. At the same time, the loss of jobs
depressed economic activity in the area. By the end of the 1980s, most retail department
stores, garment manufacturing factories, and supermarket chains moved out of the South
Central area.30
The loss of jobs, the depressed economic activity, the civil rights movement, and the
Watts rebellion all sadly hastened the flight of middle class African Americans and
European Americans from South Central. For the first time, the civil rights movement
allowed African Americans to become entrepreneurs in other places and to enter whitecollar jobs in big companies. As a result, many African-American business owners left
South Central. Because the neighborhoods’ spending capacity dropped when the
majority of middle-class African Americans left, white-owned businesses left, too.
Moreover, the Watts rebellion of 1965 gave a push for the business departures, as South
Central’s high crime rate made it too risky for business owners.31
South Central’s abandoned market condition boosted Korean-American
entrepreneurship. When large retail stores, bank branches, and supermarket chains left
South Central, many Korean-American merchants found a new opportunity. KoreanAmerican storeowners took over the businesses of check cashing, selling grocery and
other convenient items, and selling liquor products.

In other words, in addition to the

rapid increase in Korean-American population, the abandoned market condition made the
prolific Korean Americans’ entrepreneurship possible. It changed their employment
trend. Before the 1970s, most Korean Americans had worked in blue-collar jobs as
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miners, railway workers, farm laborers, cooks, gas station attendants, and garment factory
workers. But, by the late-1960s, with the small capital they accumulated from working in
factory jobs in the United States, or with the capital they brought from Korea, many
Korean Americans began to operate stores. Beginning with the wig retail business, they
gradually expanded their small businesses into dry cleaning and food markets. 32 By the
early 1980s, many Korean Americans in Los Angeles, New York, and other metropolitan
areas had firmly established their small businesses in “groceries and liquor stores, retail
outlets for Asian-imported items, dry cleaners, produce retailers, and garment
subcontracting.”33
The Korean Americans’ propensity to choose small business over other jobs has been
further evidenced by the U.S. census reports. In their study on the subject, sociologists
Light and Bonacich found that small business entrepreneurship among Korean Americans
was three times higher than it was among non-Korean Americans. According to the 1980
U.S. Census Report, 22.5 percent of Korean Americans in Los Angeles chose selfemployment compared with only 8.5 percent of non-Korean Americans in 1980. Light and
Bonacich concluded that Korean Americans’ choice of entrepreneurship exceeds that of
“every other nationality origin group” and that it was a national phenomenon.34 By 1986,
the self-employment rate among Korean Americans further increased to over fifty percent. 35
Pyong Gap Min, another sociologist, explains this high increase in relation to the recent
Korean Americans’ predeparture preparation for going into a small business
entrepreneurship in the United States. According to Min, unlike most Korean immigrants
before 1965, the immigrants in the 1970s came prepared to become entrepreneurs in the
inner-city area with the resources and information needed to start and to run small
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businesses. They not only brought a significant amount of money from Korea to buy
businesses, but also acquired business information and received necessary training through
their jobs at Korean-owned stores. 36
Many Korean Americans sought business opportunities in the African-American
neighborhoods, where vacant stores were available, start-up costs minimal, and competition
not severe.

As Light and Bonacich observe, Korean Americans have shown a tendency to

open their stores in “low income, non-white neighborhoods” abandoned by big
corporations.38 In other words, Korean Americans chose to set up their small businesses in
crime-ridden, economically disadvantaged, and downright dangerous inner-city areas such
as South Central Los Angles.39
Most Korean immigrants did not have easy access to jobs in the American labor
market. Despite their high educational and white-collar occupational backgrounds in
Korea, the language barrier and their unfamiliarity with American culture and customs
prevented them from entering the occupations o f their choice. The threat of deportation
because of unemployment compounded their anxiety, and their overambitious desire to
be rich as quickly as possible hastened them to seize the opportunity to set up a store in
the inner-city areas.40 When these college-educated Korean immigrants could not get
jobs in their pre-immigrant professional fields o f training, especially when they did not
want to wait to make money, and when they had some money ranging from $60,000 to
$250,000, becoming a small business entrepreneur was one alternative for them—even in
economically depressed and dangerous inner-city areas. Hence, instead of working in
blue-collar jobs, these college-educated Korean immigrants started up small businesses in
any area they could afford.41
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South Central’s low spending capacity and high crime rate forced Jews, Italians, Irish,
and other European Americans to leave the area. But these two factors—low spending
capacity and high crime rate—actually tailored the area to be a fitting place for Korean
Americans. South Central required relatively small start-up capital. Because of little
competition among the businesses in the area, it necessitated very minimal expertise to
run the business,42 and a low level of English proficiency. Although it was very risky to
open a shop in any high crime and low spending area, many Korean small business
owners chose to do their business in South Central because it was quite an attractive
locality if one thought that they could handle the danger. This choice of business
locations set the stage for Black-Korean conflicts.43
Black-Korean conflict was almost unavoidable in South Central. It was precipitated
by Korean Americans’ overly ambitious eagerness to make quick money in the inner-city
areas by aggressively trying to succeed economically and socially, and by an almost
desperate attempt to become “almost white.” An apparent over-representation of KoreanAmerican entrepreneurship in the area, low inventory, poor selection of merchandise,
high prices, and rude attitudes made the situation volatile.44 Although only
approximately thirty-five percent of Korean stores served African-American and LatinoAmerican customers in Los Angeles,45 Korean owned liquor-grocery marts, clothing
shops, gas stations, auto-repair shops, real estate agencies, and other types of stores
accounted over eighty percent of all small businesses in South Central.46
On their side, African Americans saw Korean Americans as foreign invaders who
tried to dominate their lives. Korean merchants did not live in South Central; they lived
elsewhere. They squeezed out the scanty resources of the community and gave very little
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back. South Central African-American community leaders and residents complained
that Korean merchants were ruthless moneymakers, exploiting the residents by
overcharging for poor quality goods and refusing to hire African Americans 47 They only
cared about making money; the dollar defeated their social and moral obligations to the
community. They neither cared about how the money was made nor were they
concerned about how their businesses affected the community. One example of this is
the proliferation of Korean liquor stores in African-American and Latino-American
communities.
South Central had more liquor stores than any other Los Angeles counties. In South
Central, liquor stores are found almost on every comer. Many times, liquor stores sat
directly across from churches. Some estimated that South Central had over 254 liquor
stores before the 1992 Los Angeles riots. According to Mayor Bradley’s 1992 South
Central Community/Merchant Liquor Task Force report, South Central had seventeen
liquor licenses per square mile when other Los Angeles counties had 1.6 licenses per
square mile.48
In the early and mid-1980s, before Korean Americans bought the liquor stores in
South Central, residents successfully put the pressure on passing an ordinance at least to
limit new liquor stores. This ordinance, however, did not apply to the liquor stores
already in operation. Additionally, when banks, grocery chains, and retail stores left the
area, South Central residents did not have any access to these types of business
establishment in the area.

This lack of normal business in the area gave many liquor

storeowners an avenue to obtain the liquor license “by providing public conveniences and
necessities” that were not ‘Svidely available in a neighborhood.” Check cashing, selling
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groceries, and other convenience items became a vehicle for them to get a liquor license
i

in the area.

49

While liquor is one of the most lucrative businesses to many Korean-American
entrepreneurs, it is the source of violence and crime for many South Central residents.
The community sees that liquor stores generally generate “drunkenness, violence,
prostitution, drug dealing, and crime” in their community. They believe that liquor
stores physically and morally break down the members of their community. Children
cannot avoid drunks who hang out in front of the liquor stores on their way to school, nor
can many church members avoid drunks on their way to enter their church as many liquor
stores are located directly in front of churches.50
The depressed economic condition, the prolific Korean-American entrepreneurs, and
rampant crime, drugs, and gang violence are the backdrops for Black-Korean conflicts in
South Central Los Angles.51 They are also the backdrops for Soon Ja Du’s killing of
Latasha Harlins. At the trial, Joseph Du, Soon Ja’s son, testified that the store had had
three robberies, over thirty burglaries, and a couple of gang threats during the two years
since it began operation in the area.52 In 1990, the thirty-two blocks surrounding the
Dus’ Empire Liquor store at 9127 South Figueroa Street had one of the city’s highest
crime rates. Assaults, robberies, and murders were frequent in the area. Gang activities
threatened the safety of the residents as well as the merchants in the area, making tempers
flare quickly.53
Black-Korean tension in South Central Los Angles rose to a new high point during the
Soon Ja Du murder incident.

On March 16, 1991, following an argument in which Soon

Ja, a fifty-one-year old54 Korean liquor and grocery store owner, accused a fifteen-year-
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old African-American customer, Latasha Harlins, of shoplifting, Soon Ja killed Latasha
by shooting her in the back of the head with a .38 caliber revolver after Latasha struck
Soon Ja. Latasha was a ninth grader in Westchester High School at the time of her
death.
Soon Ja Du’s immigration experience was shared by many Korean Americans.

In order

to avoid Korea’s hellish school entrance examinations for their children, Hung Ki (Billy) Du
and his wife, Soon Ja, immigrated to the United States with their three children in 1976. In
that year, the annual Korean immigration number first reached thirty thousand.

They both

had a college education and came from Christian, middle-class backgrounds. At first, Soon
Ja and her husband worked in blue-collar jobs, as a couch assembler and a repairman,
respectively. In 1981 they bought a convenience mart in San Fernando, and in 1989 they
bought another store, Empire Liquor Market, in South Central Los Angeles. The residents
around Empire Liquor Market saw the Dus as rude and disrespectful. According to
residents interviewed after the March 16 incident as reported in the Los Angeles Times on
March 20, 1991, the owners “often shouted insults at customers and frequently accused them
of shoplifting.”55
Latasha Harlins, a studious and self-assured African American high school freshman,
lived with her grandmother about five minutes walking distance from the Dus’ store.
Her father had left the family, and her mother was killed in 1985.

Although Latasha

came from a poor family, like most residents in South Central, she was ambitious.
Latasha wanted to go to law school.56 She also knew how to survive South Central’s
harsh street life; she knew how to defend herself when attacked.
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On Saturday morning, March 16, 1991, Soon Ja and Latasha met for the first time in
Du’s liquor and grocery store. Soon Ja had had enough of crimes, shopliftings, and gang
violence surrounding her store. She had to show that she was older, superior, and right.
Soon Ja could not let the young blacks terrorize her and her family in her own store. On the
other hand, Latasha could not let Soon Ja accuse her of shoplifting and take her backpack
without a fight, either. Both misunderstood the other’s expectations and demands. Soon Ja
grabbed Latasha. Latasha swiftly hit Soon Ja’s face at least three times, and Soon Ja
quickly shot Latasha in the back of the head, killing her.57
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FALL FROM GRACE
On the surface, the issues in the case of People o f the State o f California v. Soon Ja
Du may not appear to be particularly linked to racial prejudice. Many people tried to
convince the public that it had nothing to do with race. From the very beginning, police
tried to convince the public that the shooting was not racially motivated.1 Also, the
Korean-American community featured the case as a simple business quarrel between a
Korean-American grocer and an African-American customer that turned into a murder,
while the African-American community immediately saw it shaded by racism. The two
communities interpreted the case from opposing points of view.

Still, Soon Ja’s

testimony in court and her conduct after the incident suggest strong connections to racial
prejudice, which draped her unfeeling and untruth. The Dus’ words to many reporters
and the police, the probation report, and Soon Ja’s letter to the judge all unmistakably
revealed Soon Ja’s negative attitude toward African Americans. They suggest that Soon
Ja’s racism consumed her decency.
This incident had several layers o f motions, interconnecting to one another. This
deadly incident was first put into action by Soon Ja’s presumption that all African
Americans are potential shoplifters. After her presumption set a chain of events in
motion, Soon Ja’s rage and racism reigned everything. Her unyielding determination to
show her superiority over an African-American teen-ager placed Soon Ja in a fatal power
struggle with Latasha and ultimately led to shooting her to death. As is the case with
many Korean Americans, Soon Ja’s unsophisticated manners in handling AfricanAmerican customers, her ignorance of their culture, especially in the economically
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depressed and crime-ridden area, underlined her prejudice against African Americans.
Her unfamiliarity with American culture and her lack of consideration toward other
cultures led to an unavoidable clash. Furthermore, Soon Ja’s traditional Korean
Confucian code o f proper conduct based on the three bonds and the five rules deepened
the deadly collision with Latasha’s code of appropriate street conduct. In the fight,
neither recognized the other’s different interpretations, expectations, and demands.
On Monday, September 30, 1991, the murder trial, The People o f the State o f
California v. Soon Ja Du started.2 The testimony in this case lasted three days, with
Superior Court Judge Joyce Ann Karlin presiding. Judge Karlin banned live television
coverage, cameras’ taking any pictures of witnesses, and tape-recording of any
testimony.3 Deputy District Attorney Roxane Carvajal represented the people of the
state of California while Charles Lloyd and Richard Leonard defended Soon Ja Du.
Carvajal presented ten witnesses, and the defense introduced the three Du family
members as defense witnesses: Soon Ja Du, Hung Ki (Billy) Du, and Joseph Du. All
three Dus used a Korean interpreter in their testimony. For direct evidence in this case, a
surveillance camera videotape,4 two eyewitnesses, and a 911 audiotape were presented.
Soon Ja took the stand on the last day of the trial and began testifying about what
happened on the morning of the shooting. By the time Latasha walked into the store,
about forty minutes after she opened the Empire Liquor Market at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday,
March 16, 1991, she had already served “a little over ten” customers.5 When the
confrontation began, only two children, who witnessed the entire incident, remained in the
store. When Latasha walked to the juice section and got a bottle of orange juice, Soon Ja
testified that she watched Latasha through the rear view mirrors6 installed in the store.
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Soon Ja’s eyes followed Latasha going to the juice section, taking a foot long plastic bottle
of orange juice out of the refrigerator shelf, and sticking it in the left pocket of her
backpack. And Soon Ja only “noticed the top of the orange juice.” Then, she testified
that Latasha immediately turned and came directly toward her at the check stand. Because
she saw Latasha put the bottle in her backpack, she said that she assumed Latasha was
going to steal the $1.79 bottle of orange juice. She also noticed that Latasha was wearing
what appeared to her to be gang member apparel—a cap, a jacket, and a backpack—that
her son Joseph had warned her about.7 Until Latasha came to the counter, Soon Ja
mistakenly thought that Latasha was a man in his mid-twenties. Soon Ja continued to watch
Latasha as she stood in line behind the two eyewitnesses.8
At the time of the incident there were three security cameras inside the Empire Liquor
Market. At a close range, the surveillance camera “mounted over the door”9 recorded the
entire incident.10 Because the camera focused on the counter where the incident
occurred,11 it provided the most important piece of direct evidence in the murder trial.12
As early as March 18, the police informed the public about the existence of the
videotape. Until the trial, however, the police and the district attorney kept the videotape
from the public, particularly from the media, against the expressed desires of both the Dus
and the Harlins.13 While District Attorney fra Reiner withheld the tape from the public to
obtain untainted jurors,14the Black-Korean Alliance15 and the Korean-American
community opposed the release because they feared African Americans’ retaliation against
Korean Americans. The Korean-American community was so worried about the strong
possibility that the videotape would excite the African-American community that they had
even tried to petition against ABC’s effort to get the tape in court.16 According to Lou
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Cannon, a Washington Post journalist, withholding the videotape from the public
inadvertently fostered the continuation of Latasha’s image as a robber in the public’s mind.
Had the public seen the videotape earlier, Cannon claimed, it would have shown that Soon
Ja’s portrayal of Latasha as a thief was false.17
On the first day of the trial, the public saw the videotape for the first time when Judge
Karlin released it after admitting it as evidence. “The videotape of the incident lasted less
than a minute,” including “about thirty-five seconds from the time Latasha walked to the
counter until she dropped dead on the floor.”18 It had neither sound nor color; its pictures
were black and white in muteness. Even though the Dus and Soon Ja’s lawyers questioned
the technical quality of the tape to explain the entire incident, many people thought it
captured the incident quite well. The April 10 Korea Times (English-language weekly)
reported that the police thought that it was a good videotape. At the same time the
newspaper reported that rumors spread in the Korean-American community that police had
edited it to make Soon Ja look guilty of the crime.
This tape was kept in the Exhibit Department of the Discovery Unit of the Los Angeles
Police Department for five months after the trial. Then, the unit destroyed the tape in
accordance with police procedure. Several descriptions of the thirty-five seconds of the
tape appeared. According to the court transcripts of both the Grand Jury Proceedings and
the Criminal Trial Proceedings, Deputy District Attorney Carvajal showed a slow-motion
version of the tape more than fifteen times and reviewed it step by step with Soon Ja and
the two eyewitnesses, nine-year-old Ismail Ali and twelve-year-old Lakeshia Combs.
Defense attorneys Lloyd and Leonard rarely objected to the District Attorney’s description
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of the scenes in the tape. Additionally, there were four more descriptions of the thirty-five
seconds reported in several newspapers.
Additionally, Twilight Los Angeles, 1992, a documentary tape of the 1992 Los Angeles
riots, that I saw on April 22, 2002, contained a good portion of the actual Empire
surveillance videotape. Free-lance journalist Itabari NjerFs description of the scenes came
very close to what it showed in this documentary tape. In addition, because Njeri’s
narration of the videotape appears to be the closest to the interpretation sustained in the
transcripts and because she inteijected the least amount of her own interpretation in
narrating the scenes, Njeri’s narration became the base by which all other descriptions were
examined for this research.

In The Last Plantation: Color, Conflict, and Identity:

Reflections o f A New World Black, she narrates the silent videotape:
A young boy, hands clasped behind his back, waddles into a store.
In blurred, grainy, black-and-white silence he reaches his sister, already at the
counter. She is paying the merchant, a Korean woman. Someone else
approaches the counter from the rear of the store, a Black teenage girl. She
stands waiting her turn. In the mute video, the merchant speaks to her and
points to her backpack. The girl turns sideways to show her the contents of the
bag. The children watch, then slowly back away as the quarrel escalates. The
merchant leans over the counter and grabs for the girl, catching the left sleeve of
her black sweater. The girl tries to slap her hand away. The merchant holds on,
pulling harder. The boy hops sideways toward the door. His sister backs away
too, her arm springing up in a defensive reflex when she sees the girl swing at
the shopkeeper’s head with the backpack. The merchant snatches it. The girl
swipes the woman’s chin with her right fist, then slams her fist into the
merchant’s eye. The woman’s body crumples toward the floor, but the girl tugs
at the bag, pulling the merchant toward her, punching her in the face again. The
merchant falls but comes back hurling a stool at the girl. The girl dodges the
flying stool. The shopkeeper reaches under the counter, comes up with a
holstered gun, and seems to scream for someone as she fumbles with the
weapon. The girl picks up the bottle of orange juice and hands it to the
merchant. But the woman knocks the bottle away. As the girl turns toward the
door to leave, the merchant grips the gun with two hands, aims at her, and
shoots. Literally dead weight, the girl drops to the floor. The merchant’s left
hand flies free, revealing the glinting barrel of a .38 in her right palm. Her knees
seem to buckle. She leans over the counter, looking for the body. She presses a
hand to her injured right eye, still screaming for someone. Seconds pass; she
reels backward, on the verge of collapse. A man enters the picture, the
merchant’s husband. He rushes to his wife behind the counter, then looks over
it, staring at the fallen girl. He picks up the phone and dials 911, then paces
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behind the counter and peers over the divide at the girl’s body. A customer
walks in—a Black man with a doo-rag wrapped around his head He stops when
he sees the body, then moves closer. He is waved away but comes closer still,
stares at the child’s body, turns, then shambles out the door, muttering to himself
in apparent disbelief (pp. 47-48). A policeman enters, spots the body, and takes
the phone from Du. The cop searches the rear of the store, and another officer
enters. Both policemen rush outside, passing Latasha’s unchecked body (p.
151).19

The videotape, however, was fuzzy.

Its poor picture quality and its soundlessness

allowed conflicting interpretations of what actually took place. Despite the less-thanperfect picture quality, both prosecuting and defending attorneys asserted that the videotape
supported their claims. While prosecution declared that the videotape proved Soon Ja’s
intentional killing of an unarmed and retreating Latasha, the defense argued that it
supported her claim of self-defense. After the first day of the testimony, Charles Lloyd,
defense lawyer, told reporters that the videotape showed Latasha’s strikes and threats to kill
Soon Ja. According to Lloyd, even though C4the picture quality of the video isn’t clear and
parts of what the camera captured is open to debate,” it proved Soon Ja’s innocence of her
shooting Latasha with the 38-caliber handgun, which went off accidentally because of its
faulty trigger.21
Reflecting their own self-interest, the viewers interpreted differently Soon Ja’s and
Latasha’s attitudes and behaviors in the fight that led to the murder. This chapter will
present Soon Ja’s claims and examine them in conjunction with the testimony in the court
transcripts and newspaper reports. It will pay particular attention to the step-by-step
descriptions of the videotape presented by the prosecution but not objected to by the
defense.
Soon Ja claimed that Latasha shoplifted orange juice, attempted to rob her, inflicted
severe head injuries on her, which caused unconsciousness and loss of memory, and
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verbally threatened her life. Soon Ja also insisted that she had no knowledge of guns and
no memory of the shooting because she fainted. Most of all, Soon Ja claimed that she
killed Latasha in self-defense because she feared for her life. Considering the confusion
and emotional intensity that had overtaken Soon Ja and Latasha in those thirty-five
seconds, some of Soon Ja’s claims sounded probable while others appeared to be a product
of her desire to save herself from going to prison. The extreme of these interpretations,
however, clearly distinguished the prosecution from the defense, the Harlins from the Dus,
and the African-American community from the Korean-American community.
From the moment the incident took place, the Dus justified the killing by portraying
Latasha as a robber, the aggressor, and Soon Ja as the victim. Two days after the incident,
on March 18, 1991, Korea Times (Korean-language daily) ran an article in a big and bold
headline, “A Black Teenage Girl Demanded Money and Punched [the woman owner].”
This was the first article covering the incident in Korea Times, and it set the tone of the
incident in the Korean community. According to the article, the Dus told the Korea Times
reporter that Latasha carefully looked around the store and tried to take money from Soon
Ja who was alone at the counter. The Dus claimed that the killing was self-defense
because the girl demanded money and attacked the owner. The Los Angeles Times on
March 19 and 22, 1991, reported that Du said “the girl attacked her after being caught
trying to steal the juice.” The Korea Times (English-language weekly) also reported Soon
Ja’s telling police that “the girl attacked her and tried to steal the orange juice and take
money out of the cash register.”22
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Again, Soon Ja told her version of the incident to her family members at the Sybil Brand
Institute for Women on March 17, 1991, and Korea Times (Korean-language daily)
reported it on March 19, 1991:
The black girl came into the store and attempted to steal a bottle of the orange
juice. So when Du told her not to take it, the girl suddenly hit Du on her face with
the plastic bottle of orange juice. Du also said that the girl then proceeded to take
money from the cash register. When, using her own hands, Du tried to stop the girl
taking money from the cash register, the girl punched Du’s face first with her fist
and then with the bottle of orange juice. She said that, without thinking, she pulled
a gun out under cash register and all of a sudden pulled the trigger because she felt
scared for her life. Du told her family that she was in the condition that she couldn’t
even open her eyes because the black girl punched her face.23

Also, Joseph Du, Soon Ja’s thirty-year-old first-born son, told reporters that his mother
told the family about Latasha’s robbery attempt. According to an article in Korea Times
(English-language weekly) on March 27, 1991, Joseph told reporters how appalled he was
by what he read in the Los Angles Times article, which reported that Latasha was walking
away from the fight over the orange juice when his mother shot and killed her. It
continued: “Since the shooting incident on March 16,” Joseph with “his pictures taken
about a dozen times,” told the family’s side of the story to “more than two dozen
reporters.” The Korea Times article printed his story:
“They don’t know anything. All they’ve heard is what the police have told them,
and the police has distorted the story dramatically,” the son said This is what
happened according to Joseph Du, who spoke with his mother. “At approximately 9
a.m. on Saturday, March 16, Latasha Harlins came into the store. She took a bottle
of orange juice and was about to leave without paying. Soon Ja Du called the girl
and demanded payment, her son said. Harlins started bickering with Du, and there
was a scuffle between them. Harlins threw hard punches at the grocery owner—one
of which resulted in the black eye, he added. Harlins then tried to steal money from
the cash register. Du tried to scare her flashing the gun she kept under the register,
Joseph Du explained But Harlins was undaunted and continued to hit Du. As she
was about to faint from the blows, Du shot Harlins, he said24

Six and half months later, during the trial, Joseph testified on cross-examination that his
mother told him the story about Latasha’s attempted robbery about two or three days after
the incident, and that he told the Los Angeles Times reporter, John Lee, the robbery story.
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In contrast to Joseph’s statements to the reporters, his court testimony, and her own
statement to police, Soon Ja denied in court ever telling the robbery story to either her son
or her husband 25 At first, she admitted telling her son the story; however, later in her
testimony, she changed her previous admission.
Billy Du concurred with his wife. lie said that his wife did not tell him the robbery
story, but the open cash register and scattered money gave him the impression of a hold
up.26 That is why, Billy said, he told the robbery story to a 911 operator and to the police
officers at the murder scene. However, when asked about it on the witness stand, Billy
denied relaying this story to the 911 or to the police officers until he heard his own voice
on the tape.27
Before the trial, in several newspaper articles, defense attorney Charles Lloyd defended
Soon Ja’s innocence based on her robbery story. He argued that the robbery attempt
provided Soon Ja a cause to kill Latasha to protect her own life. According to Lloyd, Soon
Ja had a right to protect her life and property if Latasha tried to take them away from her.
Lloyd further asserted that the closeness of Latasha’s body to the cash register proved that
Latasha had attempted robbery and posed a threat to Soon Ja’s life; therefore, Soon Ja had
the right to pull the gun and to kill her. Although Latasha was not seen reaching into the
cash register in the videotape, in these articles Lloyd insisted that Latasha’s body position
“near the cash register, close to the area where Du was standing,” gave him proof that the
robbery story was true and that the killing was self-defense. 28
•

Later, in court, Soon Ja reversed this robbery claim.29 She testified that Latasha did
not attempt to get money from the cash register. This testimony contradicted not only her
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previous claim that Latasha attempted to take money from the store’s cash register but also
her lawyers’ argument that the robbery story was true.
The videotape shows Latasha standing in line behind the two young eyewitnesses, Ali
and Combs—a nine-year-old boy and his sister, a twelve-year-old girl. 30 They lived across
•

the street from the store and came into the store that morning to buy hair gel for their
mother. They stayed at the counter about six feet away from Soon Ja and Latasha and
watched the entire incident from the time the fight broke out to the time they saw a gun in
Soon Ja’s hands.31
Ali and Combs gave quite consistent and firm testimonies. Although Ali was only nine
years old and his sister was only twelve years old, they gave at least two consistent
statements to police officers. Ralph Spinello, the second police officer who arrived at the
crime scene that morning, took their statements at the crime scene. Again, later that
afternoon, Jerry C. Johnson, a South Bureau homicide investigator, interviewed them about
the videotape.32 In the trial, no one pointed out or objected to any major inconsistencies in
their statements to the two police officers or between their statements to the police and their
testimony in the grand jury and in the criminal court. For the most part, between the grand
jury and the criminal trial court, their testimony was consistent.
Furthermore, in the grand jury on April 24, 1991, and in the criminal trial court on
September 30, 1991, the videotape corroborated their testimony. The videotape had no
sound; it was visual only. So these two young eyewitnesses, sometimes, gave a voice to
many parts of the videotape. They stood firm on what they saw and heard even when
Lloyd attempted to discredit them by employing a confusion tactic.

For instance, he

asked Ali to show him which hand is right or left to discredit Ali’s testimony of seeing
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Latasha’s money in her left hand while he tried to change Combs’ testimony that Latasha
did not make any verbal threats to kill Soon Ja.33
The videotape showed that Latasha had money in her left hand. In addition, the two
eyewitnesses and police officers testified that Latasha had $2.00 in her hand. In the
criminal court, however, Soon Ja denied seeing Latasha holding money in her hand. When
Richard A. Leonard, another defense attorney for Soon Ja, asked her about seeing the
money, she answered: “No, not at all. I’m a business operator. If she had the money, I
would try to grab the money rather than the orange juice since she already had the orange
juice in this backpack.”34 Soon Ja apparently assumed that Latasha not only did not, but
also could not, have money to pay for the juice.
Ali and Combs saw Latasha holding $2.00 to $3.00 of paper currency (not coins) in her
left hand at the counter. They also testified that Latasha held the money towards the
counter when Soon Ja started insinuating that Latasha was stealing the $1.79 bottle of the
orange juice. In addition, these two youngsters identified Latasha’s money on the
videotape by pointing at a white object in Latasha’s hand. Combs testified that “at first
she was trying to put it [the money] on the counter, but then the oriental lady started
grabbing her. So then she—it was still in her hands.” In fact, it was beside Latasha’s left
hand when Police Officer Jeffrey Alley responded to the call and arrived at Empire Liquor
Market on that day.

In court, he identified “a photograph of the victim lying in front of

the counter, and there’s a small amount of money underneath of her left hand.” Also,
Officer Johnson testified that he “saw two $1.00 bills in U.S. currency lying on the floor
next to the victim’s left hand.”35
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Ali and Combs recounted how the fight began. They testified that when Latasha’s turn
came to pay for the juice, Soon Ja started to accuse Latasha of shoplifting in a halfsuspicious, “mean manner” by saying: “Are you trying to steal my orange juice?” and
Latasha, getting ready to pay for it, responded: “No. I’m not. I am trying to pay for it.”
The videotape also displayed that, besides standing in line, Latasha was turning “sideways
to show her the contents of the bag” when it came her turn to pay for the juice and when
Soon Ja said something to her and “pointed to her backpack.”36 But Soon Ja did not wait
for Latasha.
Within a second, the store’s videotape showed that the quarrel escalated.

In the

videotape, Soon Ja was seen leaning over and quickly reaching across the counter to pull
the orange juice out of the backpack, grabbing Latasha’s [left] arm, and then catching the
left sleeve of her sweater. Latasha was seen trying to slap Soon Ja’s hand away from the
sweater sleeve, and Soon Ja was seen pulling Latasha’s sweater harder and harder and not
letting her go. In describing the fight, Combs testified that Latasha told Soon Ja, “Let me
go. Bitch, let me go” and that Soon Ja also called Latasha a “bitch” and repeated her
accusation of Latasha’s shoplifting the juice, and then they “scuffled for the backpack.”
Soon after that, in the videotape, Latasha was seen swinging the backpack at Soon Ja who
snatched it.37
Soon Ja, on the other hand, told a quite different version of how the fight started. She
testified that “her first word [to Latasha] was “Please pay for the orange juice,” [and
Latasha’s first word to her was] ‘What orange juice?” Latasha’s alleged disrespectful
response to her supposedly polite asking convinced her further that Latasha was a
shoplifter, Soon Ja claimed.

Now she was convinced that Latasha was one of the
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shoplifters who “would take the merchandise, would place it inside the bra or any place
where the owner would not notice, and would come up to the check stand, would buy some
small items, and pay for them and leave.”38
Contrary to her suspicion, it was a foot long, quart-size plastic juice bottle that could not
be hidden easily. According to Comb’s testimony, Latasha put the bottle in the top pocket
of the backpack she was wearing on her shoulder and almost the whole bottle was sticking
out to the left. But Soon Ja said that she only saw the top of the bottle. Furthermore,
Latasha stood in line and waited for her turn to pay. She did not try to buy any other items
at the check stand.
When Deputy District Attorney Carvajal asked Soon Ja: ‘During the fight when this
young lady was hitting you, at any point in time did you say “bitch, why are you stealing
my orange juice?” Contrary to Combs’s testimony that she heard Soon Ja calling Latasha
a “bitch” after Latasha used the word “bitch” first, she repudiated using the word “bitch.”
Soon Ja at first firmly denied either Latasha or she used such a word. She said to her
defending lawyer that they [Latasha and Soon Ja] “had no conversation” and that Latasha
“just hit” her. Soon Ja added, “I never heard that word before. I never said that word. I
didn’t even know what the meaning of that word was. After I got out of the hospital and
the jail, and when I had a chance to talk to my daughter and I asked her about the meaning
of that word, she told me that’s a bad word and you don’t really need to know.”

But Soon

Ja later changed her testimony about Latasha’s saying the word “bitch” when Carvajal
asked her: “Is this the first time that she [Latasha] said that to you?”

Soon Ja answered

her: “No, she called me a “bitch” the first time also when she was hitting me.”40
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Soon Ja, on the other hand, narrated the fight more intensely. Although she thought
Latasha was going to make some kind of trouble, she did not expect that Latasha ctwas
going to beat her up,” so she “had pulled on the backpack” with all her strength “as hard as
I was about to die.” Against her expectation, Latasha did not let the backpack go without a
fight. When Soon Ja “was struck twice with the fist,” she described Latasha’s fist as “an
iron-like fist,” which sent her down to the floor and thought her “[right] eye was going to
fall out.”41
The videotape showed Latasha punching Soon Ja’s face at least three times: ctthe girl
swipes the woman’s chin with her right fist, then slams her fist into the merchant’s eye.
The woman’s body crumples toward the floor, but the girl tugs at the bag, pulling the
merchant toward her, punching her in the face again.” Meanwhile, the backpack “swung
free and fell to the counter.” Combs testified that Soon Ja got the backpack and ctthrew it
behind the counter.”42
Did Latasha strike Soon Ja’s face more than three times? Although it is not easy to
determine with certainty how many times Latasha hit Soon Ja’s face with her fist, the
number of blows ranges from two to five. Combs testified that she saw Latasha hitting her
four times.43 Soon Ja first said two but later changed to five all together: three before
throwing the chair and two more after that.

In the videotape, many saw three blows: one

sweeping blow on the chin, one on the right eye, and one on the face.
The Korean-American community counted four to five strikes landing on Soon Ja’s
face, which set them apart from other communities. For example, while the Los Angeles
Times counted three punches seen in the videotape, the Korea Times reported that Latasha
hit Soon Ja four to five times. Los Angeles Times on October 2, 1991, reported that in the
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videotape Latasha was seen striking Soon Ja in the face at least three times. But Korea
Times (Korean-language daily) on March 19, 1991, reported that Soon Ja told her family
that Latasha punched Soon Ja’s face twice: first with her fist and second with the bottle of
orange juice. Joseph Du told the Korea Times reporter that one of Latasha’s punches
resulted in Soon Ja’s black eye. Lt. Mike Markulis, head of the police investigation, said,
ccDu sustained the black eye when Harlins managed to hit her twice in the face.” The
October 10, 1991, Korea Times (Korean-language daily) also wrote that in the videotape,
Soon Ja received four blows from Latasha: two before and two more after the chair was
thrown. Also, Korea Times (English-language weekly) on October 7 reported that
“Harlins hit Du four times with her fist and once with the bag” before the chair was thrown.
It continued that “a videotape from a store camera shows Du grabbing Harlins by the arm
when the girl swung her fist and backpack, hitting the shopkeeper five times.”44
In the videotape, Soon Ja was seen falling down on the floor but standing up with a
three-foot high chair and throwing it at Latasha, and Latasha was seen dodging the flying
chair, about five feet away from Soon Ja. Soon Ja explained that “without any thoughts”
she “just saw a chair through the side of her eye” and “out of reflex,” her “hand happened
to grab onto the leg of a chair” and threw it at Latasha “because she thought she was going
to die,” when she fell on the floor. Soon Ja then insisted that after she threw the chair,
Latasha “walked up to her and hit her again” in the face, which sent her to the floor for the
second time.45
The videotape supported neither Soon Ja’s claim of a second fall nor of Latasha’s
additional hitting. In the videotape, Latasha was not near Soon Ja after the chair was
thrown, so Latasha could not have hit her again. The videotape, however, showed Soon Ja
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reaching under the counter after Latasha dodged the chair and coming up with a handgun
after fumbling to unsnap the holster and screaming for her husband. Combs also witnessed
Soon Ja’s struggle to pull the gun out of the brown gun pouch. According to Combs, Soon
Ja tried to unsnap the holster to take the gun out of the pouch. The videotape also
displayed Latasha bending, picking up the bottle, and handing it to Soon Ja, and Soon Ja
knocking it behind the counter with her gun. The videotape did not show Latasha hitting
Soon Ja after she threw the chair.46
Soon Ja further illustrated the moment just before the shooting. According to Soon Ja,
when she fell to the floor for the second time, “a gun just happened to fall into her
[extended] hands” after she saw a gun underneath the paper bag on the shelf right in front
of her eyes. She recalled that she “just grabbed onto it somehow” and that she “had no real
purpose [with the gun].” She also remembered that Latasha told her two or three times “in
a very low voice, ‘Bitch, I’ll kill you’” from “the moment of my falling down [the second
time] to the moment of my getting up again.” So, according to Soon Ja, as Latasha gave
the orange juice to her, she threatened to kill Soon Ja when she saw a gun in Soon Ja’s
hand. These verbal threats to kill her made Soon Ja feel that her life was in a danger.47
Carvajal, the prosecuting attorney, described Soon Ja’s alleged “second fall” in the
videotape as “bending over and picking up the gun that was under the counter.” She also
pointed out to her that Latasha was “not near the counter” at that moment. Defense had no
objections to Carvajal’s argument. Also, the two eyewitnesses testified that they did not
hear Latasha’s threatening words. After seeing the videotape scenes several times from
the point she threw the chair at Latasha until she stood up with a gun in her hand, Soon Ja
finally admitted in court that she “felt—fallen down for the second time” because she “was
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somewhat dazed so perhaps I didn’t know what was going on.”48 At that moment, in the
videotape, Latasha was seen turning toward the door to leave, while Soon Ja was seen
gripping the gun with two hands, aiming at Latasha, and shooting her. This time,
Latasha’s body fell to the floor.
Claiming her memory lapse, Soon Ja at first denied shooting. She remembered neither
touching the gun nor aiming at Latasha nor shooting her. The only thing she remembered
was crying and the pain in her eye. Soon Ja answered, “I don’t know how I held the gun
even and was fired somehow,” when Leonard, her lawyer, asked, “At any point in time, do
you remember pointing this gun at the back of the head of that young lady and pulling the
trigger?” Although she had admitted to firing the gun to Officer Johnson, after she was
arrested at the hospital, in court, she repeated her memory lapse again to Carvajal: “I do not
recall even discharging the gun.” Soon Ja further explained: the first time she found out
that she shot the girl was when her daughter told her in the hospital while she was “lying in
a bed,” with her chest attached to a testing machine and with both hands handcuffed.49
Contraiy to Soon Ja’s repeated claims of ignorance of guns and renouncement of the
aiming and shooting, she evidently aimed at the retreating Latasha who had made at least
one step toward the door because Soon Ja was about five feet four inches tall and Latasha
was five feet six inches tall. The difference of their height required Soon Ja to hold the gun
in a slightly upward position.50
David Butler, an LAPD firearms expert, testified about the handgun that Soon Ja had
used to shoot Latasha: a .38-caliber Smith and Wesson five-shot stainless steel revolver
with a two-inch barrel. According to his testimony, someone had altered the hammer of
the gun to fire it with a hair-trigger pull if the hammer was cocked, meaning the gun could
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go off with no trigger pressure at all—but only if the gun was already cocked under some
circumstances. Unless its trigger was pulled, the gun, however, would not go off by
simply dropping to the floor or bumping against a table. Butler also said, ‘"the gun cannot
be put in the holster in the cocked position and have the holster closed,” which meant that
Soon Ja must have cocked the hammer.51
Many people who saw the videotape were puzzled by the inconsistency between Soon
Ja’s claimed unfamiliarity with guns and her apparent familiarity with it as seen in the
videotape. Soon Ja’s expressed mental and physical conditions at the time of the shooting
also damaged her credibility. She was seen in the videotape holding the gun with both
hands, bracing on the counter, aiming at Latasha, and firing the gun. The fact that Soon
Ja’s single bullet hit the back of Latasha’s head, approximately 3 to 4 feet from her,
strained credibility. She shot Latasha with her “dazed and swollen right eye,” with a gun
that “just happen[ed] to fall into her extended hand,” and by simply “holding the grip of the
gun and shaking it” just once “in a state of panic.”52
Soon Ja, on the other hand, firmly asserted that she knew nothing about guns. She had
neither seen anyone “pulling the hammer back before firing” it, nor had she known the
trigger had to be pulled back in order for the gun to go off. She did not even know how to
“pull the trigger on the gun.” Furthermore, she did not even “know where the focus of the
trigger” was. She never touched it and never used it before the incident. To stress her
ignorance of guns further, in the courtroom she demonstrated her shooting act by putting
her finger not on the trigger, but entirely on the grip of the gun.53
Furthermore, to support her complete ignorance of guns, Soon Ja then talked about her
limited experience with American culture and Korean culture relating to women.

In some
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“gangster” movies and in Vietnam War films, she said, she saw people’s arms stretching
out in front of the gun, holding the grip of the gun, and shaking it made the gun go off.
Therefore, she did not know that a gun has to be cocked to fire. She said, “I seen hand
grip it [gun], and it get discharged. I never seen somebody actually putting the finger
somewhere and actually discharging the gun.” But she said that she did know that she had
to point the gun in the direction of the target to hit it. In addition, emphasizing that she
was a traditional Korean woman who could not have known or seen a gun, Soon Ja
suggested to the court that, for a Korean woman, shooting was not imaginable. She said
that the first time she ever saw a gun was after she came to the United States in 1976.
Because “Korean women only take care of the house chores and domestic work,” and she
never “even had an opportunity to see the gun before.”54
Although Soon Ja tried to maintain her absolute ignorance of guns throughout the trial,
many doubted her testimony. Lloyd tried to sustain Soon Ja’s story by pointing out that
Soon Ja’s hand on the trigger was not seen in the videotape when she pulled the gun out.55
Yet, in the videotape, Soon Ja appeared to be quite confident in holding, aiming, and
shooting the gun. She seemed to be neither nervous nor clumsy in handling the gun. At
this moment in the videotape, she showed not only a calm but also decisive and assured
appearance. She was seen not shaking the gun up and down to make the gun go off as she
had seen in some “gangster” and Vietnam War movies. She did not shake it; she accurately
aimed the gun at Latasha, casting a serious doubt that she could accidentally make a gun go
off “by holding the grip of the gun and shaking it” and kill Latasha in a single shot.
Officer Johnson also thought that Soon Ja’s claim of unfamiliarity with firearms was
unconvincing when she was able to kill Latasha with a single bullet. Johnson concluded
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that Soon Ja had tried “to create a false impression to the jury by claiming complete
inexperience with weapons and a lack of knowledge as to how they are held.”56
Billy, Soon Ja’s husband, was the first person to enter the store after the shooting.
According to Billy, when he rushed into the store after hearing the sound of a gunshot, he
saw his wife leaning on the counter with both hands stretched out; then she “slipped down
on the floor.”

He found his wife lying down on the floor behind the counter. Then, his

wife asked him “where was that person?” He saw Latasha lying on the floor and his wife
falling into unconsciousness. Billy described his wife as “falling into—collapsing into
deep unconsciousness” and as “dying in front of him.”

Nevertheless, when the police

arrived at the store, they found that his wife appeared to be passed out, but was sitting on a
chair behind the counter and that Billy was talking to a 911 operator.57
The videotape showed Soon Ja as she “leaned over the counter” and “peered repeatedly
over the counter,” “looking for the body.” Although she failed to see Latasha’s body just
lying on the floor less than 4 feet from the counter in a pool of blood, she was able to ask
her husband the whereabouts of “the girl who just hit her” and “asked him to call the
CO

police” as soon as she saw her husband.
Was Soon Ja really looking for Latasha, who had fallen to the floor less than four feet
from her with blood gushing out of her?

Could she really avoid or miss seeing Latasha on

the floor over the counter? Or was she still trying to make sure that Latasha would not get
up from the floor and somehow kill her?

When Carvajal asked Soon Ja, “Were you

afraid she was going to come up [from the floor] and get you?” She responded “Yes” to
Carvajal’s question.

At one point in his testimony, Billy quickly changed his response to

Carvajal’s question of what he was saying in the 911 tape from “my wife asked me ‘Where
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was that customer? She was—I ’m not sure whether she’s dead or not’” to “she asked me
where is that customer that is standing here.”59
Soon Ja’s injuries had been widely publicized in several newspapers, particularly in
the Korean ethnic newspapers in Los Angeles. The March 17, 1991, Los Angeles Times,
the first article of the incident, reported that “the owner later complained of a head injury
suffered during the brief struggle with the girl.” The Korea Times (Korean-language
daily) on March 20, 1991, also reported Soon Ja’s saying that “anyone who sees her
injury that was caused by the girl’s fist and orange juice bottle would understand that she
was in a condition that shooting was unavoidable.” The Korea Times ’ devotion of many
articles to Soon Ja’s injuries and her health conditions following the incident played a
pivotal role in getting the Korean-American community’s sympathy and support for Soon
Ja’s self-defense.60 This point is further explored in the next chapter.
Contrary to Soon Ja’s claim, Latasha’s hitting did not cause all Soon Ja’s injuries.
Although Soon Ja complained of head injuries that she claimed were caused only by
Latasha’s hard punches, Officer Spinello testified that “not all of her injuries necessarily
were the result of being punched by Harlins.” He said that when he arrived on the scene,
Billy was slapping Soon Ja who was in a chair behind the counter. According to
Spinello, Billy started slapping her, “at first not so hard, gradually to very hard slaps until
I had to stop him . . . because of the force he was using.”

Billy subsequently testified

that “he had hit his wife so hard because he panicked, thinking she was slipping into
unconsciousness.”61
Some evidence suggests that Soon Ja may not only have faked her unconsciousness but
also exaggerated her injuries sustained from Latasha’s hitting. Soon Ja claimed that
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Latasha’s “iron-like-punches” caused her head injuries and made her lose consciousness.
And yet, several pieces of conflicting evidence provide doubt to her claim. The
discrediting testimony comes from Officer Spinello, Dr. Joann Williams, the hospital staff,
and Officer Johnson. Officer Spinello thought she was feigning unconsciousness because
he saw “movement” in her eye when he lifted one of her eyelids. When she was taken to
Martin Luther King Jr. Hospital/Drew Medical Center with possible brain damage and eye
and facial injuries, the hospital’s medical staff concluded that she had nothing seriously
wrong with her health except a black eye. They observed Soon Ja feigning
unconsciousness during her stay at the hospital. After an interview with Dr. Joann
Williams, who had examined Soon Ja at the hospital, Patricia Dwyer, the probation officer
who was appointed by the court to evaluate Soon Ja’s suitability for probation, wrote that
“psychomotor testing indicated that defendant was in fact conscious, and staff observed the
defendant sitting up and alert when she believed she was not being watched by hospital
personnel.” Officer Johnson also concurred with the hospital’s findings. After reviewing
the investigating officers’ reports and the videotape, Johnson also thought that Du had
exaggerated her injuries and feigned unconsciousness.62
Soon Ja claimed that she killed Latasha because Latasha physically and verbally
threatened her life. This fear that her life is in danger, Soon Ja said, came from Latasha’s
iron-like punches and her verbal threat, which Latasha made to her at the end of the fifth
punch that sent her to the floor for the second time. Soon Ja’s fear at the moment of
shooting needs to be further examined because the fear became the base for her selfdefense. What made Soon Ja kill Latasha? Was the fear that her life was threatened real,
imagined, or fabricated?
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Soon Ja’s claim that she feared for her life presents some doubt. She testified that she
was not afraid of Latasha when she grabbed her sweater and pulled Latasha’s backpack.
But she said that she started to be afraid of Latasha when Latasha beat her up. Even when
Soon Ja was struck by Latasha and fell down on the floor, and felt that her “[right] eye was
going to fall out,” despite her “dazed, panicked, and shocked” state, she was still able to
throw the backpack behind the counter and a three-foot high chair at Latasha. 63
Soon Ja also claimed that she feared for her life because she suspected that Latasha was
hiding some weapon in the backpack. She testified that Latasha’s unwillingness to give up
her backpack reinforced her suspicion. According to Soon Ja, Latasha’s not giving up her
backpack in spite of Soon Ja’s pulling it as hard as if she “was about to die,” convinced her
that Latasha was hiding some weapon like “a gun, a knife, or some kind of blunt
instrument” in the backpack. And this suspicion made Soon Ja shoot Latasha because she
felt a threat to her life from Latasha. Yet, according to Soon Ja’s own testimony, Latasha
had neither any weapon on her nor her backpack at the time of shooting. Actually, it was
Soon Ja who had two guns and Latasha’s backpack, and she was supposedly afraid for her
life behind the counter64
Soon Ja’s further claim that Latasha verbally threatened her life also sounds incredible.
According to Soon Ja, Latasha threatened her by saying “Bitch, I’ll kill you” when she
stood up with a gun in her hand. In addition to the two eyewitnesses’ testimony that they
did not hear Latasha’s threats, Latasha’s behaviors seen in the videotape at this moment
cast doubt on Soon Ja’s claim. Instead of showing Latasha hitting Soon Ja again after she
threw the chair at Latasha, the videotape showed that Latasha was picking up the juice
from the floor and handing it to Soon Ja when Latasha supposedly said the threatening
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words to her, who was swiping the bottle behind the counter with a gun. Latasha’s gesture
of picking up the bottle and giving it Soon Ja contradict her continuous intention to threaten
Soon Ja verbally or physically at this moment, and they indicate Latasha’s readiness to end
the fight. Furthermore, it was unlikely that Latasha, who was familiar with the guns and
crimes of South Central, would make verbal threats in such a low voice, while looking at a
gun in Soon Ja’s hand. It was more likely that she would either duck or run away
immediately from the gun. At this moment, this is what Latasha precisely did—turned
toward the door because she saw Soon Ja with a gun.65
In justifying her shooting, Soon Ja introduced Latasha’s attempted robbery story before
the “iron-like fist.” At first Soon Ja told her family and the police that she killed Latasha
because Latasha attempted to rob the store. She did not tell them that she shot Latasha
because Latasha endangered her life with hard blows and verbal threats. The story that she
feared for her life surfaced a couple days after the shooting. Secondly, although Soon Ja
thought Latasha fit her son’s description of a gang member, she testified that she was not
afraid of Latasha. At this moment, Soon Ja thought Latasha a typical woman shoplifter in
her mid-twenties, who was going to make some kind of trouble but not an attacker who
“was going to beat her up.”66
So the facts in this case discredited Soon Ja’s claim that Latasha threatened her life.
Latasha had not physically and verbally endangered her life. Physically, Soon Ja was able
to retaliate Latasha’s iron-like punches by throwing a chair at her. Latasha’s supposed
verbal threats were unlikely under the circumstance. Soon Ja’s suspicion that Latasha hid
a deadly weapon in the backpack was false. Thus, the facts did not support her fear of
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Latasha; it was not real. Then, was Soon Ja’s fear that Latasha threatened her life
imagined or fabricated?
Soon Ja’s fear for her life did not come from Latasha.
store was located: South Central Los Angeles.

It came from the area where her

In many ways, South Central not only

gave Soon Ja a feeling of contempt for African Americans but it also terrified her. She
was fed up with South Central Los Angeles. Because of the danger of gang assaults in the
area, and hearing about robbers killing some merchants there made her fear that it could be
her son or her husband who would be killed the next time.

Soon Ja’s fears and

frustrations surrounding her store in South Central were understandably real.
Joseph testified for his mother on the dangers surrounding the Empire Liquor Market.
Since the store’s opening in 1989 until the time of the incident, he had worked with his
father at the store. His mother usually worked at another family-owned liquor store,
Bouquet Canyon Liquor Store in the Saugus area (in Valencia) and worked at the Empire
Liquor Market only once in a while. According to Joseph’s testimony, the Empire Liquor
Market had been robbed three times, the first time on December 16, 1990, the second time
on December19, 1990, and the third time on March 9, 1991, and burglarized over thirty
times and shoplifted countless times. Ten to fourteen gang members of the Main Street
Crips terrorized the Dus by threatening more than thirty times to kill him and more than
twenty times to bum down the store. Soon Ja was aware of the gang’s threats and
robberies. In February, the family had to close Empire Liquor Market for two weeks
because the neighborhood gang members threatened Joseph’s life for testifying against
three gang members. At the time of the shooting incident, they were waiting to be tried for
these crimes.68

109

In studying her reason for killing Latasha, however, it appears that Soon Ja’s racism
rather than her fear for her life actuated the shooting. Considering the fact that the orange
juice was only $1.79, the shooting may have nothing to do with either a simple business
related matter or fear, but may have something to do with how Soon Ja viewed AfricanAmerican customers in her store. Soon Ja was not afraid of Latasha, but she undeniably
perceived Latasha as a shoplifter because she was an African American. Soon Ja
perceived that all blacks are potential shoplifters and thieves. Certainly, this attitude did
not come from anything Latasha did on that morning. If Latasha had not been a strong,
athletic-looking, dark skinned black youngster, would Soon Ja have assumed that Latasha
was a gang member and a shoplifter? Would Soon Ja have confronted Latasha or assumed
that she stole the orange juice if she were not black?

ccWould Latasha not have been shot

had she been white?”69
Although Latasha’s behavior of sticking the bottle in the outside pocket of her backpack
before paying could be interpreted as an attempt at shoplifting, her other behaviors
indicated that she did not attempt to shoplift. For instance, Latasha had $2.00 in her left
hand, and the orange juice was $1.79. Soon Ja admitted seeing the top portion of the bottle
and watching Latasha come directly toward the check stand and stand in line behind the
two youngsters. Latasha’s backpack seemed to be a regular size one with an outside
pocket that was not huge enough to cover the whole bottle. Combs, one of the
eyewitnesses to the incident, testified that almost the whole foot-long, quart-size juice
bottle was sticking out of the left pocket of the backpack. In addition, the videotape
showed that Latasha turned sideways to show her the bottle when Soon Ja pointed at it.
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Both Ali and Combs testified that Latasha told Soon Ja that she was trying to pay for the
juice when Soon Ja accused Latasha of shoplifting.

7n

Soon Ja, however, said that before grabbing her, she asked Latasha very politely to:
“Please pay for the orange juice” and Latasha responded to Soon Ja by saying “What
orange juice?” Considering that in the videotape, Soon Ja was seen speaking to Latasha by
pointing to her backpack and Latasha was seen turning sideways to show her the backpack,
her portrayal of asking her to pay for the juice “politely” appears unlikely. Also, before
Latasha walked into the store, Soon Ja had waited on a little over ten customers since she
opened it at 9:00 a.m. This meant that she took care of each customer in less than three
minutes. Soon Ja’s saying, ‘Please pay for [whatever]” to each of her customers was
unlikely. Her son also said to the Korea Times reporter that his mother called out to
Latasha and “demanded” payment because Latasha was leaving the store without paying
for the juice.71
Even if Latasha had responded, “What orange juice?” as Soon Ja claimed, she grabbed
Latasha because she was a black, not just because she thought the girl was shoplifting.
From the beginning, she was sure that Latasha was shoplifting.

Soon Ja not only accused

her of stealing the juice, but also failed to see the indication of Latasha’s remarks, money,
and gestures that she was trying to pay for it. Soon Ja’s presumption that Latasha could not
have had any money further reinforced her bias against Latasha. Despite Soon Ja’s
unexpected and unfair accusation and continuous seizure, the two eyewitnesses testified
that Latasha asked Soon Ja to let her go, and, then, the videotape showed Latasha slapped
Soon Ja’s hand away before she ultimately punched Soon Ja in her face. But Soon Ja
neither heard nor saw Latasha’s gestures.

Ill

Soon Ja’s action of grabbing reflected both her contempt for African Americans and her
related assumption that all African-American customers shoplift. Latasha was an African
American. Grabbing in this circumstance meant subjugation, and therefore it was a
contemptuous behavior, but Soon Ja felt nothing wrong with grabbing Latasha. Soon Ja
more likely assumed that her older age in the Confiician value system automatically
sanctified it; her higher social and economic status as a store-owner in a socially desolated
and economically depressed area gave her the right and the power to grab Latasha. As a
storeowner, she probably thought that she had the right to stop Latasha from stealing; it
was her obligation. Soon Ja could not understand and most certainly did not expect
Latasha to fight to get her dignity back when she took it away from Latasha by falsely
accusing and grabbing her. In this respect, she was arrogant in expecting Latasha to
submit immediately to her assumed power and authority.
Some people may see Latasha’s behavior of sticking the bottle into the pocket of her
backpack as the impetus of the incident. Some probably consider that Latasha’s striking
Soon Ja caused her own death. As Carvajal said in the grand jury summation, <cWhat
would you expect a 15-year-old girl to do?”72 Neither Latasha’s putting the bottle in the
backpack pocket nor hitting Soon Ja to get her off is such an unusual behavior among
teenagers, especially in the inner cities. Police Officer Johnson stated to Njeri that his son
would have “slugged” Soon Ja if she had grabbed him the way she grabbed Latasha. He
also said to Njeri, “kids frequently put things in backpacks, thoroughly intending to pay for
them.”73
Soon Ja testified that she did not expect that Latasha would beat her up when she
grabbed Latasha and tried to take her backpack. Initially, Soon Ja grabbed Latasha to get
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her orange juice back. When Soon Ja’s suspicion escalated from thinking that Latasha was
shoplifting to believing that she was hiding a weapon in the backpack, she attempted to
take Latasha’s backpack. Latasha, on the other hand, initially fought back to get Soon Ja
off of her. But when Soon Ja tried to take her backpack, Latasha fought Soon Ja to protect
her backpack. Latasha did not need to strike Soon Ja nor did Soon Ja have to grab Latasha,
pull her backpack, and refuse to let her go.
Both Soon Ja and Latasha made assumptions and took actions that led to the murder.
Neither had to do what they did.

Without much thought, both acted out their assumptions

and beliefs. In other words, Latasha did not have to put the bottle in the backpack pocket
before paying for it; Soon Ja did not have to grab Latasha and attempt to take her backpack;
Latasha did not have to strike Soon Ja; and, finally, Soon Ja did not have to kill Latasha.
First of all, it appeared that Soon Ja assumed that Latasha would not feel insulted when
she accused Latasha of shoplifting and tried to take her backpack.

Because she believed

that all blacks are potential shoplifters, she assumed therefore that they would be
accustomed to being accused of shoplifting. This attitude explains not only Soon Ja’s
failure to see Latasha’s money and her attempts to pay for the juice, but also Soon Ja’s
unprepared position to be struck by a young black girl.
Secondly, Soon Ja, again, appeared to expect a young black girl to submit to her demand
immediately. This expectation came from Soon Ja’s internalized Confucian rules of
proper behavior. In Confucian rules, the younger person must respect the elder’s mistake
as if any wrongs the elder made were actually borne by the younger.

From this

perspective, it is very possible that Soon Ja thought she could not be doing anything wrong,
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because, compared with Latasha, she believed herself higher in social rank, material
wealth, and age.
Thirdly, to Soon Ja’s amazement, Latasha fought back instead of “ducking at” Du’s
“whip.” Latasha had a different set of proper behavior rules: “a code of street conduct:
You do not put your hands on me without a fight—win, lose or draw.”74 While grabbing
meant to Soon Ja a simple display of her superior power, it implied to Latasha an
inescapable invitation to fight for her dignity and safety. Perhaps most important, Soon Ja
overlooked what grabbing could symbolize to Latasha.

Soon Ja’s ignorance of the street

code of conduct where she operated her store heartbreakingly took away a fifteen-year-old
girl’s life.
Latasha grew up in the nation’s poorest and most violent cities. She had lived in South
Central Los Angeles since she had moved from East St. Louis, Illinois—another
economically depressed and drug- and crime-ridden inner-city—when she was four years
old.75 In these cities, according to Elijah Anderson in Code o f the Street: Decency,
Violence, and the Moral Life o f the Inner City, many residents, especially the younger
generation, behave following a “code of the street” to protect their safety because police
could not protect them. The fact that they have to use their own resources to survive based
on “street justice” encourages and reinforces the ability to take care of oneself using
physical violence, if the situation requires it. Anderson points out that children learn the
need of physical violence to defend themselves, and the code becomes internalized. To a
degree, physical and mental toughness is considered a virtue. An ability to take care of
oneself is well respected in the inner-city.

76
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In this interpersonal context, when some one attacks, physical prowess is a fairly
common way of asserting oneself.77 When Soon Ja accused, grabbed, and pulled Latasha
and took her backpack, it was a verbally and physically aggressive attack on Latasha’s
personal safety. Based on street code, when Latasha struck Soon Ja, it was her selfdefense against Soon Ja’s attack. Latasha had to defend herself and protect her
possessions.
Latasha could not have known exactly what Soon Ja expected from her. In the video
tape, Latasha first complied with Soon Ja’s demand by turning sideways to show her the
backpack when Soon Ja asked her. That was not what Soon Ja expected. Instead of
waiting for Latasha to pay for the juice, Soon Ja immediately reached over the counter and
grabbed Latasha. It appears she expected Latasha to accept her insulting accusations and
render respect by taking out the orange juice and putting it on the counter with her $2.00, or
perhaps by giving the backpack with a smile and apology before Soon Ja grabbed her.

If

Latasha had done either, or had continued to plead with Soon Ja to let her go until Soon Ja
released her, and had not struck Soon Ja, she might still be alive today.
Upon closer review, Soon Ja’s actions indicate more rage at Latasha than fear of her.
When Latasha punched her face three times, Soon Ja was outraged as well as panicked.
Up until this moment, Soon Ja was quite certain that Latasha would not beat her up even
though she expected that she would cause some kind of trouble. At least two possible
reasons explain Soon Ja’s uncontrollable rage. One was Soon Ja’s adherence to the
Confucian rule of proper behaviors; the other was her feeling of embarrassment and defeat.
In the five rules of Confucian values, it was unimaginable for a younger person to strike an
older person. Many Korean Americans understood Soon Ja’s predicament and
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sympathized with her “rage at young customers’ assertive attitude to older shopkeepers.”78
This Confucian rule supplied a ground for many Korean Americans’ belief in Soon Ja’s
innocence and their justification for her killing Latasha.
Soon Ja’s rage also came from the fact that Latasha overpowered her with stronger
physical power—her “iron-like-fist.” This frightened her. Latasha’s hard “iron-like”
punch surprised Soon Ja because it was not what she expected from Latasha, although she
initiated the fight by grabbing her. At the same time, it also embarrassed her because
Latasha was a young black girl who was supposed to be neither stronger nor more powerful
than she. Her belief system dictated that she should not submit to a young black girl and
should make Latasha obey her at all costs even if it meant killing her.
Soon Ja’s rage at Latasha mirrored her loathing and dread of South Central; Latasha was
not whom Soon Ja really hated and feared. Although her own testimony as well as her acts
seen in the store’s videotape refuted her claim that fear motivated Soon Ja to shoot Latasha,
she justified her killing by identifying her fear of South Central with Latasha. To reinforce
her fear and to legitimize the murder, Soon Ja stressed the image of gangs and the dangers
of South Central. Her son’s victimization in one of the gang’s assaults was also
emphasized. So, right after the incident, Soon Ja circulated the robbery story by telling
some Korea Times reporters that the injuries on her face would prove that the shooting was
unavoidable. Her identification of Latasha with her fear of gangs and crimes brought about
the public, particularly Korean Americans, understanding of her predicament. In this
context, Soon Ja persuaded the public that it was the dangers of ghetto life that were
responsible for the murder, and it was not she, the feeble, overwhelmed, and overworked
Korean American storeowner at the mercy of shoplifters and gang members, who was
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responsible for the murder. In this way, implying that Latasha’s blackness and her ghetto
life forced Soon Ja to kill Latasha, Soon Ja made Latasha responsible for her own death.

79

Soon Ja’s robbery story shows the degree of her aggressiveness in seeking her own
interests. Soon Ja ruthlessly framed Latasha as a robber. From the beginning Soon Ja
knew that Latasha did not try to steal money from her cash register. But she started the
robbery scenario right after she killed Latasha. At the hospital when she was arrested,
Soon Ja told police that she shot Latasha because Latasha tried to take cash from the cash
register. Then, she told her family members who visited her at the prison that Latasha
punched her with the orange juice bottle when she tried to stop Latasha taking money from
the cash register. This robbery attempt story was then spread to several newspapers.
Although the criminal court transcript and the videotape unquestionably cleared Latasha
of shoplifting in the store, and it actually showed Soon Ja’s motive in fabricating and
circulating the misperception, the public impression of Latasha as a would-be robber has
not changed. Sadly, Soon Ja did not try to erase it, and, although I can never know for
sure, the Dus probably never apologized to the Harlins family not only for depriving them
of love, joy, and hope by cutting Latasha’s life short, but also for falsely portraying Latasha
as a would-be robber.
Importantly, Soon Ja’s lie of attempted robbery was believable to many because Latasha
was an African American. Soon Ja used the robbery story persuasively because she knew
that in the racialized American society, the image of black teenagers robbing a store was
already an understood and agreed-upon stereotype. Furthermore, Soon Ja was encouraged
to lie by her belief that public desire for protection from these black youngsters would
make people sympathetic to her argument that she acted in self-defense. Soon Ja used this
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accepted understanding to justify shooting Latasha to death. The public’s expectation that
Latasha “must have been doing something” that made Soon Ja kill her provided Soon Ja
with a way to protect herself.
Soon Ja in essence killed Latasha twice: once inside her store with a gun and the second
time outside her store with a fabrication of Latasha’s attempted robbery. The Dus spread
this lie to not only a Los Angeles Times reporter but also to some Korea Times reporters.
The Korea Times in Los Angeles had several articles delineating Latasha as robber, and
many newspapers in Korea reported her as a robber as well. As a result, many Koreans
considered her a robber. What is worse is that many Koreans, especially Korean
merchants, understood and accepted Soon Ja’s fabrication as quite reasonable.
Soon Ja’s framing of Latasha as a robber left a lingering imprint in the mind of many
Koreans. Soon Ja’s initial bold-faced lie about Latasha’s attempted robbery, Billy’s
subsequent misleading reports to a 911 operator and the police, and Joseph’s eventual
misrepresentation to Los Angeles Times and Korea Times reporters spread and justified
Soon Ja’s action in Korean communities in the United States as well as in Korea. Even
today, the image of Latasha as a “robber lady” who was going for the cash register when
she was shot remains as a major flashing memory of the incident as much as or more than
the bottle o f orange juice.
After the trial, Soon Ja’s racism came out openly. When the white probation officer
Patricia Dwyer interviewed Soon Ja, she openly expressed dislike, fear, and contempt for
blacks. During the interviews with Dwyer, who evaluated Soon Ja’s suitability for
probation, Soon Ja told her how she really felt about all African Americans.

Ironically,

defense attorney Charles Lloyd, an African American, was worried and warned Soon Ja

118

against telling Dwyer her “negative stereotypes of black people.” Although Lloyd tried to
explain Soon Ja’s racism by her language difficulty and cultural unfamiliarity, he was
aware of Soon Ja’s negative attitudes toward African Americans because he knew that
“racism was prevalent among Koreans who wanted to be accepted in the white world.”
Soon Ja’s ignorance and naivete in race relations troubled him, too. He knew that Soon
Ja’s assumption that all whites had the same racist attitudes toward blacks and that all
whites therefore would sympathize with her negative feelings toward blacks would
eventually lead her to reveal her negative prejudices about blacks to a white probation
officer. This was exactly what Soon Ja did. In spite of his warning, Soon Ja revealed her
prejudices to Dwyer. Through an official Korean translator, in the second interview with
Dwyer, she told her that “[All] blacks were lazy and used welfare money to buy liquor
instead of feeding their children.”80
Dwyer’s evaluation report on Soon Ja’s sentencing disclosed her observation of Soon
Ja’s racial prejudice. After listening to Soon Ja’s negative attitudes that were “tinged with
suspicion, fear and contempt” toward African Americans, Dwyer wrote:
It was this attitude that caused her to set in motion a chain o f events
which led to the death o f a 15-year-old child. Accusing the victim o f theft
and physically accosting her, who presumably wanted to pay for the orange
juice, the defendant confronted the girl who approached the counter with
money in her hand. While the victim may have responded with excessive
force, the defendant’s response was horrifying . . . in an uncontrollable rage
[she] shot the girl in the back o f the head as she attempted to leave.81

Soon Ja’s actions in the incident further convinced Dwyer that Soon Ja did not feel
remorse for killing Latasha. Dwyer wrote that Soon Ja’s actions of not providing any
assistance to the victim immediately after the shooting, exaggerating her injuries, feigning
unconsciousness, and falsifying an attempted robbery suggested inability to show
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responsibility for her actions, compassion for her victim, or remorse at her killing.
Asserting that any of Soon Ja’s expressions of guilt or remorse related only to “the possible
consequences” of going to prison, Dwyer concluded that Soon Ja’s actions were “a
•

deliberate attempt to manipulate public opinion and underscore her unrepentant attitude.”

82

Although Soon Ja’s expressed racism bothered the probation officer, Dwyer was more
troubled by Soon Ja’s callousness. Dwyer wrote that Soon Ja “did not accept responsibility
for the offense and expressed no remorse for what had occurred.”

Soon Ja’s apparent

remorseless behavior substantiated her unwillingness to be responsible for the shooting.
She did not feel that she had done anything wrong.

Nor did she feel sorry for taking the

life of another human being. Soon Ja made her feelings very clear in her response to
Dwyer’s question about how she felt about killing Latasha: she said she “would not change
anything if she could live through the incident again.” 83
During the interviews with Dwyer, Soon Ja blamed Latasha for causing her and her
family pain and shame. Soon Ja said to the probation officer:
“It didn’t come to my mind right away . . . [I] found out she was such a young
girl. . . such a painful experience . . . I pray for her, thinking that if she was bom in
a better family, better situation she could have been leading a much happier life . ..
She made me suffer so much, and she suffered tragedy, too.”84

These statements further supported Soon Ja’s unwillingness to feel responsible for the
killing. She undoubtedly treated Latasha as an agent of all Soon Ja’s own evil acts in the
incident. It could not have been Soon Ja’s fault but Latasha’s. By making Latasha’s poor
family background and the crime-ridden South Central Los Angeles responsible for her
shooting, Soon Ja rationalized that if Latasha was bom in a better family, she would not
have forced Soon Ja to kill her.
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The court transcripts also revealed Soon Ja’s avoidance in taking responsibility for her
shooting. In her testimony, Soon Ja claimed that she neither remembered nor
acknowledged killing Latasha. She expressed the killing in a mixed stance. On the one
hand, she avoided accepting the killing by describing Latasha’s dead body falling to the
floor as disappearance from her eyes: “That girl was gone all of a sudden. She was there
just a moments ago, and there was no girl.” According to Soon Ja, the shooting did not
really happen.

On the other hand, if she admitted the killing, she tried to blame Latasha

for her own murder.

Soon Ja blamed Latasha’s strong athletic physique for her own

feelings of intimidation; Latasha’s apparel—baseball cap and backpack—for her mistake of
falsely accusing Latasha as a shoplifting gang member; Latasha’s putting a $1.79, foot long
plastic bottle in her backpack for her own initiation of a fight by grabbing and pulling;
Latasha’s punching her in her face for her pulling out a gun and shooting her to death.

It

was Latasha that made her do the killing. It was Latasha’s own fault that she was dead.85
There was also no expression of remorse in her testimony.

Soon Ja’s testimony in

most parts reflects her ability to see things centered only on herself.

It manifests Soon

Ja’s quick and persistent tendency to appeal to others’ pity. It did not show that she cared
about other persons. In responding, for example, to district attorney Carvajal’s question
relating to the killing, Soon Ja shifted the subject of killing Latasha to her pitiable condition
in the hospital by describing her chest attached to a testing machine in handcuffed position.
Not even once in her testimony did Soon Ja express sorrow for taking the life of a human
being.

Not even once did she take responsibility for her failure to see the money and

Latasha’s gesture of willingness to pay, or recognize the wrongful and disrespectful
insinuation she made to Latasha, or her own lack of wisdom and business sense when she
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did not yield and release Latasha’s sweater and backpack, and she did not accept that
Latasha gave up the fight.
From the day of the killing to the day of the sentence, Soon Ja only expressed her
regrets for how the incident affected her and her family. According to Cannon, “Du’s
letter to Judge Karlin, dated October 25, written in Korean and translated by Sandy Du”
attested to her unwillingness to feel compassion and remorse for Latasha and her family.
In this letter, Soon Ja described the killing as an “unexpected horrifying accident” that
Latasha forced her and her family to go through. She wrote to the Judge: ‘"Even to this day
I can’t believe something like this could happen to our family.” Soon Ja’s letter to Judge
Karlin continued:
I feel like I am suffering in a nightmare. I am sad and overwhelmed by
the incident, and I find m yself wondering, only i f my eyes weren’t suffering
from the iron like punch, only if I was fully aware that I was doing
something like this would have never happened.86

This letter reflected Soon Ja’s unfeeling attitudes toward Latasha and her family. While
her suspicion and fear played a decisive role in her power struggle with Latasha, her
arrogance and contempt for Latasha definitely contributed to her refusal to take
responsibility or to feel compassion and regret toward Latasha and her family.
In summary, the case of People v. Soon Ja Du involves racism. This was not a simple
business quarrel between a Korean-American grocer and an African-American customer
that turned into a murder. Soon Ja’s negative attitude that all African Americans are
potential shoplifters provoked the fight that eventually ended in the killing of Latasha.
Soon Ja’s attitude caused her to accuse falsely Latasha of shoplifting and to treat her as a
gang member. More importantly, her attitude blinded Soon Ja so she could neither see
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Latasha’s holding money and trying to pay for the juice nor hear Latasha’s verbal
explanation and pleading. It deadened her common consideration and courtesy toward a
member of the human race. When a fifteen-year-old teenager was grabbed and pulled
continuously and falsely accused of shoplifting, after explaining that she or he was trying to
pay and pleading to let her or him go, that teenager, especially in the inner city, probably
does not see many other choices than striking back. In this sense, Soon Ja’s prejudice
toward African Americans and ignorance of the area took away Latasha’s young life, even
though Latasha was neither a shoplifter nor a gang member. Latasha simply became the
victim of Soon Ja’s prejudice and ignorance.
What was more tragic in this incident was Soon Ja’s conduct after killing Latasha.
Motivated by self-interest, she made a desperate attempt to save herself from going to
prison and to maintain her family’s reputation in the Korean community: she ruthlessly
framed Latasha as a robber. In this respect, Soon Ja’s racism became an integral element
in her defense strategy. In justifying her killing, Soon Ja tailored her defense by using the
already understood and agreed-upon images of African Americans and the image of an
ignorant, and therefore innocent, Asian immigrant woman in the racialized American
society. By the same token, she portrayed Latasha as a physically strong, intimidating, and
uncontrollable African-American youngster who beat her fearlessly and demanded money.
Consciously portraying Latasha as a shoplifter, an attacker, and a robber by emphasizing
the symbol of danger and threat in young African Americans, Soon Ja contrasted that with
an image of herself as an ignorant Asian-American immigrant. She used American racist
interpretation to justify her act of shooting and killing. And she was very successful, at
least, in saving herself from serving a prison term. To some degree, even today, Soon Ja is
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successful in deceiving the public by imprinting Latasha as a robber, particularly in many
Koreans’ minds.
Soon Ja spread the racist image of Latasha’s race and youth. Latasha’s image as a
robber still lingers in many Korean Americans’ minds. To some degree, Soon Ja was
successful in persuading many Korean Americans and Koreans to agree with her and
sympathize with her. As Carvajal pointed out in her sentencing memorandum to Judge
Karlin dated November 6, 1991, this was a typical case in which an innocent AfricanAmerican girl was forced to give up her life for the crimes committed by some AfricanAmerican shoplifters and criminals in her neighborhood. Latasha had “merely lived her
life in an area where gang members abound and visited a store where shoplifting was
apparently common.”
After four days of deliberation, on October 11, 1991, the jury found Soon Ja guilty of
voluntary manslaughter.

On October 3, the day after ending Soon Ja’s testimony, Judge

Karlin had issued a ruling that jurors were not to consider a first-degree murder charge
because of lack of evidence of premeditation.

So, the jury came back with a compromise

verdict, rejecting both charges of second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter.
The jury’s decision meant that Soon Ja killed Latasha intentionally without premeditation
and malice, but that the killing was not an accident. Soon Ja could have been sentenced to
a maximum term of eleven years for voluntary manslaughter and five years for using a gun.
On sentencing day, November 15, 1991, however, Judge Karlin suspended a ten-year
prison sentence—six years for the killing and four years for use of a gun—and placed Soon
Ja on five years probation with 400 hours of community service, a $500 fine, and out-ofpocket expenses related to Latasha’s funeral and any medical expenses. The judge said that
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she believed that Soon Ja did not know anything about guns. She sympathized with Soon
Ja’s fear of African Americans and gangs in the area. She also said that she did not
believe that keeping Soon Ja out of prison would endanger others, since Soon Ja had no
other criminal record.

oo

This verdict by the judge immediately brought anger and protest from the AfricanAmerican community. Their outburst, however, came later in April 1992, when the Simi
Valley’s jury acquitted the four police officers involved in the King beating incident.
During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, many African Americans expressed their deep anger
and resentment over Soon Ja’s killing of Latasha by destroying many Korean-American
owned businesses. The destruction of Korean-American owned stores in the riots caused
many Korean Americans to realize their precarious position in America.

In some ways,

the Du murder incident heightened the tension between the two communities, and in others,
it marked a climate that required awareness and changes in the Korean Americans’ openly
negative attitude toward the African Americans.
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Notes
1 Andrea Ford and John Lee, “Slain Girl Was Not Stealing Juice, Police Say,” Los Angeles Times,
March 19, 1991, sec. B l.
2 The testimony ended on Wednesday, October 2, 1991, in Department 111 at the Criminal Courts Building
in Downtown, Los Angeles. In the criminal trial, Soon Ja testified on the last day of testimony,
Wednesday, October 2, 1991. This case contained two court transcripts: Reporter’s Transcript of the
Grand Jury Proceedings (Wednesday, April 24, 1991) and Reporters’ Daily Transcript of the Criminal
Court Trial Proceedings (Monday, September 30, 1991; Tuesday, October 1, 1991; Wednesday, October
2, 1991; and Friday, November 15, 1991).
3 The Courtroom Television Network sought to film the trial but Judge Karlin did not permit any live
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CHAPTER SIX
CERTAIN UNTRUTH
Soon Ja’s murder of Latasha shook the African-American and Korean-American
communities, dividing them further along political, economic, and racial lines. After the
incident, African Americans retaliated for Korean Americans’ prejudice against them.
Many African-American community leaders openly criticized Korean-American
storeowners’ treatment of African-American customers. Some angry African Americans
physically attacked Korean-Americans on the streets and in the stores. Demonstrations and
boycott-signs started to appear in front of some Korean-American owned stores. This
retaliation fueled racial tensions between the two communities, already exacerbated by the
March 3, 1991, beating incident of Rodney G. King. In some ways this incident brought
Korean Americans together, and in others it made them feel insecure about their place in
American culture. Although this retaliation underlined a need for Korean-Americans to
stand together for their economic interests, initially, the community was unsure of how to
deal with the retaliation collectively.1
Before the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the Du murder incident had stirred a debate about
how to deal with retaliation by the African-American community. Some advocated strong
and tough measures while others cautioned against such measures and pleaded for more
patience and a more amicable solution. A few voices stressed doing the morally and
religiously right thing, which was understanding African Americans’ anger and frustration,
but they were too delicate and too few to make any significant difference in the debate.
The debate generally centered on two areas: Korean Americans’ fear for their economic
interests and their anger and frustration as they perceived that their ethnic pride suffered in
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the perception of African Americans and European Americans. Korean Americans’
feelings of being alienated and isolated—“only us” against “all others”—dominated the
debate.
This feeling of isolation generated a dilemma over choosing a conciliatory, cooperative
approach or a resistant self-defensive approach—even using guns if necessary—against
African Americans’ retaliation. Until the aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the
Korean-American community seemed to show a conciliatory approach in public while
internally attempting to inspire Korean ethnic pride as a defense against African
Americans’ retaliation and against the mainstream’s unfavorable attitude toward them. In
the meantime, the Korean-American community publicly started to voice its suspicion that
the mainstream was using the community to calm the African Americans’ anger associated
with the King incident and to make the white community look good by pitting the KoreanAmerican community against the African-American community. The growing suspicion
against the white community and the intensified retaliation by African Americans deepened
many Korean Americans’ hostility toward both groups. Proportionally, this perception
seemed to make them lean toward a stronger resistant stance and solidarity against such
retaliation among the first-generation Korean Americans.
This perception undoubtedly influenced their attitude toward the Du murder incident,
making Soon Ja a symbol of a Korean-American merchant’s reality.

Her plight

exemplified the hardships of their daily struggles. Many Korean-American merchants
understood her uncontrolled rage, the constant fear of African Americans, the months-long
harassment by neighborhood gang members, several dreadful threats, robberies, and the
daily shoplifting, and the long hours of physical labor. They identified with her because it
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could happen to any one of them, too. In many instances, they saw themselves in Soon
Ja’s predicament: an innocent victim of robberies in crime-ridden African-American
neighborhoods.2 In this sense, the Korean-American community justified Soon Ja’s
killing by using the reality of high crime rates that the merchants faced in predominantly
African-American and Latino neighborhoods.3 So, in the Korean community, Soon Ja
became an innocent victim and the killing was justified.
The Du murder incident was covered by the mainstream news media as well as Korean
ethnic news media in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Times and the Los Angeles Sentinel
gave limited coverage, while Korean ethnic newspapers, particularly the Korea Times,
covered it extensively. One day after Soon Ja shot Latasha to death, on Sunday, March 17,
1991, the incident made its first appearance in the Los Angeles Times. Mentioning the
location of the incident without identifying the names of those involved, the Los Angeles
Times reported it in a six-paragraph story under the headline, “Girl, 15, Shot to Death Over
Orange Juice,” on the fifth page of the metro section. The following day, March 18, 1991,
the Korea Times (Korean-language daily) reported the incident in three different articles.
The Los Angeles Sentinel coverage came later, on March 21, 1991, as it is a weekly
newspaper that only comes out on Thursdays.
Although the Los Angeles Times and the Los Angeles Sentinel covered this incident
during the period of March 1991 through December 1991, it neither predominated in any
local news coverage nor made national news in the other parts of the United States except
in the Korean ethnic newspapers. Even in the local newspapers, the incident competed
with other news. For instance, at the time of the Du murder incident, the March 3 incident
in which Rodney King was beaten by four white Los Angeles police officers drew the
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attention of most Americans, particularly African Americans. Other cases like the
securities fraud trial of ex-Lincoln Savings & Loan chief Charles Keating, Anita Hill’s
sexual harassment charge hearing against Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, and
the cross-burning trial of four white supremacists4 diverted the public’s attention from the
Du murder incident. Another reason for the media’s limited coverage was probably the
fact that the Du store’s surveillance camera videotape was not released to the media until
September 30, 1991.5
Despite the media’s preoccupation with other cases and the inaccessibility of the
videotape, the Los Angeles Times, the county’s largest daily,6 gave quite steady and
balanced coverage of the incident7 from the shooting to Judge Joyce Karlin’s probation
sentence. The Los Angeles Sentinel, one of the largest African-American weekly
newspapers on the West Coast, covered this incident the least of the three newspapers, but
quite steadily. Its weekly limited space was taken mostly by the King incident along with
other news items.
Unlike these two newspapers’ limited coverage, the Korea Times reported the incident
quite extensively for the longest period. Editorials, commentaries, letters, and other
articles associated with the Du murder incident dominated its pages.

From March 18,

1991, through March 16, 1992, there were over 300 articles that were either directly or
indirectly related to the incident. Not so surprisingly, at the end of 1991, the Korea
Times chose the Du murder incident as the number one story it covered for the year
1991.®
But the Korea Times is not the only Korean ethnic newspaper in the United States.
During the post-1965 Korean Immigration period, three Korean daily newspapers were
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established as branch offices of the major newspapers in South Korea: the Korea Times
(Han-kook Hbo) in 1969, the Oriental Daily (Dong a Hbo) in 1972, and the Central Daily
(Joong-ang Ilbo) in 1973. Because of competition among them, each daily has kept its
circulation information confidential; therefore, it is difficult to estimate each daily’s
circulation volume and its advertising revenue.9 Their South Korean headquarters
supported them with manpower, news materials, and financial assistance until 1983. The
Korea Times is currently considered the major Korean ethnic daily on the West Coast.10
The vast majority of first-generation Korean Americans subscribe to these Korean
language newspapers.11 A Korea Times article on April 13, 1991, entitled “The Korean
Language Newspapers: The First Thing Most Korean Immigrants Do Is Read the
Newspapers before They Unpack their Luggage,” explained how intrinsically the Korean
ethnic newspapers in America have interwoven themselves into the lives of most Korean
Americans. From finding a place to stay to finding a job, a school, a church, a market, or
a car, the dailies have provided vital information for finding the necessary resources.
Despite the fact that the first-generation Korean Americans depended on it for
information about America, until the mid-1980s Korea Times ignored and avoided the
issue of ethnic conflict. It did, however, report the actual incidents of some AfricanAmerican criminals’ violence against Korean-American merchants. The mere reporting,
to some extent, fueled Korean Americans’ animosity toward African Americans. The
number of incidents related to the African-Korean conflicts started to rise in the early
1970s, reflecting the increased number of Korean-American merchants engaged in
businesses in predominantly African-American areas, and the feelings of animosity and
ethnic pride grew proportionately. The newspapers’ sensationalized reporting of such
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incidents not only encouraged Korean Americans’ fear and dislike toward African
Americans in general but also nurtured solidarity and ethnic pride in the KoreanAmerican community. The Korea Times’ inadequate coverage of racial issues12 played
an important role in the race conflict. As most Korean immigrants had very limited
exposure to American magazines or newspapers, the Korea Times exerted enormous
influence on them in shaping their attitudes toward African Americans.
According to a. Korean Street Journal survey on August 19, 1982, thirty percent of 197
randomly selected Korean immigrants were afraid to interact with African Americans and
fifteen percent hesitated to associate with Mexican Americans. Blacks were frequently
referred to derogatively as kamdungwee (“darky”) instead of hukin ( black person).

In

another article of the Korean Street Journal on August 12, 1981, the reporter observed the
widespread practice of Korean American’s negative prejudice toward African Americans
and Latinos.13
In contrast to its earlier coverage trend, after the mid-1980s Korea Times started to
direct its attention to the issue of ethnic conflict.

It made strenuous efforts in dealing

with race relations at least between African-American customers and Korean-American
merchants. Although its effort mirrored Korean-American merchants’ purely economic
interest, it tried to broaden their racial views and to improve their attitudes. It reported
many activities that were designed to improve race relations through meetings,
workshops, church services, fundraising activities, neighborhood athletic sponsorships,
scholarship foundations, and cultural exchange programs. Nevertheless, the Korea
Times’ articles featuring some Korean Americans’ good deeds toward African Americans
appeared to be lacking in real understanding of human relationships and in genuine
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concern toward them. Many of the articles suggested a sense that “we are better; you are
worse”—implying a “so we save you” theme.
This change in the Korea Times'' (Korean-language daily) coverage trend reflected two
conflicting interests on the part of Korean Americans: the importance of maintaining a
good relationship with African Americans for economic interest, and the importance of
protecting Korean merchants’ solidarity and ethnic pride. The Korea Times (Koreanlanguage daily) eventually embraced the latter, even though it recognized the Korean
Americans’ politically weak position and less profitable situation in confronting the
African-American community. The Korea Times’ position was perhaps understandable in
view of the fact that its financial support came mainly from Korean merchants through
subscriptions and advertising revenues.14 Another contributing factor for the choice might
have been its status as an ethnic newspaper. Because few non-Koreans could read the
Korean-language newspapers, it probably felt comfortable choosing this position without
worrying too much about losing its economic interest through the African Americans’
retaliations or loss of fairness or objectivity.
In this respect, Korea Times (English-language weekly) showed more balance in its
coverage of the incident than the Korean-language daily did. It printed its first articles
about the Du murder incident on March 27, 1991, twelve days after the incident. In its first
six articles, although it generally stayed in tun with the Korean merchants’ points of view,
its articles emphasized the importance of maintaining a cooperative relationship between
the two communities. In “Death of a black teen-ager. Blacks and Koreans join hands to
heal wounds,” it stressed the on-going work of the leaders of both communities. Another
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article, “Faces in a tragedy,” explained the tragic nature for both the Harlins and Dus
depicted in the murder scene.15
The more balanced points of view came from the articles written by K.W. Lee. In his
two articles, “Learn, Baby, Learn: Lessons from Latasha Harlins’ Tragedy” and “An
American Passage: Latasha: A Haunting Presence Among Korean Americans,” Lee
insightfully observed Korean Americans’ ignorance and uncaring practice toward African
Americans and carefully appealed to them to practice good neighborliness.16
An overwhelming number of the Korea Times’ articles during this period contained
the theme of Korean Americans’ fear of African-American retaliation and anger at the
Korean merchants. Most of the three hundred articles in the Korea Times voiced an
increasing fear that the Du murder incident would ignite a new flame in the already
existing tension in the black-Korean relations as did the New York Red Apple case,
which caused a seventeen-month-long boycott by blacks in New York. The boycott was
triggered by a dispute that occurred on January 18, 1990, between a Haitian woman and a
Korean manager of Red Apple produce store in Brooklyn, New York, and was finally
over by late May 1991.17 Comparing the Du’s incident with the New York Red Apple
case, many Korean Americans worried about a widespread boycott, mass demonstrations,
and violent retaliation against Korean Americans.18 Warning the Korean-American
community not to kindle the flames of retaliation, the newspaper tried to calm the
community by reporting the peace-making efforts attempted by some people in the two
communities such as the Black-Korean Alliance (BKA), City Hall, the Korean American
Grocers Association (KAGRO), the L.A. Korean American Community, the NAACP,
church groups, and Korean-American merchants.
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Some people thought that the fear of African-Americans’ retaliation was not based in
fact. Jay Lee Wong, a consultant with the Los Angeles County Human Relations
Commission, found that most of the rumors in the Korean community about AfricanAmericans’ retaliation with boycotts and attacks turned out to be false when they were
checked with alleged victims and police. He asserted that the high crime rate in South
Central Los Angles that existed before the incident had not increased since the incident.
According to Wong, ‘"the Korean-language media is partially to blame for the rumors
because it reports incidents without verification from police and sources other than alleged
and actual victims.” He also pointed out that the Korean-language media’s increased
coverage of incidents involving blacks and Koreans could have contributed to the fear.19
In reporting Soon Ja’s murder incident, Korean ethnic newspapers adopted the view of
Korean-American merchants and sided with the Dus. Depicting Soon Ja Du as a symbol
of the Korean-American merchants who had been innocently victimized by some AfricanAmerican criminals, they attempted to placate Korean-American merchants. By stressing
Soon Ja’s claim o f innocence and self-defense, the Korea Times led the way in unifying the
community to rally behind the Du family in the Black-Korean conflict. By encouraging
caution toward African Americans’ retaliation and emphasizing the importance of a unified
stance as Koreans, it attempted to guide the community by shaping and manipulating
information regarding the incident.
Many Korea Times articles reflected this effort. The paper de-emphasized or omitted
anything that could be used against Soon Ja while it played up anything that could help her
in proving her innocence. For example, Soon Ja’s initiation of the fight, her false
accusation, her shooting and killing a fifteen-year-old child, and the Dus’ lies did not
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receive the same level of importance in reporting as did the story of Latasha’s attempted
robbery and iron-like strikes, police conspiracy and scapegoating story, the faulty gun, and
Soon Ja’s injuries. The two eyewitnesses’ accounts were completely ignored in the Korea
Times. Eventually, the ethnic newspapers’ efforts were materialized in the KoreanAmerican community’s feeling toward the verdict and sentencing, its efforts in the letter
writing campaign against the Du verdict, and its active participation in Judge Karlin’s fight
against the African-American-led recall movement.
Unfortunately, the Korea Times did not address the issue of the false accusation of
shoplifting, the deliberate robbery framing, and the unnecessary killing. Although more
than seventy percent of Korean Americans are regular churchgoers, and Soon Ja was a
deaconess in the Valley Korean Central Presbyterian Church, there was not one article in
the Korea Times that addressed the feeling of what it would be like to lose someone they
loved in a similar situation. It did not present how much grief most Korean Americans
would feel if one of their daughters or sons were killed by African-American shopowners
after being falsely accused and framed for robbery. Instead, the Korea Times tried to
justify many Korean-Americans’ unwillingness to show any sympathy toward Latasha and
her family by comparing Soon Ja’s killing Latasha to African-American criminals’ killing
Korean shop owners. The newspaper also blamed the community’s unfeeling attitude
toward Latasha and her family on the African-American community’s nationalistic rhetoric
directed against the Korean-American entrepreneurship and Korean Americans’
disrespectful behavior toward African Americans.
In this line of reasoning, Soon Ja’s false accusations, deliberate lies about Latasha after
the murder, and her exaggerated injuries consumed the Korea Times’ portrayal of Soon Ja’s
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self-defense. Despite the videotape evidence, Soon Ja’s own testimony, and the two
eyewitnesses’ accounts which cleared Latasha of Soon Ja’s false accusation and the
robbery story, in many Korean newspapers in Los Angeles, Latasha was described either as
a petty thief or as an armed robber who made Soon Ja kill her in self-defense. In many
South Korean newspapers Latasha was also reported as a thief.20
Although it was a false and demeaning portrayal of Latasha, not even one article in the
Korea Times—either in the Korean-language daily or in the English-language weekly—
was devoted to eradicating this false portrayal. Even several Korean-American scholars
who had analyzed the cause of the Black-Korean conflict accepted Latasha’s attempted
shoplifting as fact. They neither recognized that Latasha, who had no previous criminal
record, had not attempted shoplifting, nor did they make any effort to set the record
straight.21 Would these Korean newspapers and Korean-American scholars have
continued to identify Latasha as a thief who stole a Korean-American immigrant woman’s
orange juice had she not been a black girl?
The image of Latasha as a thief, robber, and attacker was sensationalized in Korea
Times articles. From March 18, 1991, through March 31, 1991, it printed at least seven
articles that described Latasha as a thief or robber. The first article that reported the
incident on March 18, 1991, started with the big bold headline, “A Black Teenage Girl
Demanded Money at the Market and Punched [the Owner].” It unmistakably emphasized
the robbery attempt and violence by Latasha. From the beginning of the incident,
sensationalizing Soon Ja’s lie, the Korea Times (Korean-language daily) continued to
reinforce the image of Latasha as a thief even after the trial. By printing and reporting
Soon Ja’s deliberate deceptions as news, the Korea Times gave credibility to her lies and,
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therefore, strengthened her story. Unfortunately, its active participation in planting and
nurturing the lies in the minds of Korean Americans has never been corrected, even long
after the facts came out. The Korea Times never printed any articles that completely
wiped out the lie. As a result, many Korean Americans remembered Latasha as a thief and
robber who attacked Soon Ja viciously and demanded money.
For many Korean Americans, the justification for Soon Ja’s killing came from Latasha’s
strikes. Reflecting this public sentiment, the Korea Times first visually magnified Soon
Ja’s injury with photos, secondly, it attempted to remove or minimize Latasha’s young age,
and, thirdly, it validated Soon Ja’s illness claims. In proving Soon Ja’s innocence by
making the shooting seem unavoidable, the Korea Times collaborated with Soon Ja. From
the beginning of the incident, Soon Ja’s physical condition was underlined in its many
articles. The first article of the incident reported Soon Ja’s head trauma as well as her
facial and eye injuries. Its reporting of her unconsciousness and the general oxygen
treatment in the emergency room undoubtedly produced a vivid impression of her poor
condition in the readers’ minds.
Secondly, to reinforce Soon Ja’s own feelings of intimidation by Latasha’s strong
athletic physique, the Korea Times presented Soon Ja and Latasha in contrast, picturing
Soon Ja as a fragile, helpless, and old Korean-American woman and Latasha as an
athletically built and strong African-American youngster. This point was suggested by
Soon Ja from the beginning of the incident. Implying that Latasha was not a child, Soon
Ja said that she thought Latasha was a young male in his mid-twenties until she came close
to the counter.22 Then she perceived her as a young woman in her mid-twenties23 until a
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few days after the incident.

Soon Ja’s mistaken initial impression of Latasha’s physical

prowess gave another underlying justification of Soon Ja’s claim of innocence.
This strategy sought two goals. One was to minimize the effect of Latasha’s age on
Soon Ja’s self-defense. The other was to convince the public that Soon Ja’s own feeling of
intimidation was justifiable. To argue that Latasha’s physique was equal to that of an
adult’s, the Korea Times stressed Latasha’s physical size and strength while it neglected to
mention Soon Ja’s rather large and sturdy physique. Contrary to what many non-Asian
people stereotypically assumed her to be, Soon Ja appeared to be neither small nor weak.
Soon Ja was probably not much smaller than Latasha. In the news photos, she appeared to
be quite large and in the videotape, she showed her strength and agility when she quickly
lifted and threw a three-foot high chair at Latasha after being punched and falling down.24
Nevertheless, the Korea Times emphasized only Latasha’s size. Quoting Charles Lloyd in
an interview with the Korea Times, the newspaper stated that “Harlins was physically very
strong to be considered as an adult: weighed 152 pounds.”25 Again, in another article, the
Korea Times pointed out that Latasha was a big girl for a fifteen-year-old.26 By using the
strategy, the Korea Times (Korean-language daily) implied that Soon Ja’s shooting of
Latasha was unavoidable and justified because the well-developed, adult-size Latasha
physically overwhelmed old and frail Soon Ja.
After developing its argument that Soon Ja did not kill a child, the Korea Times
validated her claim of disabled physical condition by detailing Soon Ja’s injuries from
Latasha’s punches. Its news photos and articles emphasized Soon Ja’s difficulty in
walking, seeing, breathing, and holding her head up.27 Another Korea Times article
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wrote, “Du appeared weak and groggy at her arraignment.”28 Soon Ja was still seen as a
“dazed” woman in a wheel chair29 long after her black eye returned to normal.
Soon Ja’s black eye from the fight became the centerpiece of her injuries. Her black
eye visually symbolized the terror she allegedly went through and consequently drew
sympathy for her killing of Latasha in self-defense.
other physical damages sprang.

From this eye injury, Soon Ja’s

She could neither see well with only one eye nor walk

because of loss of balance. Additionally, the eye injury could possibly indicate a head
injury; therefore, she could not even think straight.

Soon Ja’s belief that her eye injuries

would be enough to prove her innocence was evident in her letter to Judge Joyce Karlin
dated October 25, 1991. In this letter Soon Ja blamed Latasha for her own killing by
saying, “only if my eyes weren’t suffering from the iron like punch,”

she would not

have shot her.
Similarly, Soon Ja’s eye injury was also played up in the Korea Times articles. The
March 18 article in the Korea Times stated, “Du, who shot the Black girl, had injuries
around some parts of her head, which were apparently caused by the dead girl’s punches.
Soon Ja lost consciousness at the scene due to the trauma of the incident and was taken to
the hospital.” In the March 18 issue, the Korea Times reported the Du family’s claim
that Soon Ja was hospitalized as a result of the injury sustained by Latasha’s aggression.
A March 19 Korea Times article also reported that Soon Ja said to her family that she
couldn’t even open her eyes because the black girl punched her face. Also stated in the
same article was the Du family members’ description of Soon Ja’s condition: “At the
hospital Du was unconscious and connected to the oxygen and was unable to walk but the
police took her to a jail.” This article also headlined what Soon Ja said to the family
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members who visited her while she was jailed in the Sybil Brand Institute for Women on
March 17, 1991: “She was struck twice on her face by the black girl with the juice bottle
and felt her life being threatened.” Again, in the March 21, 1991, issue of the Korea
Times (Korean-language daily), an article stressed Soon Ja’s blackened right eye swollen
with bruises.31
In spite of the evidence that Soon Ja exaggerated her injuries and feigned
unconsciousness, the Korea Times omitted Soon Ja’s deception and exaggeration.
Instead, it contributed credibility to her exaggeration. After connecting Soon Ja’s eye
injuries to her incapacitated condition, the Korea Times wrote about Soon Ja’s health
condition in her lawyers’ eyes. By quoting one of Soon Ja’s lawyers saying, “having
come out of a coma just two days before,” in an article headlined, “Soon Ja Du’s Family
Claims Self-defense,” the Korea Times (English-language weekly) described Soon Ja’s
helpless condition. According to her first defense attorney Tyson Park, Soon Ja suffered
from heart problems and epilepsy and went into a two-day coma induced by an epileptic
seizure after her arrest.32 In his attempt to convince the public of Soon Ja’s ‘"totally
incapacitated”33condition, Soon Ja’s lawyer, Charles Lloyd, said that she suffered not
only from a problem of “balance and equilibrium” due to her black eye34 but also from
“dizziness and deep depression.”35 In arguing against Soon Ja’s release on bond, even
Deputy District Attorney Roxane Carvajal gave her objection based on Soon Ja’s family
doctor’s diagnosis of her mental condition, emphasizing that Soon Ja was a threat to
herself and to society since she was suffering from “paranoid ideation (ideas or mental
images) and death wishes.”36
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Throughout the trial, the Korea Times (Korean-language daily) faithfully stood by Soon
Ja. Its interpretation of the videotape, description of the courtroom attendants, reaction of
some Korean Americans, and its omission of many major issues all appeared to influence
the Korean-American community to believe in Soon Ja’s self-defense claim by remaining
sympathetic toward her. Its distorted and selective reporting was clearly observable.
Korea Times’ coverage of the first day of Soon Ja’s trial was a good example. The
October 1 Korea Times (Korean-language daily) article headlined “Self-Defense: [the
videotape showed] Harlins Punched Du Four Times; Du Fell twice” showed two pictures.
One was Latasha’s hitting motion taken from a television monitor that was almost
unrecognizable. Under the caption: “a scene of Du’s falling under the counter after
receiving a strike from Harlins’ right hand,” it says that Latasha has a big frame, weighing
more than 150 pounds. The other picture was a sketch of Latasha’s striking Du. This
drawing showed Latasha wearing her backpack on her back, both straps on each shoulder
with her right hand hitting Soon Ja who was falling. The videotape, however, showed a
completely different picture. In the videotape, when Latasha hit Soon Ja, her backpack
was momentarily on the right shoulder only, and soon after that it fell down on the counter.
Soon Ja grabbed it quickly but Latasha tugged it. Using the backpack, Latasha was able to
pull Soon Ja toward her who was also pulling the bag, punched her, and pushed her under
the counter. Showing the backpack securely on Latasha’s back gave credibility to the story
that Soon Ja did nothing to provoke the fight—grabbing and pulling Latasha.
In the same article, the Korea Times defended the accuracy of its information and
emphasized its authenticity by reiterating how clearly and vividly the store’s videotape
showed that Soon Ja received four punches and fell two times. Although the videotape
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showed that Latasha was shot after she turned and made at least one step toward the door,
the article emphasized the timing of Soon Ja shooting at the moment of turning. It firmly
placed a reasonable doubt in the minds o f Korean-American readers that Soon Ja neither
shot Latasha as she retreated from the fight nor were Soon Ja’s hands shown in the
videotape when she pulled the gun out. The article continued to describe and interpret the
videotape to validate Soon Ja’s claim.37
Furthermore, this article concentrated on minimizing Du’s shooting and killing
Latasha while it attempted to magnify the effect of Latasha’s punches to Soon Ja’s face.
It described how shocked the courtroom audience appeared and later quoted some elderly
Korean Americans expressing deep anger when they saw Latasha punching Soon Ja.
The article first underscored that this unthinkable and extreme attack by Latasha forced
Soon Ja to kill the girl. Secondly, its repeated statements of Latasha’s just-tumed-head,
the faulty gun, and Soon Ja’s unseen hands when she took out the gun in the videotape
suggested the possible lies of the mainstream reports of the incident.
The trial coverage of the Korea Times contrasts sharply with the coverage of the Los
Angeles Times. Most Korea Times (Korean-language daily) trial coverage articles omitted
or ignored facts that could hurt Soon Ja’s defense. One particular instance of the Korea
Times’ (Korean-language daily) distortion of the facts was its failure to point out that in the
videotape, Latasha was not seen getting money from the cash register and that Soon Ja was
seen pointing a gun at Latasha. While the Korea Times (Korean-language daily) trial
coverage articles emphasized Latasha’s punches and Soon Ja’s falls, the Los Angeles Times
stressed Latasha’s retreat from the fight, Soon Ja’s false claim of Latasha’s attempted
robbery, and Soon Ja’s denial of pointing the gun at Latasha.
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The two newspapers also described the reaction of the courtroom audience differently.
On the one hand, the Korea Times focused on the Korean Americans’ deeply angry
* io

reaction to Latasha’s blows and their emotion toward the bloody killing by Soon Ja.

On

the other hand, the Los Angeles Times depicted the shocked and gasping reaction of people
in the court by focusing on 4tthe graphic images of the killing.”
In addition, the Korea Times added several articles that focused on Soon Ja’s good
character. One article, entitled “Mrs. Du: A Silent Helper of Lepers and Homeless,”
included testimony from her church minister who described her as a “compassionate,
faithful, God-fearing woman” with no criminal record. She represented a fellow citizen
driven to the edge in pursuit of the shared dream.40 Although most African Americans are
also Christians, it could very well be true that Soon Ja felt compassion toward Koreans and
Christians,41 but not toward African-American Christians.
In the Du murder incident, many Korean Americans felt rejected by the American
public. Their own feelings of disappointment came from their perception that the
American public showed more understanding and sympathy toward the AfricanAmerican community than toward the Korean-American community. The American
public’s attention given to the murder of one African-American girl puzzled their sense
of fairness and made them feel unfairly treated by the public. This feeling of isolation
and disappointment notably made them compare themselves with some AfricanAmerican criminals who had killed their fellow Korean-American merchants.

In several

Korea Times articles, they angrily asked why the American public did not fuss about the
criminals who killed thirty-eight Korean-American merchants in the United States since
1975 42 Although some African-American criminals were caught and sentenced for their
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crimes, many Korean Americans perceived that African Americans got away with killing
many Korean Americans, while Korean Americans could not get away with killing even
one African American.43
This perception made many Korean Americans feel isolated and defensive. It helped
them see things through the framework of “only us” against “all others” and produced
defensive attitudes toward the police and the mainstream news media. Questioning
police investigations as well as the mainstream news-media reports of the Du murder
incident, they suspected a conspiracy against them by the police and the media. From the
beginning of the incident they felt that the police and the mainstream media treated Soon
Ja Du unfairly, portraying her as an unprovoked and unfeeling aggressor.
Querying the police’s motive of charging Soon Ja with first-degree murder, Korean
Americans linked Soon Ja’s arrest to a police conspiracy. They blamed police for
making innocent Soon Ja into a scapegoat. Many believed that Soon Ja was sacrificed
for the crimes of the four white police officers in the Rodney G. King beating incident to
calm African Americans’ anger.44 Some even thought that police edited the tape to make
Soon Ja look guilty.45
As early as March 20, 1991, the Dus’ conjecture that Soon Ja had been scapegoated by
the police appeared in both the Los Angeles Times and the Korea Times. Joseph Du, Soon
Ja’s son, accused the police of producing inaccurate and distorted information about his
mother’s incident to make her into a scapegoat. At least three articles covered Joseph’s
accusation.

The March 20, 1991, Los Angeles Times reported Joseph’s claim that his

mother had been victimized twice, first by Latasha Harlins, and then by the police.
Because his mother was a Korean American, a minority, she became not only the victim of
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the African-American robbers and thieves but also the victim of the police department
which was supposed to protect her from these criminals. Quoting Joseph’s words, “They
[the Los Angeles Times] don’t know anything. All they’ve heard is what the police have
told them and the police [has] distorted the story dramatically.” The March 27,1991,
Korea Times (English-language weekly) reported Joseph’s aspersions on the accuracy of
the Los Angeles Times’ reports on the incident.46 Another April 3, 1991, Korea Times
(English-language weekly) article reported that Joseph called on the entire KoreanAmerican community to stand up for his mother because the white race sacrificed his
mother for the African-American race. He asserted that the media made his mother into a
scapegoat for the Black-Korean conflict.47
Not so surprisingly, many angry Korean Americans immediately embraced the theory of
police conspiracy against Soon Ja Du. Even some Korean-American scholars believed the
theory.

Some scholars said that the mainstream media used the Du murder incident to

appease the anger of the African-American community in the Rodney King incident in
order to disguise institutional racism and racial inequality 48 Others believed that the white
community in general pitted one minority group against another and enjoyed watching
minority ethnic groups destroying each other.49 The Los Angeles Times, the District
Attorney’s office, and the police became the targets of the Korean Americans’ conspiracy
charge.
To stop rumors from spreading that could possibly cause a race riot, two days after the
Du murder incident, on March 18, 1991, Los Angeles Police Department Commander
Michael J. Bostic called a press conference.50 According to the Los Angeles Times’ report
on the press conference, Bostic treated the incident as a simple business dispute, de
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emphasizing the racial implication of the incident and emphasizing instead that Latasha
was neither shoplifting nor robbing the store. Based on the videotape from the store’s
surveillance camera and the two eyewitnesses’ accounts, Bostic informed the public that,
on the videotape, Latasha was seen trying to pay for the orange juice when Soon Ja accused
her of shoplifting and that Soon Ja started a fight that ended in the girl’s death. Even
though Latasha put the orange juice in her backpack, she had money in her hand. Bostic
said, “There was no attempt at shoplifting. There was no robbery. There was no crime at
all. The videotape showed only ‘a scuffle’ begun by Du over the knapsack, not an attack
mounted by the teen-ager.” He also said that Soon Ja was treated at a hospital for
“superficial injuries.”51 Bostic tried to set the record straight by exonerating Latasha from
Soon Ja’s false accusations to police that Latasha “attacked her after being caught trying to
steal the juice” and “attempted to take money from the market register moments before”
she grabbed the gun and fired.”52
The Korea Times’ report on this press conference, however, differed from the Los
Angeles Times’. While the Los Angeles Times reported Bostic’s statement that Soon Ja
started the fight, the Korea Times (Korean-language daily) reported that Bostic said in the
conference that Latasha started a verbal quarrel and proceeded to a physical fight.
Another less striking discrepancy between the two newspapers related to what Bostic said
about Latasha’s money seen in the videotape. The Los Angeles Times wrote that Bostic
said the videotape showed Latasha “approaching the store counter with money in her
hand.”54 But the Korea Times quoted Bostic as saying that the videotape captured Latasha
taking money out of her pocket and then holding it in her hand.55 It quoted, “[In the
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videotape, she [Latasha] was taking her money out to pay as she walked to the counter.
She had the money in her hand. You could see it in the videotape.”56
Many Korean Americans thought that Bostic’s clarification of who started the fight—
‘“ a scuffle’ begun by Du over the knapsack, not an attack mounted by the teen-ager,”
became proof of a police conspiracy. Arguing that the police and the district attorney’s
office participated in an “activist” role in the incident, Korean-American sociologist
Edward Chang has asserted that the police deliberately lied about Latasha’s strikes to
Soon Ja’s face to imply that Soon Ja committed an “unjustifiable” crime. He explains
that the active role might have been motivated by their desire to bring a first-degree
murder charge against Soon Ja in order to calm the African- American community, which
was very much disturbed by the Rodney King incident.

Like Joseph Du earlier, Chang

sees their eager efforts to convict Soon Ja with first-degree murder as a mystery that was
tied to a conspiracy to make her into a scapegoat.57
Motivations other than a conspiratorial intent could explain Bostic’s not mentioning of
Latasha’s strikes. Soon Ja’s obviously vivid visual display of her blackened and swollen
eye perhaps weakened Bostic’s need to point specifically to Latasha’s strikes. He probably
thought that his description of “a business scuffle” begun by Soon Ja included the
punches.58 Although this omission could have been motivated by his interest in clarifying
who started the fight rather than establishing which combatant caused more harm, the
Korean-American community thought Latasha’s hitting constituted a crime regardless of
who started the fight and grabbed first. Obviously, Soon Ja caused more harm: she is alive,
and Latasha is dead. Bostic’s omission might not have been so important to the general
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American public, but it gave solid ground to the Korean-American community to view the
Du murder incident through the conspiracy and scapegoat theory.
Several articles in the Korea Times covered the conspiracy theme.

These articles

reported how defense attorney Lloyd interpreted the videotape and photographs of the
murder in the interviews given to the Korea Times. Based on Lloyd’s interpretations, the
Korea Times presented the discrepancies between the police reports in the press conference
and Lloyd’s interpretations.

In the first article of the Korea Times (Korean-language

daily) on May 17, 1991, under the headline, “What Is the Intention of Police’s One-sided
Interpretation?” it attempted to validate the scapegoat theory. According to Lloyd in this
article, the police, in order to convict Soon Ja on a first-degree murder charge, hid
Latasha’s strikes on Soon Ja and publicly lied that Soon Ja had shot a retreating Latasha in
the back, that Latasha was not stealing the orange juice, and that she did not try to take
money out of the cash register.

According to these alleged police lies, therefore, Soon Ja

shot Latasha without any reasonable cause: a Korean merchant killed an innocent girl who
tried to buy a bottle of orange juice.59 In other words, the police sacrificed Soon Ja,
falsifying facts in the incident to fabricate the charge.
Another May 17 Korea Tim es\Korean-language daily) article headlined, ‘“Evidence of
Self-Defense’: New Aspect of Du’s Alleged Murder,” summarized what Lloyd said during
his interview with the Korea Times 60 Another May 17 article stressed police lies.61
These May 17 articles validated to the Korean-American community what the Du family
said two months earlier in the Korea Times about the police news conference: “The
findings of police contained full o f fabrication and malice.”62 In another Korea Times
(Korean-language daily) article on May 17, 1991, with a headline ‘“Harlins Punched Du,”
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the paper reported Lloyd’s statement that the videotape supported the Du family’s claim
that Latasha had attempted robbery.63 Now, to readers of the Korea Times, it seemed to be
certain that the police were sacrificing Soon Ja to quell the anger of the African-American
community in the middle of the embarrassing Rodney King police brutality incident by
maliciously falsifying the truth about the Du incident,

t he scapegoat theory explained

their perceived unfair treatment from both the police and the mainstream newspapers.
These May 17 Korea Times articles also charged the Los Angeles Times with conspiring
with the police against Korean Americans. Many Korean Americans thought that the Los
Angeles Times unnecessarily sensationalized the Du murder incident as a typical example
of the black-Korean conflict. They blamed the Los Angeles Times for inflaming the
tension by portraying a Korean merchant negatively. Joseph Du, as well as many KoreanAmerican community leaders, some Korean members of the Black-Korean Alliance, and
even some Korean-American scholars were disappointed by the March 20 Los Angeles
Times article that ran with the headline, “Racial Tensions Blamed in Girl’s Death.”64
They thought that the article sensationalized the story by stirring sympathy toward Latasha
and the African-American community and generated a negative impression of Soon Ja and
the Korean-American community.
Edward Chang, in his article “African-American Boycotts of Korean-Owned Stores in
New York and Los Angles,” agrees with this perception.

Blaming the Los Angeles Times

for playing “agitator’s roles, far beyond that of simply printing facts objectively, as it
claims,” he asserts that although the Los Angeles Times articles in the Du murder incident
had been factually correct, they were distorted or exaggerated by selective reporting or
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leaving out critical information in the incident. He concludes that the Los Angeles Times
gave a biased coverage of the incident.65
Chang reviewed the first and the second articles of the incident in the Los Angeles
Times. He asserts that the articles, “Slain Girl Was Not Stealing Juice, Police Say” and “A
Senseless and Tragic Killing,” embodied a biased view toward Korean Americans. They
highlighted African-American customers’ complaints about Korean merchants’ rude and
disrespectful behaviors, portrayed the Korean merchant as “guilty” of murdering an
innocent girl, and gave a more sympathetic tone toward the African-American community
than toward Korean-American immigrants.66
Some Korean Americans blamed the African-American community’s nationalistic
rhetoric directed against their entrepreneurship for their own unfeeling attitudes toward
Latasha and her family. Bong Hwan Kim, director of the Korean Youth and Community
Center in Los Angeles, pointed out that many Korean Americans’ sympathy toward
Latasha had been thwarted by their frustration and anger at the African-American
community’s retaliation.67 In other words, some Koreans buried their sympathetic
feelings toward Latasha’s death or forgot their feelings in the response to the fear, anger,
and frustration they felt against her people’s charges against Korean Americans.
Nevertheless, Koreans made a conscious choice. Although the African-American
community’s rhetoric made it easier for the Korean-American community’s choice, the
African-American community was never the cause of their unfeeling response. This
circumvention reflected Korean Americans’ making a choice: self-interest.
Some Korean-American scholars disagree with the conspiracy charge against the
mainstream news media. Pyong Gap Min points out that although the media
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sensationalized the Du murder incident in the context of the black-Korean conflict, he
doubts that their motive had been to scapegoat Korean Americans to soothe the anger of the
African-American community. He sees the media’s dramatization motivated by profitorientation.68
Whether or not the media purposely plotted against Korean Americans with the police
and the district attorney’s office, their coverage of the Du murder incident appears to be
somewhat selective. Larry Aubry, a senior editor of the Los Angeles Sentinel and a
consultant with the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, points out that the
city’s crime rate between African Americans and Korean Americans amounts to “an
extremely small percentage of total crime in the inner-city.”69 Yet, the mainstream media
reported them in an exaggerated and sensationalized way, giving a false impression that the
violence between the two communities is the only crime in South Central. Reporting it
without any reference to other crimes in South Central distorts the reality.

7n

Although the Du incident was one of many crimes in South Central, it undoubtedly
sparked angry protests by many African Americans. After the incident, through numerous
radio and television talk shows, organized demonstrations, and press conferences, Danny
Bakewell, president of the Brotherhood Crusade, and other community activists made
verbal attacks on the Korean Americans’ exploitative business practices and disrespectful
behaviors. Their protests that started with about 150 African-American residents around
the Empire Liquor Market on March 21, 1991, expanded to buy back programs and
boycotts against Korean-American stores in their neighborhood.

71

The African

Americans’ retaliation escalated when Tae Sam Park, another Korean American liquor
store owner, shot Lee Arthur Mitchell, an African American customer, to death in South
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Central Los Angeles on June 4, 1991, two and half months after Soon Ja’s killing of
Latasha 72 The Du’s and Park’s stores were picketed, boycotted, vandalized, and set on
fire73 by these protesters, while the Korean-American community launched a support
campaign for the Park family. Over the course of 109 days, Park received $36,400 from
the Korean-American community.74
From the very beginning, the Du murder incident divided the two communities.
Spectators on both sides often filled the courtroom, occasionally exchanging harsh words.
*JC

Latasha’s supporters usually protested outside the courthouse, while Soon Ja’s supporters
filled the courtroom.

At one point, defense attorney Lloyd had to stop Korean Americans

from applauding,76 and Judge Karlin had to order the spectators not to shout or talk loud in
the courtroom.77
The division between the two communities became much deeper in their responses to
the verdict and sentencing, eventually leading to the 1992 Los Angeles riots. When Judge
Karlin threw out Du’s first-degree murder charge on October 3, 1991, most Korean
Americans interviewed by the Korea Central Daily were pleased by the decision.

7ft

When

the jury convicted Du on a voluntary manslaughter charge, many Korean Americans were
angry, and they participated in the Korean American Coalition (KAC)’s “letter-writing
campaign to Judge Karlin to request leniency for Soon Ja Du.”

7Q

A Korea Times (Korean-

language daily) article on November 13, 1991, estimated that KAC sent 1,028 letters to the
judge for Soon Ja. Furthermore, another Korea Times (Korean-language daily) article on
November 16, 1991, reported that Billy Du, Soon Ja’s husband, expressed his family’s
gratitude to the Korean-American community for sending about 2,400 letters, including
700 letters from South Korea, to Judge Karlin.80
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Despite the publicly-expressed acceptance of the verdict by some Korean-American
leaders, many thought that the verdict was “too harsh” because “a significant number
probably felt the shooting was justifiable self-defense.” This public expression appeared
to be congruent with the community’s internal feeling. Jerry Yu, executive director of the
Korean-American Coalition, alluded to their ambiguous stance when he said that Koreans
wanted justice in the Du incident because not all Koreans “offered unconditional support
for Du,” even though they sympathized with Soon Ja’s predicament.81
This ambiguous stance became much clearer when Judge Karlin placed Soon Ja on five
years’ probation. Even though they knew that Karlin’s light sentence could cause more
retaliatory reaction from the African-American community, many Korean Americans
welcomed her no-prison-time sentence for Soon Ja.82 Yumi Jhang Park, executive director
of the Korean American Grocers Association, expressed the Korean Americans’ sentiment
regarding the sentencing: ccMany merchants sympathized with Du’s plight and always
believed she was innocent.”83 Jerry Yu also expressed to the news media that he agreed
with Judge Karlin’s lenient sentencing.84 Judge Karlin also ordered Soon Ja to pay
Latasha’s funeral costs, but the Harlins refused to accept Soon Ja’s money—the $3,400
•

•

•

•

funeral cost was paid by a victim’s rights group and community organizations.

o<

Judge Karlin’s lenient sentencing angered the African-American community. Her
perceived leniency was interpreted as a double standard and as judicial racism often applied
to African Americans.86 They felt that “Du got judicial treatment as a white because she
killed a black” and that she would not have been given probation if she had killed a white.87
Some people even compared Soon Ja’s receiving a no-prison-time sentence with several
dog owners’ having six months or more jail sentence for killing or beating a dog.88
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Judge Karlin’s sentence further separated the two communities. The African-American
leaders launched a recall drive to remove Karlin from the bench while Korean-American
leaders embarked on sending her support letters,89 formed a group to back her in the 1992
election,90 and to raise money for Karlin’s re-election.91
Many scholars note Judge Karlin’s light sentence as one of the most important stimuli of
the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Although her sentencing did not actually trigger the 1992
riots, it played a major role in the destruction of Korean-owned businesses during the
riots.92 About five and half months after the sentencing, “the widespread anger,
frustration, and outrage”93 in the African-American community exploded on April 29,
1992, when the Simi Valley’s predominantly white jury acquitted the four white police
officers involved in the March 3, 1991, Rodney King beating incident. African
Americans’ outrage over Judge Karlin’s sentencing was expressed in the destruction of
Korean-American businesses.

The rioters burned down, looted, and destroyed

approximately 2,300 Korean-American owned stores. As a result, damages in both South
Central and Koreatown in Los Angeles were estimated at $350 million, forty-five percent
of the total riot damage.94 Korean-American attorney Angela Oh said, “The disposition of
the Latasha Harlins case was a major factor in the targeting o f Koreans. Even today if
people in South Central were asked to name one Korean, it would be Soon Ja Du.”95
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
Most Korean Americans saw the Du murder incident in the context of an economic
structural problem. Seeing it as a simple business dispute between a Korean-American
storeowner and an African-American customer, they attempted to explain the incident in
terms of economic conditions. Focusing on structural problems—unemployment, racism,
poverty, crime, gang activity, and Korean Americans’ employment disadvantages—they
concluded that the fundamental cause of the tension was the economic frustration of African
Americans. Hence, most Korean Americans believed that the cause was not the problem
with Korean Americans operating businesses in African-American neighborhoods. They
emphasized that Korean Americans were caught in the middle and should not be blamed for
the conflict.1
In analyzing the nature of Black-Korean conflict, scholars, journalists, writers, and
some community activists pointed out two related groups of factors that had often
generated conflict: structural factors and socio-psychological factors.

The structural

factors included African Americans’ economic frustration, Korean-Americans’
disadvantage in the U.S. labor market, and their “middleman” economic role. The sociopsychological factors consisted of language barriers, cultural differences, and mutual
prejudice. They seemed to agree that the influencing causes are related, although they
differ in their emphasis on one or the other factor.
Pyong Gap Min in Caught in the Middle-. Korean Merchants in America's Multiethnic
Cities explains that when playing the middleman economic role, ‘Koreans bear the brunt
of Blacks’ economic frustrations.”2 Min argues that Korean merchants’ middleman role
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between big corporations and inner-city customers—distributing the corporate products
to inner-city consumers—and their language barrier and weak political power often
invited a situation where they became an easy target for African Americans’ scapegoating
for their economic and social frustration.3

Min, however, points out that the structural

factor does not explain the causes of the conflict on the individual level, nor does the
socio-psychological factor make clear its causes on the collective level. Based on the
fact that Korean merchants’ accusations of African-American customers’ shoplifting
often triggered the conflicts on the individual level, Min asserts that the sociopsychological factor played a much more determinant role in the Black-Korean conflict
than the structural factor.4 Although Min sees that the structural problem has little to do
with what actually happens between the merchants and the customers on the individual
level, he maintains that it is nevertheless the fundamental base for supplying an
environment prone to conflict, making the socio-psychological factor a frequent driving
force.5
Asserting that Koreans’ prejudiced behavior often actuates the conflict on the individual
level, Min sees two causes for Koreans’ prejudiced behavior that is rooted in the Korean
Americans’ sense of superiority over African Americans. They are the Koreans’
monocultural ethnic background and Korean Americans’ ideological beliefs in American
opportunities. According to Min, these twp causes seem to contribute far more than any
other causes of the prejudice such as language difficulties, cultural differences, unfamiliarity
with African-American history, class differences, and the pre-immigration exposure to U.S.
racism. While Koreans’ inexperience with living in a multiethnic society generates
difficulty for them to cope with the different values and customs, Korean Americans’
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ideological beliefs in the American dream for those who work hard inclined them to look
down on African-American poor. Implying a class-based prejudice among Korean
Americans, Min argues that many college-educated Korean-American merchants believe
that African Americans’ own cultural deficiencies—irrational consumer behavior, too many
children, non-traditional family structure, and a high divorce rate—cause African-American
poverty.6
Similarly, in “Korean Merchants in the Black Community: Prejudice among the Victims
of Prejudice,” Moon H. Jo stresses Korean Americans’ prejudiced attitudes as the main
cause of Black-Korean conflict.

In contrast to Min’s view on the origins of Koreans’

prejudiced behavior, however, Jo accents Koreans’ status anxiety.

Based on interviews

with Philadelphia African-American community leaders and Korean-American merchants
and data from secondary sources, he concludes that the conflict originated in Koreans’ status
anxiety. Jo argues that although cultural misunderstandings, communication problems,
economic competition, and structural changes could explain the conflict, its source is
actually Koreans’ historically contemptuous attitudes toward dark-complexioned people and
Koreans’ insecurity in their own ability to regain the status they held in Korea. Observing
their unemployed customers’ spending habits and work ethics, which are far different from
their own, not only reinforces their stereotype of blacks being “lazy and dumb,” but also
scares them with the possibility of becoming like one of them by failing. Many Koreans, Jo
says, see this as a warning sign, and they avoid any close association with African
Americans. On the other hand, African Americans interpret Korean Americans’ desire to
disassociate from them to gain economic success and the white-status at all costs as
arrogant, discourteous, and insensitive, causing the clash.

n
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Another scholar, Sumi K. Cho, sees Koreans’ prejudice against African Americans as a
class-based clash between two unequal classes. In “Korean Americans vs. African
Americans: Conflict and Construction,” she explains that this conflict becomes critical when
college-educated middle-class people in two-parent families compare themselves with
unemployed and uneducated lower class people in single family settings.8
Some scholars like Kyeyoung Park, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the
University of California, and Edward Chang emphasize the pervasive influence of white
racism in the mass media in the Black-Korean conflict. Park and Chang argue that the root
cause of Koreans’ prejudiced attitudes comes from white-American racism against African
Americans. Pointing out the pervasive American cultural influence in South Korea
through the continuous American military presence, along with economic and political
dominance in South Korea since the Korean War, they argue that Koreans learned the value
of white skin—“the lighter one’s skin, the better one is treated”—before they immigrated to
the United States. This learned racial attitude became further strengthened by their daily
observation of unemployed customers in predominantly African-American neighborhoods.9
Larry Aubry also points out that violent crimes related to Black-Korean conflict make
up a very small percentage of the total crime in South Central Los Angeles. Yet the media
often report the incidents, but neglect to put them in perspective. Aubry argues that not
mentioning other crimes in the area distorts reality and often heightens the tension
unnecessarily. The media’s exaggerated urgency and frequency not only stirs a potentially
explosive situation, but also facilitates formation of prejudiced attitudes.10
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ItabariNjeri in Last Plantation. Color, Conflict, and Identity. Reflections o f a New
World Black emphasizes the psychological aspect—rigidity of thinking, low self-esteem,
compensatory behavior—that exacerbates the structural problem in the conflict. Njeri
argues that Soon Ja’s feeling of inferiority and dehumanization steered her irrational
behavior to kill Latasha. Recognizing that both Korean Americans and African Americans
share a history of oppressed experience—the Japanese occupation, American slavery—and
day to day racism,11 she believes both Soon Ja and Latasha “became too quick to defend
themselves when they perceived their humanity being violated, acting on ‘internalized
oppression. ”’12
Notably, Koreans’ prejudiced attitude against African Americans has been observed in
Koreans’ rude behaviors. In many instances, this disrespectful behavior is exhibited in
reluctant smiling, dropping change on the counter to avoid any physical contact, avoiding
direct eye contact and answering any questions, yelling, and presumptuously treating all
blacks as shoplifters. Consequently, these behaviors have naturally brought forth
resentment and attracted many criticisms from the African-American community.
Incidentally, these behaviors resembled Chinese merchants’ behaviors in Mississippi in the
nineteenth century. James W. Loewen in The Mississippi Chinese: Between Black and
White depicts the nineteenth century Chinese merchants’ unreflective exhibition of rude
racism to their African-American customers— “change was slapped down on the counter,
rather than placed in customers’ hands, and discussions of prices were usually curt and
unpleasant.”13
In response to many criticisms on Korean-American merchants’ rude behavior, many
Korean Americans tried to defend the merchants’ rude behavior by their Confiician cultural
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heritage, language difficulty, and their African-American customers’ shoplifting attempts.
In examining the rudeness, some scholars explained the reason with cultural difference and
language problem while others disagreed with this explanation. Some questioned its
validity. Poor English and cultural difference were not enough reason for their demeaning
behavior, and many Korean Americans knew that they would not treat their white
customers rudely in a middle-class white neighborhood. David H. Kim, the president of
the Korean American Grocers Association in Los Angeles, in an interview with K. W. Lee,
chief editor of Korea Times (English-language weekly), stated that “English does not really
matter. If you speak English and you run a store in a white neighborhood, and you throw
customer’s change on the table, the people would not come to that store anymore.”14 The
September 15, 1991, Korea Times (English-language weekly) article also described how
many Korean-American merchants treated their African-American customers
disrespectfully.

It said, “when someone asks them a question they don’t understand,

instead of politely asking them to repeat it, they either don’t respond and wave their hands
disgustedly, or squint their faces and say ‘What?’”15

Sumi K. Cho argues that the

disrespectful behavior stems from neither a language problem nor cultural differences, but
from prevalent Korean-American’s stereotypical views of African Americans. She asserts
that too many Korean merchants perceive African Americans as lazy and unintelligent
complaining criminals to explain their rude behavior as only due to cultural difference and
language problems.16
Some Korean Americans attempted to defend Korean-American merchants’ lack of
smiles with the Confucian culture and the complete exhaustion from overwork. According
to their explanation, the Confucian culture reserves a smile for only family members and

172

friends. Working long hours leaves merchants too tired to smile at their customers.
Kyeyoung Park does not agree with this explanation. Park argues that since most new
immigrants came from Seoul with a college degree and professional and managerial
background, this explanation does not apply to them. He adds that merchants who lack
smiles in ghettos will most certainly smile in a middle class white neighborhood.17
Regardless of the explanations, Korean-American merchants’ rude behaviors bespeak
their feeling of dislike and their moral judgment of contempt.

They treat African-

American customers rudely because they believe that their customers steal, are uneducated,
lazy, and dirty, and drink a lot. In other words, they treat them badly because KoreanAmerican merchants think that African Americans deserve to be treated badly. As a result,
Korean Americans’ prejudiced disrespectful attitudes manifest in rude behaviors. The
Confucian culture and overwork may contribute, but they are not a real source of this
behavioral problem.
Even though Korean-American merchants use their African-American customers’
stealing as a justification for their prejudices, shoplifting occurs in all businesses, all
classes, and all ethnic groups. Some African Americans as well as Korean Americans,
European Americans, and other ethnic groups have cheated and stolen items in stores and,
in many instances, the cost of shoplifting is passed on to customers. In other words,
African Americans are not the only ones who would resort to shoplifting and stealing to
survive. Poverty necessitates stealing because it is a means to survive. Many KoreanAmericans’ ancestors and relatives survived hunger and poverty by stealing and pick
pocketing. Also, many Korean-American merchants defend their high prices for poor
quality items based on adding cost of shoplifting in the price. In turn, many African-
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American customers argue that Korean-American merchants cheat them by overcharging
and stocking cheap merchandise to increase their profit margin because they buy it cheap
and sell it high, maximizing on the poor residents’ inability to shop around.

Shoplifting

therefore can be seen by some African Americans as a means to equalize the playing field.
Not all residents in the area steal, are uneducated and low-class, and drink a lot. Many
of them are working-class Christians. Justifying rude and disrespectful treatment of all
African Americans because of a Korean merchant’s inability to recognize who is and who
is not a shoplifter is not only immoral but also irrational.
A few scholars argue that Korean-American prejudice originated from Korean’s
historical tendency to “look down on people with dark skin.”18 However, I argued in this
thesis that Koreans’ negative attitudes toward people with dark complexions appears to be
more influenced by Western racism. Historically, it seems that Koreans paid more
attention to status and less attention to color. Since the Korean War, however, this
tendency has become more complicated because the color line was directly tied to the value
of money and status. Koreans learned the value of white skin—“the lighter one’s skin, the
better one is treated.”19
This association of one’s skin color with one’s status brought a tragedy. Koreans’
historic “idiosyncratic” obsession with status and class gave Korean-American merchants a
false impression that they had a limitless opportunity to obtain their status if they worked
hard enough. In their attempt to obtain white privileges and status, they had a one-track
mind; they did not allow themselves to know that openly expressing their contempt toward
African Americans because of their complexion constituted not only an exhibition of their
ignorance, but also a moral wrong.
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Ironically, Korean-Americans’ blind desire to possess white status deepened their
ignorance in race relations and hindered them from attaining white status in America. It
isolates many Korean Americans from mainstream America, further reinforcing their
ignorance. Korean Americans’ desire to disassociate with African Americans to gain
white privileges at all costs,20 their inexperience in multicultural settings, cultural
differences, and the language problem intensified their ignorance. What is more
problematic was their narrow interpretation of the American dream. Assuming that
everyone has equal opportunity to achieve the individual’s dream by simply working hard,
they overtired themselves, often working seven days a week and 12-14 hours a day that left
them with no time for reflection. This time constraint keeps them from recognizing the
unethical nature of their prejudice. Many Korean Americans are unaware not only of what
they are doing, but also that what they are doing is wrong.

Furthermore, the deliberate

avoidance of contact with African Americans perpetuated their ignorance because many
Korean Americans do not meet highly educated middle-class African Americans. This
actually is a disadvantage, but many are not even aware of the fact.

In this respect, any

improvement in Korean American race relations requires Korean Americans be educated
and reflect on their own racial thoughts.

Unfortunately, this awareness did not come in

time for Latasha.
Both individually and collectively, the Du murder incident was a tragedy. Individually,
the tragedy ended Latasha’s life and inflicted pain and suffering on Latasha’s family.
Soon Ja also lost her dignity and caused pain and suffering to her own family. At the heart
of this case were Soon Ja’s tragic impulses arising out of racism. Her monocultural ethnic
pride, status obsession, ignorance, exhaustion from overwork, and fear affected Soon Ja’s
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ability to think before destroying Latasha’s life. Her self-interest, Korean tradition, and
racism dominated Soon Ja’s horrifying actions, while Latasha’s street tradition, selfpreservation, and self-respect in response to Soon Ja’s dehumanizing racism determined
Latasha’s assertive behaviors.

Latasha, a fifteen-year-old teenager, showed rational

thinking when she picked up the orange juice bottle from the floor, gave it to Soon Ja, and
turned away from the fight. But Soon Ja, a fifty-one-year-old mother, lost control of
herself, shot Latasha to death, and lied to people to avoid going to prison. Both, in their
struggle, lost their humanity.
Collectively—for society as a whole—this case represented hopelessness.
Society reinforced Soon Ja’s rationalization of taking Latasha’s life through racial
prejudice, and allowed her to practice racism against African Americans. In essence
society gave more privileges to its members who are almost white. In Soon Ja’s store, in
court, and in the Korean community, Soon Ja’s lies prevailed. Judge Joyce Karlin
sympathized with Soon Ja’s predicament and the Korean-American community defended
Soon Ja’s criminal act because it is what everyone is allowed to practice—racism against
African Americans, particularly young African Americans. Under this rule, Latasha’s
young life disappeared through the fissures of the societal structures. Shamefully and
erroneously, many Korean Americans still think Latasha was a thief who stole an orange
juice and demanded money from Soon Ja.
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